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ABSTRACT
Hydropower is arguably the most important and widely used renewable energy source in
the world. Deregulation has led to the use of auction-based markets while a growing desire
for efficient and renewable energy sources has rekindled modeling efforts in the energy sector.
Producers that can impact prices with their production quantities are termed price makers,
whereas producers that have no influence on prices are termed price takers. We ask: What
is the revenue-maximizing production schedule for both single and multiple price-maker
hydroelectric producers in a deregulated, bid-based market?
We begin by reviewing the problem in which producers submit bids to the day-ahead
market, the bidding problem. Following the review, we model the problem over multiple
stages for (i) a single price maker assuming deterministic inflows, (ii) a single price maker
assuming stochastic inflows, and, finally, (iii) multiple price makers assuming deterministic
inflows. Decomposition algorithms, like Benders decomposition and stochastic dual dynamic
programming, are commonly used to solve multi-stage problems like ours. In all the above
cases, our methodology aims to extend the stochastic dual dynamic programming algorithm.
The market interaction between producers creates a revenue function with jump discon-
tinuities. Because of the discontinuities, we use mixed-integer linear programming to model
the revenue, thus precluding us from solving the problem with either of the aforementioned
algorithms. To overcome this difficulty, we pair Lagrangian relaxation with either Benders
decomposition or stochastic dual dynamic programming, in the deterministic and stochastic
cases. In addition to often yielding better bounds and solutions, we prove our method never
yields worse bounds. For multiple price-maker producers, we consider each price maker’s
bidding decision in a non-cooperative Nash-Cournot game, in which we seek a Nash equi-
librium for all of the price-maker producers’ bids in every stage. Unlike current approaches,
when one exists, our method returns an equilibrium that is preferred by all price makers.
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...a man of knowledge enhances his might...[1]
The twentieth century development of the hydraulic reaction turbine, or the Kaplan turbine,
led to modern-day hydroelectric power [2]. Hydropower is the most important and widely
used renewable source of energy, providing 19% of total electricity production worldwide
[3]. China is the largest producer of hydroelectricity, followed by Canada, Brazil, and the
United States [4]. For a variety of reasons, experts believe that both the supply of and
demand for renewable energies will increase. The first and possibly most important reason
for this is that energy production from renewable sources is becoming more affordable [3].
As such, since 2004, worldwide renewable energy capacity has grown at annual rates of 10%
to 60% [5]. Another major factor that explains the increase in supply is improvements in
technology. In fact, according to the International Solar Energy Society, renewable energy
technologies will continue to improve, and, as they stand now, they are sufficiently advanced
to allow for drastic increases in their implementation [6]. The last reason the demand for
renewable energies will continue to grow, and one that cannot be underestimated, is our
growing concern for the environment.
The economics of exhaustible resources has been studied for centuries. In large part,
this area of economics seeks to determine how to optimally consume a fixed-stock resource
over time. Consumption, in this case, refers to production, generation, or extraction. In
this sense, the optimal consumption schedule may maximize revenue or profit, minimize
costs, or minimize some negative effect resulting from consuming the good. Deregulation in
energy markets and a growing focus on efficient and renewable energy sources motivate this
research. We ask: What is the revenue-maximizing production schedule for both single and
multiple price-maker hydroelectric producers in a deregulated, bid-based market? Though
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hydroelectricity is a renewable resource, we study this problem over a fixed time horizon and
thus, the available water supply can be considered a fixed-stock resource.
Society first became concerned with resource scarcity in the late eighteenth century,
when the pessimistic views of Malthus, Ricardo, and other economists led many to refer to
economics as the dismal science. Malthus believed that as the population grew, it would
consume all of the available resources and future generations would be left with nothing.
Ricardo was the first to study the economics of renewable resources [7]. In the 1800’s, he
analyzed the relationship between the demand for agricultural goods and agricultural land
of differing quality. The highest quality land is the cheapest to farm while the lowest quality
land is the most costly. When lower quality land is farmed, food prices must increase to cover
the higher costs, and the surplus earned on higher quality land is referred to as economic,
or Ricardian, rent. In 1848, economist John Stuart Mills debunks the pessimistic views
of Malthus and Ricardo by suggesting that decreasing living standards caused by resource
scarcity could be completely countered by advances in technology [7]. Thankfully, recent
evidence supports Mills’ views more so than those of Malthus and Ricardo.
Another early economist that studied resource scarcity is Hotelling. Hotelling [8] presents
the seminal work that models the economics of exhaustible resources and defines a different
form of rent. With exhaustible resources, each unit produced today leaves one fewer unit for
future production. Hotelling refers to this rent as user costs. Producers that use exhaustible
resources must consider both the cost of producing another unit and the opportunity costs
or user costs associated with lost future profit. Since user costs are the present value of lost
future profits, they can be used to determine the value of an additional unit of a mineral
resource left in the ground or an additional unit of water left in a reservoir. Hotelling’s
theory is widely used in economic modeling and has underpinned many economic theories
over the past eighty years.
Our growing reliance on renewable energy sources in general, and on hydropower in
particular, demands we develop more efficient ways to model its use. In practice, energy
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producers utilize mathematical models to make more informed operational decisions. Mod-
els in regulated environments are cost minimization models in which a centralized agent
meets demand at minimal cost [9]; these are not considered in this work. Many energy
markets have shifted from regulation to competition and this has led to the development of
competitive market models that are tailored to the power sector [9]. For example, beginning
in the early 1990’s, the United States government’s involvement in the electricity industry
began to diminish [10]. In 1996, in an effort to increase competition, the Federal Energy
Reserve Commission (FERC) issued an order to restructure US wholesale electricity markets
[11]. Competitive electricity market models soon followed. When modeling energy produc-
ers, practitioners must determine if the producers have the ability to alter prices. Energy
producers that have no influence on prices are termed price takers, whereas producers that
have the ability to impact prices with their production quantities are termed price makers.
After deregulation, models for price-taker producers in competitive environments replaced
centralized cost minimization models. More recently, models for price-maker producers have
emerged in the literature.
With deregulation came the introduction of auctions to the power sector. Typically,
electricity markets use procurement auctions in which an independent system operator (util-
ity company) seeks the lowest possible prices for the energy to be sold by the generation
companies (bidders). Maurer and Barroso [10] describe an auction by three rules regarding
bidding, clearing, and pricing. The day-ahead electricity market is a bid-based market that
serves as an excellent example of a procurement auction. We assume the price-maker hydro
producers compete in a day-ahead electricity market in which market-clearing prices and
quantities are derived in the following manner: (i) producers submit price and/or quantity
bids for the following day (in hourly increments); (ii) the market operator (utility company)
adjusts the market-clearing price, while minimizing costs, until the total energy dispatched is
equal to the total demand; (iii) energy producers are paid for the amount of energy they dis-
patch, according to the market-clearing price. Kwon and Frances [9] note that a significant
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amount of power is allocated through day-ahead markets, and that the number of day-ahead
electricity markets is increasing in deregulated environments. In the United States, most
electricity is traded either through day-ahead markets or through contracts [12].
To maximize revenue, price-maker producers seek to determine an optimal bid while
considering its impact on the price. For clarity, the problem in which price takers submit
bids to the day-ahead market is termed the bidding problem [13] and the same problem
for price makers is termed the strategic bidding problem. In this paradigm, hydro-based
generation companies seek to develop bidding strategies that maximize their revenue. In
doing so, they optimally schedule their energy production and storage over the given time
horizon.
Our literature review identifies areas in which the bidding problem is lacking and finds
that very few researchers study the problem for price-maker hydroelectric producers. Those
that do tend to study the problem over the short term, because of the difficulty associated
with modeling non-convex, dynamic problems that possess uncertainty. More specifically,
the literature lacks a method that determines a coherent hydroelectric operations policy,
modeling terms lasting at least one year, in a strategic bidding framework. This research
fills this void.
Hydroelectric producers are different from all other energy producers because of their
cost-free ability to store energy (water). Because of storage, hydroelectric producers must
consider the impact of selling water (energy) today versus selling it in the future. The
impact associated with the use of water today, also referred to as opportunity cost, creates a
time-coupling relationship between the present period and all future periods. Consequently,
the price-maker hydroelectric producer’s optimal production schedule must consider the
impacts of today’s water use on future revenue over a one- to five-year term. Over this
duration, which is considered the medium term, hydroelectric producers experience large
variations in reservoir inflows, due mainly to varying amounts of rainfall. Since reservoir
inflows significantly impact the price-maker hydroelectric producer’s bidding decisions, one
4





















Figure 1.1: Hydroelectric producer modeling over time
Figure 1.1 depicts how the development of hydroelectric producer modeling has advanced
over the years. Dynamic Programming (DP) schemes are attractive in hydroelectric model-
ing, because they provide a scheme through which the overall time-coupled problem can be
solved by separating and solving a subproblem for each period. For a given period, DP al-
gorithms recursively compute the maximum possible revenue in all future periods via Future
Revenue Functions (FRFs) and pre-defined discrete values for the state variables. Stochastic
Dynamic Programming (SDP) has traditionally been used to solve multi-stage, stochastic
hydro-scheduling problems. Because the state space grows exponentially, DP and SDP are
limited to applications with only a few hydro plants and/or short time horizons. These
are referred to as a curses of dimensionality. As an alternative, one can use a decomposi-
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tion algorithm, like Benders decomposition [14] or Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming
(SDDP), to dynamically approximate FRFs.
When explicitly modeling the inflows, researchers typically utilize a stochastic variant
of Benders decomposition. One such variant is the SDDP algorithm, which was introduced
by Pereira and Pinto [15] to counter the curses of dimensionality that inhibit SDP. SDDP
solves multi-stage problems by decomposing them into multiple single-stage subproblems and
approximating the future-stage elements of the objective function [16]. Since its introduction,
SDDP has been established as the predominant method in hydro-thermal scheduling because
of its ability to model large systems, over one to ten+ years (i.e., medium to long term).
However, the algorithm can only be applied to problems with convex or concave objective
functions, for a minimization or maximization problem.
Once deregulation in energy markets rendered previous methods obsolete, practitioners
adapted by modifying existing methods or creating new methods to model hydro producers.
An example of this adaptation is the hybrid SDP/SDDP method of Gjelsvik et al. [17],
which models mid-term scheduling problems for price-taker hydro producers rather than the
bidding problem or price-maker producers. The use of auctions in electricity markets led to
bidding strategy analyses and the development of SDDP extensions.
Because of its ability to model large hydro systems over longer time horizons, many
practitioners extend the SDDP methodology so that it can be applied to many different
applications. We extend the SDDP methodology by mitigating its greatest limitation: its
inability to model non-convex minimization or non-concave maximization problems. This
limitation poses significant challenges when modeling many important real-world situations.
To model hydro producers, SDDP requires concave FRFs; our price-maker producers have
piecewise linear and non-concave FRFs that require Integer Programming (IP) or Mixed-
Integer Linear Programming (MILP) formulations. Consequently, practitioners that use
SDDP in this context typically resort to either solving LP relaxations of the original IP
or applying concave overestimators and then solving. These approaches guarantee the con-
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cavity of the objective function by making each period’s revenue function concave. This
static overestimation, however, typically yields larger cumulative errors than a progressive
estimation process, i.e., a dynamic overestimation.
This dissertation presents an innovative dynamic overestimation that overcomes the con-
cavity limitation and enables the use of Benders decomposition (assuming deterministic
inflows) or SDDP (assuming stochastic inflows) for the bidding problem. Through enabling
the use of SDDP, we provide a method that determines a coherent hydroelectric operations
policy for terms lasting at least one year, in a strategic bidding framework. This inno-
vative approach optimizes a price-maker hydroelectric producer’s water consumption over
long planning horizons, which both increases the producer’s revenue and better prepares the
producer for unforeseen droughts and wet spells.
We are able to dynamically overestimate the revenue by using Lagrangian relaxation to
dualize the water balance constraints that link periods together in the given time horizon.
Instead of overestimating the revenue function in each period, we use an exact representa-
tion of the immediate revenue function and overestimate only the FRF. Furthermore, for any
given period, the objective function that results from dualizing the water balance constraints
is concave and can be approximated using Benders optimality cuts. We utilize Lagrangian re-
laxation and either Benders decomposition or SDDP to model and solve the bidding problem
for hydroelectric producers over the medium term. Combining Lagrangian relaxation and
Benders decomposition or SDDP is not new to hydro-thermal scheduling problems; however,
its application to the bidding problem is.
As a critical by-product, this dissertation proposes an original algorithm for finding a
revenue-maximizing set of bids for multiple price-maker hydro producers, facing the day-
ahead electricity market. In every time period, each price maker’s bidding decision is a
move in a non-cooperative Nash-Cournot game. In this context, a Nash equilibrium is
defined as a set of bids such that, given all other price-maker producers’ bids, no price-
maker producer can improve (increase) their revenue by changing their bid. In every game,
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we seek a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, in which the strategy space in stage t depends
on the decisions made in stage t − 1. In other words, each player’s strategies, in every
stage, are Markovian. To find an equilibrium, we create interpolations for each price maker’s
best response function using MILP formulations. If multiple Nash equilibria exist, we use a
tailored bargaining algorithm to determine a unique equilibrium. Unlike current approaches,
our method guarantees a Pareto-optimal equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium that is preferred by
all players, when one exists. Because the players’ strategies are Markovian, the solution over
the entire time horizon defines a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). We utilize a backwards
DP algorithm to solve for an MPE.
1.1 Contributions of This Work
This work contributes to the body of knowledge through
• identifying major contributions in the strategic bidding problem for hydro producer’s
evolution and illuminating a path for future efforts (Chapter 2);
• introducing a nested Benders decomposition method that utilizes dynamic convexifi-
cation and solves the bidding problem, over the medium term, for a single price-maker
hydroelectric producer in a deterministic environment, and providing an in-depth anal-
ysis of the proposed method (Chapter 3);
• presenting an extension of the stochastic dual dynamic programming algorithm that
solves the bidding problem, over the medium term, for a single price-maker hydroelec-
tric producer incorporating stochastic reservoir inflows (Chapter 4); and
• proposing a dynamic programming methodology that incorporates a tailored bargain-
ing approach and determines a revenue-maximizing hydro operations policy for multiple
price-maker producers, in a strategic bidding framework (Chapter 5).
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1.2 Overview
Though each chapter in this dissertation is a stand-alone article that has been or will be
submitted to a peer-reviewed journal, together the chapters build on each other and form a
thorough analysis of the strategic bidding problem for hydroelectric producers.
Chapter 2 presents work found in the literature that is related to the bidding problem.
In this chapter, we identify the approaches and methodologies that have been used to model
the bidding problem for hydroelectric producers. We present the problem’s developments
over time and, through reviewing different variants of the problem, progressively build to
the case in which the agent is a price-maker hydroelectric producer. In each variant of the
bidding problem, we examine how the solution approaches may or may not be applicable
to other variants. Lastly, for the price-maker hydroelectric producer’s bidding problem, we
recognize the most recent developments and illuminate a path for future efforts.
Chapter 3 introduces our model for one price-maker hydro producer. In this chapter, we
determine the revenue-maximizing production schedule for a single price-maker hydroelectric
producer in a deregulated, bid-based market. Because of the market interaction between the
price-maker and price-taker producers, the FRF has a sawtooth shape and contains jump
discontinuities. Consequently, we create a piecewise-linear, exact representation of the FRF
and model it using MILP. This prohibits us from solving the problem using Benders decom-
position alone, which requires a concave objective function (for a maximization problem).
To overcome this difficulty, we model the price-maker’s bidding decision via a combination
of Benders decomposition and Lagrangian relaxation, through dualizing the state variable
(water balance) constraints. Besides proving that our method yields better bounds and so-
lutions than existing methods in many cases, we also show that our method never yields
worse bounds. We demonstrate the utility of our algorithm through an illustrative example
and three case studies in which we model the electricity markets in El Salvador, Honduras,
and Nicaragua.
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In Chapter 4, we again present a model for a single price-maker hydro producer, but this
time we consider uncertainty in reservoir inflows. The approach mirrors the one presented
in Chapter 3; however, we replace Benders decomposition with SDDP. We model inflow
uncertainty by generating and incorporating scenarios, based on historical data. To resolve
the stagewise dependency between bidding decisions, we utilize a DP algorithm. Lastly, we
demonstrate our approaches’ utility by modeling Honduras’ electricity market assuming that
the thermal producers act as price takers and that one price-maker hydro producer operates
all of the hydroelectric plants.
In Chapter 5, we identify the revenue-maximizing production schedule for multiple price-
maker hydroelectric producers competing in a deregulated, bid-based market. We assume
the electricity market consists of both price-taker thermal producers and price-maker hydro
producers and for the same reasons stated above, we model the FRFs using MILP. Each
price maker’s bidding decision, in each stage, is a move in a non-cooperative Nash-Cournot
game. Our algorithm finds a Nash equilibrium in every stage of the problem and, when one
exists, finds a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. The long-term goal of this work is to extend the
methodology so that it can also be used in conjunction with SDDP. Last, our final chapter
summarizes our findings and lists areas for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGIES FOR HYDRO-ELECTRIC PRODUCERS: A
LITERATURE SURVEY
Modified from a paper to be published in
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Gregory Steeger 1 2, Luiz Augusto Barroso 3, and Steffen Rebennack 4 5
2.1 Abstract
In a competitive environment with bid-based markets, power generation companies de-
sire to develop bidding strategies that maximize their revenue. In this paper, we ask: What
approaches and methodologies have been used to model the bidding problem for hydroelec-
tric producers? We present the problem’s developments over time and, through reviewing
different variants of the problem, progressively build to the case in which the agent is a
price-maker hydroelectric producer. In each variant of the bidding problem, we examine
how the approaches used to solve it may or may not be applicable to other variants. Last,
for the price-maker hydroelectric producer’s bidding problem, we recognize the most recent
developments and illuminate a path for future efforts.
2.2 Introduction
Deregulation has led to the development of bid-based markets that are tailored to the
power sector [10, 11]. One such market is the day-ahead electricity market [9]. In the
day-ahead electricity market, energy producers seek bidding strategies that maximize their
revenue. Energy producers that have the ability to impact prices with their bids are termed
1Primary researcher and author
2Graduate student, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
3Power Systems Research Inc., Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
4Author for correspondence
5Assistant professor, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
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price makers. Alternatively, energy producers that have no influence on prices are termed
price takers. To maximize revenue, price-maker producers seek to determine an optimal bid
while considering its impact on the price. For clarity, the problem in which price takers
submit bids to the day-ahead market is termed the bidding problem [13], whereas the same
problem for price makers is termed the strategic bidding problem.
A literature survey on the bidding problem is incomplete without a discussion on the
energy producer’s scheduling problem. Whereas the bidding problem seeks an optimal set of
bids, the scheduling problem seeks an optimal production schedule. In contrast to the bidding
problem, in which bids are realized the following day, practitioners solve the scheduling
problem over much longer time horizons in small steps (e.g., days to months). The optimal
decisions from the scheduling problem are used as target points, in short-term models, to
determine the day-ahead bids (in a wholesale energy market). Producers base their bids off
their marginal costs, which, for hydro producers, are unknown. Solving the hydro producer’s
scheduling problem aids in their bidding decision because its solution yields a proxy for
the company’s marginal operating cost. Because the bidding and scheduling problems are
intimately connected, in this chapter, we survey literature on both problems and references
to the bidding problem may allude to either problem.
In the present review, we draw attention to different variants of the bidding problem.
Our main focus is price-maker hydroelectric producer models, but we review other models
to build the necessary framework. From this point forward, hydroelectric producers are
simply referred to as hydro producers. A key characteristic that differentiates electricity
markets from other commodity markets is the inability for producers to economically store
energy. The only significant exception to this rule is the energy (water) used by hydro
producers. Storage allows hydro producers to transfer energy (water) between periods when
economically viable.
The bidding problem has been studied by many researchers, for a wide variety of mar-
ket players. Researchers utilize many different modeling approaches and represent system
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components in varying levels of detail. Most focus on thermal and neglect hydro producers.
An overwhelming majority of those that study the problem for hydro producers only do so
over time horizons lasting less than one year and few model the uncertainty in reservoir
inflows. The lack of literature on the bidding problem for hydro producers that determines a
medium-term hydro operations policy in hydro systems with significant storage (i.e., systems
in Austria, Canada, Colombia, New Zealand, and Norway) motivates this effort.
Table 2.1: Bidding problem surveys
Reference Focus
[18], 2001 Mathematical programming issues (short to medium term)
[19], 2004 Generation scheduling in various markets
[20], 2005 Optimization, equilibrium, and simulation models
[21], 2006 Uncertainty in competitors’ bids
[22], 2008 Hydropower operations with price uncertainty
[23], 2010 Optimal bidding and stochastic programming models
[24], 2011 Comprehensive review of modeling methods since 2000
[9], 2012 Bidding with unit commitment
Though the literature already contains surveys on the bidding problem (Table 2.1), this
survey is unique in two main aspects.
• First, while focusing on the strategic bidding problem for hydro producers, we list
several major contributions in the problem’s evolution in a clear and concise manner.
• Second, we present the most recent developments on the strategic bidding problem for
hydro producers, outline the work that remains to be done, and discuss the challenges
that must be overcome.
We begin, in Section 2.3, by providing an overview of the bidding problem. Section 2.4
presents some notable work in price-taker thermal producer modeling. Next, Section 2.5
surveys several price-maker thermal producer models. Following this, Section 2.6 documents
work in modeling price-taker hydro producers and Section 2.7 outlines work in modeling
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price-maker hydro producers. Last, we present summarizing remarks and suggestions for
future research in Section 2.8.
2.3 Bidding Problem Overview
We begin by discussing several of the bidding problem’s characteristics. The overview
includes the day-ahead electricity market, differences between price-taker and price-maker
models, storage capabilities of hydro producers, and last, different approaches to different
variants of the bidding problem.
2.3.1 Day-Ahead Electricity Market
A significant amount of power is allocated through day-ahead markets [25]. In the United
States, most electricity is traded either through day-ahead markets or through bilateral for-
ward contracts [12]. Day-ahead electricity markets can be described by three rules: bidding,
clearing, and pricing [10], which are manifested in the following manner:
(1.) bidding - producers submit price and/or quantity bids for the following day (in
hourly increments);
(2.) clearing - the market operator (utility company) adjusts the market-clearing price,
while minimizing costs, until the energy dispatched equals demand;
(3.) pricing - producers are paid for the amount of energy they dispatch, according to
the market-clearing price.
In step (2.), the market operator meets demand at minimum cost and, in doing so,
determines the amount of energy that each producer generates. The market operator solves
what is termed the market-clearing or economic dispatch model. In solving this model, the
set of producers that supplies some nonzero amount of energy to meet demand is referred
to as the market-clearing dispatch. For now, we assume that all producers are price takers.
We define the following indices, sets, parameters, and decision variables:
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Indices and Sets:
j = 1, . . . , J index for all producers considered in the system
Parameters:
Λj price bids for producer j, assumed to be known [$/MW]
Ej quantity bids for producer j, assumed to be known [MW]
D demand in market [MW]
Decision Variables:
gj quantity of energy produced (sold in market) for producer j [MW]
πd market-clearing price [$/MW]
To avoid confusion, our convention is to represent parameters with uppercase letters and
variables with lowercase letters. In step (2.) of the day-ahead electricity market the market
operator meets demand at minimum cost and, in doing so, determines the amount of energy








gj = D (π
d)
gj ≤ Ej ∀ j
gj ≥ 0 ∀ j.
The set of gj; j = 1, . . . , J such that gj > 0 is referred to as the market-clearing dispatch. The
market-clearing price πd, which is discussed in steps (2.) and (3.) of the day-ahead electricity
market, is given as the dual (marginal value or shadow price) of the demand constraint in
the economic dispatch model. In other words, the market-clearing price is the highest price
bid from the producers that are part of the market-clearing dispatch. Regardless of what
each producer bids, all producers that are part of the market-clearing dispatch are paid the
market-clearing price.
15
Note that, if transmission constraints are included in the market-clearing dispatch, then
the market-clearing price may no longer be the highest price bid from the producers that are
part of the dispatch. In this construct, we assume that there are no deviations (e.g., changes
in demand and/or generator failures) in the market-clearing dispatch. In other words, there
are no secondary or reserve markets. If we remove the assumption that all producers are
price takers, then the market-clearing formulation becomes more complicated since we must
consider how the market-clearing price will change based on price-maker producers’ bids.
We next discuss why it may be necessary to lift the price-taker assumption.
2.3.2 Price-Taker Producers vs. Price-Maker Producers
Often times, for the sake of simplicity, power systems are modeled using the assumption
that producers cannot impact the market-clearing price with their bids. However, if a pro-
ducer supplies a large portion of energy, it may be able to alter prices based on their bids,
since significant changes in aggregate supply will have an impact on the market-clearing
price. Price-maker producers are said to exercise market power. When a practitioner moves
from modeling price-taker producers to modeling price-maker producers, the structure of
the aforementioned formulations may be impacted. Additionally, price-maker producers’
bids may impact several market characteristics. These impacts are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: The impacts of market power
Market power Formulation structure Market characteristics




Does not impact Market-clearing
Price takers’ bids
16
2.3.3 Opportunity Costs and Hydroelectric Production
Developing optimal bidding strategies for hydro producers is more trying, because they
possess the unique ability to store water (energy), at practically no cost (ignoring evapora-
tion), for use in future periods. Consequently, hydro producers must consider the impact,
i.e., the opportunity cost, of selling water today versus selling it in future periods. The time
coupling between the present stage and future stages is resolved in the context of Dynamic
Programming (DP) (and its variants) through the introduction of state variables. Note that
thermal producers also experience time coupling, due to generator ramping, but it only lasts
for the short term. Thermal producers use their marginal operating costs to place values on
the energy they produce and sell. Pereira explains how a hydro company’s marginal oper-
ating cost is actually their opportunity cost and should be used as a proxy for the value of
water to the producer [26]. A hydro producer’s operating cost can be found through solving
the company’s scheduling problem.
A hydro producer’s opportunity cost depends on future inflow scenarios, demand, and
on the future production of other generators, each of which is uncertain [27, 28]. The
duration of the impact of today’s generation depends on the volume (storage capability)
of the hydro producer’s reservoirs. To be certain that one fully accounts for the impact
of today’s generation on future revenue and to adequately capture the seasonal patterns of
the hydrological inflows, practitioners model the problem over a time horizon lasting one
to five years (medium term) or longer, depending on the hydro storage capacity and the
seasonal patterns of reservoir inflows. Table 2.3 shows the time horizons, not necessarily for
the bidding problem, that are utilized when modeling hydro producers.
Over the medium term, hydro producers experience large variations in reservoir inflows.
Since reservoir inflows essentially equate to “free” energy, variations in reservoir inflows
impact bidding decisions, and we must account for different possible inflow scenarios in our
model. Gjelsvik et al. [29] and Bye et al. [30] discuss the importance of including uncertainty
in models of this type. Consequently, the bidding problem for hydro producers is dynamic
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and possesses uncertainties.
Table 2.3: Different time horizons used in hydro modeling
Term Time Inflows Bidding Problem
Horizon Relevance
Immediate term Minutes Deterministic –
Short term Days to months Deterministic X
Medium term 1-5 years Stochastic X
Long term 10-30 years Stochastic –
2.3.4 Approach Evolution
Figure 2.1 provides an overview of different techniques used to model and solve different
variants of the bidding problem. In cases with multiple price-maker producers, the ap-
proaches are similar to those depicted, but differ in that their solutions rely on economic
game theory. The arrows show how different challenges have inspired various modeling tech-
niques and solution approaches. Arrows with slashes illustrate why the affiliated technique
cannot be used on a different variant of the problem.
2.4 Price-Taker Thermal Producer Modeling
Many researchers have contributed to the bidding problem for price-taker thermal pro-
ducers. Detailed surveys that document work in this area can be found in Kwon and Frances
[9], Conejo and Prieto [18], and Ventosa et al. [20].
In the vast amount of literature in this area, the work by Gross and Finlay [31] stands
out. In a market consisting solely of price-taker thermal producers, Gross and Finlay [31]
prove that the optimal strategy is for producers to bid their variable operating costs, a well
known concept for economists. Since price-taker thermal producers will bid their variable
cost regardless of whether the producers seek to maximize their profit or an independent
system operator seeks to minimize cost (centralized cost minimization model), the market-
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Figure 2.1: Bidding problem evolution
cost minimization models [9], the market-clearing dispatch will be the same regardless of
whether we are operating in a deregulated or regulated market paradigm. This result allows
producers to use fundamental modeling practices for price forecasting [32], but does not hold
when producers’ bids impact prices.
2.5 Price-Maker Thermal Producer Modeling
Because a price maker can, by definition, alter the market-clearing price, it may no longer
be optimal for price makers to bid their marginal costs. In a market with both price makers
and price takers, price makers will most likely bid above their marginal costs while it is still
optimal for price takers to bid their marginal costs. The crux of the problem is that the
market-clearing price depends on how much the price maker bids, and the quantity the price
maker produces depends on the market price.
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To address this dependency, the problem is divided into two dependent formulations:
market clearing and bidding strategy. While the price maker seeks to maximize revenue via
the bidding strategy formulation, the market operator seeks to satisfy demand at minimum
cost via the market-clearing formulation. The problem is formulated as a bi-level optimiza-
tion problem and then transformed into a single nonlinear programming problem [33–35].
To illustrate, we examine the case of a single price-maker thermal producer. We define
the following indices, sets, parameters, and decision variables:
Indices and Sets
j = 1, . . . , J - index for all producers considered in the system
A - set of generators that belong to the price-maker
Parameters
Λj - price bids for producer j, j /∈ A, assumed to be known [$/MW]
Ej - quantity bids for producer j, j /∈ A, assumed to be known [MW]
D - demand in market [MW]
Gj - maximum generator capacity for producer j, j = 1, . . . , J [MW]
Cj - variable operating cost for producer j, j = 1, . . . , J [$/MW]
Decision Variables
ζj - price bid for price-maker, j ∈ A [$/MW]
ej - quantity bid for price-maker, j ∈ A [MW]
gj - quantity of energy produced (sold in market) for producer j [MW]
πd - market-clearing price [$/MW]
A price maker in a market with price and/or quantity bidding seeks to maximize revenue










The difficulty here is that the market-clearing price, πd, depends on how much the price
maker bids, ej (j ∈ A), and the quantity the price maker produces, gj (j ∈ A), depends on
the market price, πd. To deal with the dependency we divide the problem into two separate
formulations: market-clearing and bidding strategy.
Market Clearing (Economic Dispatch)
While the price-maker seeks to maximize revenue, the market operator seeks to satisfy de-
mand at minimum cost via the market clearing or economic dispatch model. In doing so,
the market-clearing price, πd, is determined. The market-clearing price is found via the dual
of the demand constraint, as shown in equation (2.2) below. The dual variables associated











gj = D (π
d) (2.2)
gj ≤ ej ∀ j, j ∈ A (πgj )
gj ≤ Ej ∀ j, j /∈ A (πgj )
gj ≥ 0 ∀ j
Bidding Strategy (Profit Max for Bidder)








s.t. ej ≤ Gj ∀ j ∈ A.
The bi-level optimization formulation contains both the market clearing and the bidding
strategy formulations for the price maker. We now have all the pieces necessary to trans-
form the bi-level formulation into a single nonlinear formulation.
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Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)
The first level in the bi-level optimization problem is the bidding strategy formulation while
the second level is the market-clearing formulation. Since the second-level problem is a
Linear Program (LP), we can use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions to
characterize the optima of the LP as a system of equations. The KKT conditions fully char-
acterize the optima, because they are both necessary and sufficient for LPs. By adding this
system of equations to the first level, we create a single Mathematical Program with Equi-
librium Constraints (MPEC). The KKT conditions, now constraints in the MPEC, include
primal feasibility (Equations (2.4)-(2.7)), dual feasibility (Equations (2.8)-(2.10)), and the
optimality condition (equality of primal and dual objective function values in the market-
clearing formulation). The MPEC formulation is equivalent to the bi-level optimization
problem. We desire the single-shot MPEC optimization procedure because it fits nicely into
a DP framework which is amenable to hydro modeling. The large struggle with the MPEC
formulation is solving it to optimality. To the authors’ knowledge, no one has solved the








s.t. Ej ≤ Gj ∀ j, j ∈ A (2.4)
J∑
j=1
gj = D (2.5)
gj − Ej ≤ 0 ∀ j, j ∈ A (2.6)
gj ≤ Ej ∀ j, j /∈ A (2.7)
πd + πgj − ζj ≤ 0 ∀ j, j ∈ A (2.8)
πd + πgj ≤ Λj ∀ j, j /∈ A (2.9)











πgjEj = 0 (2.11)
The MPEC is a nonlinear, non-convex formulation, (i.e., since we have products of vari-
ables and equality in the optimality condition (2.11), the MPEC has a non-convex feasible
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region) and, thus multiple solution methodologies arise to handle the non-convexities (Ta-
ble 2.4). Advantages and disadvantages of these methods are excluded. The trouble with
these approaches is that they do not guarantee a global optimum. To make the optimal-
ity gaps smaller, practitioners devise models based on Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) techniques. However, since these are based on discretization schemes, in this context,
they do not guarantee a global optimum either.
Table 2.4: Methods to solve the MPEC formulation. LCP = Linear Complementarity Prob-
lem
Method References Comments
Iterative procedures [36, 37] Solve via simulation
Tailored algorithms [34] Penalty interior point algorithm
[38] Nash Equilibrium through iteration
[39] Stackelberg Equilibrium
Heuristics [40] Coordinate-descent solution
Simulation [41] Simulates hydrothermal market
LCP [35, 42] Solve via LCP software
MILP [43] Cost model with MPEC
[44] No assumptions on agents
[45] Adjustment & reserves’ markets
[33] Binary expansion (BE)
[46] BE & Nash Equilibrium
[47] BE & uncertain demand & offers
With the exception of de Lujan Latorre and Granville [39], Barroso et al. [46], and Kannan
et al. [48], the models we survey assume only one price maker exists in the market. Latorre
and Granville [39] solve the MPEC for a Stackelberg equilibrium, where the leader firm
(price maker) acts first and then the follower firms (price takers) move sequentially. Barroso
et al. [46] expand the work done in Pereira et al. [33] by applying the techniques to bid-
based markets, with multiple price-maker thermal producers, to solve for a Nash Equilibrium
(NE). Kannan et al. [48] present an iterative scheme that solves for a NE in a market with
two price-maker producers. In our context, a NE is a set of bids such that, given all other
price-maker producer’s bids, no price-maker producer can improve their revenue by changing
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their bid. Time coupling is excluded in this work because including it would increase the
computational time for the MILP algorithms and create intractability issues.
When a market consists of multiple price-maker producers, the revenue for each producer
also depends on the bids from all other price-maker producers. In this case, all of the price-
maker producers act simultaneously to maximize their revenue. This is usually modeled as
a non-cooperative economic game in which the practitioner seeks to find a set of bids such
that, given all other price-maker producer’s bids, no price-maker producer can improve their
revenue by changing their bid. In this paradigm, the state-space consists of a set of bidding
actions for each price-maker, one bidding action for each set of competitors’ strategic bids.
When the price-maker producers are hydro producers, each solves a multi-stage, stochastic
problem to determine a single bidding action. For multiple price-maker hydro producers,
the processes are combined and the state-space grows exponentially large spawning models
that are intractable [49].
For this reason, non-game theoretic models emerge in the literature. In non-game the-
oretic models, a competitor’s bidding behavior is represented via bidding scenarios and
a revenue-maximization problem, under uncertainty, is solved for the price-maker agent
[45, 46]. Comparing the game and non-game approaches is difficult, because they represent
the same uncertainty in two different ways. Game theoretic models are the preferred choice
for regulators interested in analyzing market performance under the assumption of rational-
ity by the market participants. In contrast, non-game models are the preferred choice for
generation companies interested in devising bidding strategies while considering extreme,
rival bidding scenarios.
2.6 Price-Taker Hydro Producer Modeling
When we move to modeling power systems with hydro producers (with significant stor-
age), we observe time coupling between stages. To capture annual or multi-annual impacts
of present-day generation decisions, we must model the inherent uncertainty in reservoir
inflows. Because of challenges associated with modeling dynamic problems that possess un-
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certainty, existing literature that studies the bidding problem for hydro producers is limited
in the time horizons over which the problem is examined. Our intent, in this section, is not
to survey all of the work in this area, but to focus more on the problem for price-maker
producers.
Several different methods have been used in decision-making models for hydro producers.
Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages and specific applications dictate the
appropriate method (Table 2.5 and Table 2.6).
Table 2.5: Prominent dynamic programming methods for modeling hydro producers: Capa-
bilities
Method Reference Capabilities
DP [27], 1982 Models nonlinearity, non-concavity, discontinuity
SDP [27], 1982 Same as DP
SDDP [15], 1991 Solves systems with multiple reservoirs & stages
Constructive DDP [50], 2010 Uses exact solutions for future revenue functions
Sequential stochastic LP [51], 2010 Uses historical inflow records directly
Approximate DDP [52], 2013 Models price uncertainty at each stage
SDDP & trees [53], 2013 Incorporates different types of uncertainties
Table 2.6: Prominent dynamic programming methods for modeling hydro producers: Limi-
tations
Method Reference Limitations
DP [27], 1982 Curse of dimensionality & no uncertainty
SDP [27], 1982 Curse of dimensionality
SDDP [15], 1991 Requires convexity of future cost-to-go function
Constructive DDP [50], 2010 Curse of dimensionality (lesser extent than DP)
Sequential stochastic LP [51], 2010 One-week ahead production schedule only
Approximate DDP [52], 2013 Approximation of future cost function
SDDP & trees [53], 2013 Curse of dimensionality (for tree uncertainties)
SDP is well suited for solving multi-stage, stochastic problems with nonlinearities. Un-
fortunately SDP suffers from the “curse of dimensionality.” SDP requires the discretization
of the state space, formed by the storage levels and past inflows, in order to approximate
the future revenue function. This means, for a reasonable level of fidelity, one must solve
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the problem for multiple incremental reservoir storage levels and past inflows, and then enu-
merate all of the possible combinations of reservoir storage levels. The combinatorial nature
of the discretization yields computation times that increase exponentially with the number
of reservoir storage levels. For this reason, SDP is typically limited in its applications to
systems with fewer than ten hydro plants (i.e., reservoirs).
In many applications, systems are comprised of more than ten hydro plants and, to solve
the associated bidding problem, practitioners either aggregate reservoirs or turn to various
decomposition algorithms. Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming (SDDP) is a DP scheme,
introduced by Pereira and Pinto [15], that is based on multi-stage Benders decomposition and
has been successfully applied to schedule large-scale power systems for more than a decade,
because it alleviates the challenges associated with the curse of dimensionality [54]. Rather
than aggregating reservoirs, SDDP can be used to provide a more detailed representation of
the associated hydro system. SDDP, however, is limited in its applications because it relies
on the concavity (convexity) of the future revenue function (future cost function). This poses
a major challenge for modeling price-maker producers, due to the non-convexities involved.
Until the work by Gjelsvik et al., SDDP was limited to modeling price takers in a regulated
environment.
Gjelsvik et al. [17] are the first to study mid-term scheduling for price-taker hydro
producers where both spot prices and reservoir inflows are uncertain, through developing a
hybrid SDP/SDDP algorithm. Later, their algorithm is used to model the bidding problem.
Since the bidding problem’s introduction for price-taker hydro producers, many methods
have been used to model and solve it (Table 2.7 and Table 2.8).
Due to drawbacks associated with state-space explosion, many researchers apply decom-
position techniques, such as Benders decomposition or Lagrangian relaxation to this problem.
Redondo et al. [60], Flach et al. [69], and Pérez-Dı́az et al. [70] recognize these techniques
as the most efficient way to solve the bidding problem for price-taker hydro producers with
multiple reservoirs. Gjelsvik et al. [29] survey SDDP and its applications to hydropower
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Table 2.7: Methods used for modeling and solving the bidding problem for price-taker hydro
producers: Limitations
Method References Time Limitations
Horizon
SDP [55], 1996 Medium see Table 2.5 SDP
[56], 2003 Short see Table 2.5 SDP
[57], 2005 Short see Table 2.5 SDP
Optimal control [58], 1992 Medium Requires differentiable functions
Hybrid SDP/SDDP [17], 1999 Medium see Table 2.5 SDDP
[59], 1999 Medium see Table 2.5 SDDP
Lagrangian relaxation [60], 1999 Short Optimality gaps
Nonlinear QP [61], 2006 Short Future water value not considered
Heuristics [62], 2007 Short Optimality gaps
Neural networks [63], 2009 Short Optimality gaps
MDP [64], 2010 Medium Small systems
Sequential stochastic LP [51], 2010 Medium One-week ahead production only
Evolutionary algorithms [65], 2010 Short Small systems
MINLP [66], 2012 Short Computationally expensive
[67], 2011 Short See above
Mixed-integer QP [68], 2012 Short Requires “good” starting point
Table 2.8: Methods used for modeling and solving the bidding problem for price-taker hydro
producers: Comments
Method References Time Comments
Horizon
SDP [55], 1996 Medium Introduces SDP for hydro scheduling
[56], 2003 Short Yields explicit offer curves
[57], 2005 Short [56] modified for large reservoirs
Optimal control [58], 1992 Medium Solves large systems with multiple objectives
Hybrid SDP/SDDP [17], 1999 Medium Seminal reference on bidding problem
[59], 1999 Medium [17] applied to Norway
Lagrangian relaxation [60], 1999 Short Solves dual & presents multiplier updating
Nonlinear QP [61], 2006 Short Models head-dependency & nonlinearity
Heuristics [62], 2007 Short Peak shaving – hydro & thermal decomposition
Neural networks [63], 2009 Short Merit order & Lagrangian Hopfield networks
MDP [64], 2010 Medium MDP formulation with approximate DP solution
Sequential stochastic LP [51], 2010 Medium Accurate system representation & scenario fans
Evolutionary algorithms [65], 2010 Short Sequential quadratic programming
MINLP [66], 2012 Short Price scenarios & risk management
[67], 2011 Short Deterministic model similar to [66]
Mixed-integer QP [68], 2012 Short Head-dependency & risk management
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scheduling. Aouam et al. [71] and Pereira et al. [72] discuss the differences and limitations
of SDP and SDDP. Redondo and Conejo [60] explain decomposition techniques in great de-
tail. With few exceptions, all of the models in the case of a price-taker hydro producer with
significant storage follow the hybrid SDP/SDDP solution approach initially devised in [17].
Therefore, it can be argued that a consensus on the best solution approach for the bidding
problem in the case of a price-taker hydro producer has been reached.
There remains one interesting aspect relating to the economic efficiency of the market-
clearing dispatch for hydro systems. Gross and Finlay [31] show that the market-clearing
dispatch of thermal systems converges to its cost-minimization counterpart in the absence of
market power. By using an optimization model similar to the one developed by Gjelsvik et
al. [17], Lino et al. [73] show the equivalence of this result for price-taker hydro producers
located in different river basins.
However, if the system contains companies that operate hydro plants in the same river
basin, Lino et al. [73] show that the profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing solutions are
different. In this environment, the “individual” profit-maximizing operation of hydro plants,
in cascade, is different from its least-cost operation. This difference is due to an inadequate
spot payment scheme that does not recognize the benefits from downstream production. Lino
et al. show that this problem can be solved by creating a Wholesale Water Market (WWM),
analogous to the wholesale energy market, in which water is traded. The correction of the
spot payment through the WWM allows the bid-based operation, in a cascade, to converge
to its least-cost operation provided that all agents are price takers.
2.7 Price-Maker Hydro Producer Modeling
The most taxing variant of the problem is for price-maker hydro producers, where the
problem is multi-stage (for producers with significant storage), non-convex, and inflows are
uncertain. In the following paragraphs, we discuss several researchers’ contributions (Ta-
ble 2.9 and Table 2.10) that progressively get us closer to modeling the strategic bidding
problem for hydro producers with significant storage and limitations of their methods. Some
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thermal models are included in the table, because their contributions are relevant in price-
maker hydro producer modeling. The table is not exhaustive, but shows the work and
contributions most relevant to the strategic bidding problem for hydro producers.
While hydro-power production is inherently uncertain, many models ignore the uncer-
tainty for the sake of tractability. However, it is necessary to incorporate uncertainty in
reservoir inflows when modeling hydro power producers because of the influence inflows have
on optimal generation [74], [13]. In many hydro bidding markets, the quantity bids producers
offer may have an impact on the market-clearing price [46]. Thus, one could argue that the
most realistic models for hydro producers incorporate uncertainty in reservoir inflows and
capture the impact producer’s bids have on the market-clearing price.
Table 2.9: Approaches and Contributions to the Strategic Bidding Problem. NZ = New
Zealand, SP = Spain, Gen=General, BR = Brazil, US = United States, ES = El Salvador,
GR = Greece, PO = Portugal, MUL = multiple.
Reference # of NE DP Hydro Stochastic Time Case
Agents SDP SDDP Producers Inflows Horizon Study
[75], 1996 2 X – – X X Medium NZ
[43], 1999 N X – – X – Medium SP, N=4
[76], 2000 N X – – X X Medium GEN, N=2
[74], 2001 N X X – X X Medium BR, N=2
[40], 2002 N – – – – – Short GEN, N=1
[38], 2002 N X – – – – Short GEN, N=9
[44], 2002 1 – – – – – Short GEN
[33], 2005 1 – – – – – Short BR
[46], 2006 N X – – – – Short BR, N=3
[47], 2007 N X – – – – Short GEN, N=7
[69], 2010 1 – – X X X Medium ES
[77], 2011 1 – – – X X Medium GR
[78], 2012 1 – – – X – Short GEN
[79], 2012 1 – – – X – Short PO
[80], 2013 1 – – – X – Short PO
[81], 2013 N – X – X – Short MUL, N=17
Scott and Read [75] document one of the first instances in which hydro generation is
modeled using Dual Dynamic Programming (DDP) in deregulated markets. Specifically,
the authors model two energy producers operating both hydro and thermal generators in a
decentralized duopoly market. Scott and Read use a concave overestimator to approximate
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Table 2.10: Contributions to the strategic bidding problem
Reference Contribution
[75], 1996 Dual DP with Cournot duopolies
[43], 1999 Profit maximization via a MPEC
[76], 2000 Value of water
[74], 2001 Assessing market power & its impacts
[40], 2002 Shape of discontinuous revenue curve
[38], 2002 Iterative NE
[44], 2002 Describe a price maker’s price quota curve
[33], 2005 Binary expansion
[46], 2006 Binary expansion & NE
[47], 2007 MPEC converted to MILP via binary expansion
[69], 2010 SDDP application
[77], 2011 Hedges against demand & offer uncertainty
[78], 2012 Relationship between market power & storage
[79], 2012 Risk-neutral MILP with head dependence
[80], 2013 [79] with uncertainty in competitors’ bids
[81], 2013 Uncertainty via model-based price forecasts
the nonlinear revenue function. Their approach differs from SDDP in that it produces a
representation of the marginal water value using what they term a demand curve for release
and is limited in that it is only amenable for systems with a relatively small number of
reservoirs.
Ramos et al. [43] contribute to the problem’s solution through the incorporation of
equilibrium constraints. The proposed model, however, neglects uncertainty in reservoir
inflows and contains nonlinearities. Barquin et al. [76] provide a calculation for what is
termed the water value in a competitive market. This is the opportunity cost hydro producers
must consider (see Section 2.3.3) and is used in modeling the future revenue function in later
efforts.
Kelman et al. [74] present the first Nash-Cournot model that determines an optimal hydro
operations policy for two price-maker hydro producers in a multi-stage, stochastic setting.
Since the method is based on SDP, the major drawback is the curse of dimensionality.
Because the market-clearing price is associated with the variable cost of the most expensive
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price taker, Conejo et al. [40] show how it will change discretely based on the quantity
offered by the price maker. This relationship produces jump discontinuities in the revenue
function giving it a sawtooth shape. With this knowledge, practitioners can better model a
price-maker hydro producer’s revenue.
Binary expansion transforms products of variables in the nonlinear MPEC into mixed-
integer linear expressions. Pereira et al. [33] use this representation to solve the strategic
bidding problem, in the short-term, for one price-maker thermal producer. Barroso et al. [46]
extend this work by applying the techniques to markets with multiple price-maker thermal
producers, to calculate a NE. Bakirtzis et al. [47] also extend the work in Pereira et al. [33] to
find a single price-maker thermal producer’s optimal bid while considering stepwise energy
offers, consisting of multiple price-quantity pairs. Since the above authors are modeling
thermal producers, the problem is not considered over multiple stages.
Most recently, Baslis et al. [77] present a yearly, stochastic, MILP for a price-maker
hydro producer. Teixeira et al. [78] show an inverse relationship exists between the degree
of market power and the available amount of hydro storage. Pousinho et al. [79] solve
the strategic bidding problem via MILP for one price-maker hydro producer in the short
term. Pousinho et al. [80] extend the work in [79] through incorporating uncertainty in
competitors’ bids. In [81], Wehinger et al. utilize “predictive bidding” to find the profit-
maximizing set of bids, for a market with multiple agents. Wehinger et al. [81] models both
production and storage plants. Last, Sanchez et al. [82] focus on the combined operation of
wind and hydro power. These models strengthen our understanding of the strategic bidding
problem for hydro producers, but only consider the problem over time horizons of a year or
less.
To the author’s knowledge, there is only one group of researchers that model the strategic
bidding problem for hydro producers over a time horizon lasting more than one year. Flach et
al. [69] present the first instance in which SDDP is used in this context. SDDP requires the
objective function to be concave; thus, the expected future revenue function is approximated
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by a concave overestimator. Though it allows for the modeling of large systems, this approach
overestimates the true revenue function.
Table 2.11: Examples of how different aspects of the strategic bidding problem for hydro
producers are modeled
Model Dimension Approach Examples




(solved via LP relaxation)
Stepwise linear [43]
Inflow uncertainty Discrete distributions [76], [74], [69], [29]
Probability curves [75]
Price-Taker Known (variable cost) [74], [69], [42], [41]
competitors’ bids Uncertain [77], [80]
Unknown [43], [36]
Price-Maker Assumed known [74]
competitors’ bids Decided simultaneously [76], [42], [41]
Known [75]
Unknown, found iteratively [36]
Time-dependency DP [41]
DDP [75]
No Decomposition [43], [42], [77], [79]
SDP [74]
SDDP [69]
Demand Demand curves [75], [76], [41]
Deterministic [43], [74], [42], [69]
Uncertain [77]
The few researchers that study the strategic bidding problem for hydro producers either
focus on very detailed aspects of the problem and/or limit the time horizon over which they
study the problem. In the references we survey, the ways in which different aspects of the
strategic bidding problem are modeled are given in Table 2.11. In the table, the first column
lists an aspect of the problem, the second lists the technique used to model that aspect, and
the last column lists the references that utilize the technique.
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2.8 Conclusion
In reviewing the literature on the bidding problem, we make a couple of key observa-
tions. First, there is an extensive amount of literature that studies the bidding problem
and strategic bidding problem for thermal producers and solution techniques for these types
of models are well documented. Second, few researchers study the problem for price-taker
hydro producers and an even smaller number study the problem for price-maker hydro pro-
ducers. Last, those who study the strategic bidding problem for hydro producers limit their
findings by either targeting specific details and/or only consider the problem over the short
term.
The aforementioned contributions and the lack of literature that considers the strategic
bidding problem for hydro producers over longer time horizons point researchers in the
direction for future work. Solving the strategic bidding problem is a crucial step in efficiently
scheduling a hydro producer’s production over the medium term. This is especially true for
hydro producers with significant storage. On a broader scale, what is missing in the literature
is a method that determines a coherent hydro operations policy, over the medium-term, in
a strategic bidding framework. On a more detailed scale, the following aspects could be
incorporated in the strategic bidding problem for hydro producers:
• an exact representation of the future revenue function;
• more market details, including secondary and reserve markets (see [83] and [84]);
• nonlinearities due to head effects of the reservoirs (see [85]);
• additional uncertainties (i.e., uncertainty in bids, prices, and/or demand);
• different techniques to model uncertainty (e.g., robust optimization);
• emissions (see [86]); and/or
• transmission constraints (see [87] and [88]).
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Last, growing interest in renewable energy has led to a new focus on the bidding problem
for renewable power producers (see [89] and [90]) and this is an area that deserves attention.
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CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC HYDRO BIDDING FOR A SINGLE PRICE MAKER: DYNAMIC
CONVEXIFICATION WITHIN BENDERS DECOMPOSITION USING LAGRANGIAN
RELAXATION
Modified from a paper submitted to
Operations Research
Gregory Steeger 6 7 and Steffen Rebennack 8 9
3.1 Abstract
In this paper, we ask: What is the revenue-maximizing production schedule for a single
price-maker hydroelectric producer in a deregulated, bid-based market? Because of the mar-
ket interaction between the price-maker producer and the price-taker producers, the future
revenue function has a sawtooth shape and contains jump discontinuities which prohibit
us from solving the problem using Benders decomposition alone, which requires a concave
(for a maximization problem) objective function. To overcome this difficulty, we model the
price-maker’s bidding decision utilizing both Benders decomposition and Lagrangian relax-
ation. We create a piecewise-linear, representation of the future revenue function and model
it using mixed-integer linear programming. To remedy the non-concavity issues associated
with modeling the future revenue function as a mixed-integer linear program, we utilize
Lagrangian relaxation to dualize the state variable (water balance) constraints. We prove
that our method yields better bounds and solutions than existing methods, in many cases,
and never yields worse bounds. We demonstrate the utility of our algorithm through an
illustrative example and through three case studies in which we model electricity markets in
6Primary researcher and author
7Graduate student, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
8Author for correspondence
9Assistant professor, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
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El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
3.2 Introduction
A fundamental assumption in economics is that firms are profit maximizers. Courses in
microeconomics teach students to maximize revenue using simplistic models and techniques.
Yet, maximizing a firm’s revenue is seldom so straightforward. Power generation companies
are no different than other firms in that they seek to maximize their revenue, and the way
in which they develop revenue-maximizing strategies is not trivial. What is different is the
market through which they sell their goods. Many hydroelectric companies sell their energy
through a specific type of procurement auction, commonly referred to as the day-ahead
electricity market [9, 10]. Though day-ahead electricity markets vary, we assume market-
clearing prices and quantities are derived in the following manner: (i) producers submit
price and/or quantity bids for the following day; (ii) the market operator (utility company)
adjusts the market-clearing price, while minimizing costs, until the total energy dispatched
is equal to the total demand; (iii) energy producers are paid for the amount of energy they
dispatch, according to the market-clearing price.
The problem in which producers submit bids to the day-ahead electricity market is termed
the bidding problem [13]. Steeger et al. [91] expose areas in which the literature on the bid-
ding problem is lacking and find that very few researchers study the problem for price-maker
hydroelectric producers. Few study this problem over the medium term, because of the
difficulty associated with modeling non-convex, dynamic problems that possess uncertainty.
More specifically, what is missing in the literature is a method that determines a coherent
hydroelectric operations policy, over horizons lasting longer than one year, in a strategic bid-
ding framework. In this vein, we ask: What is the revenue-maximizing production schedule
for a single price-making hydroelectric producer in a deregulated market? In the next several
paragraphs, we explain more precisely what is involved in filling this void.
Hydroelectric producers are different than all other energy producers because of their
cost-free, ignoring evaporation, ability to store energy (water). Because of this, hydroelec-
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tric producers must consider the impact of selling water (energy) today versus selling it in
future periods. The impact, also referred to as opportunity cost, associated with the use
of water today creates a time-coupling between the present period and all future periods.
Consequently, in order to determine the price-maker hydroelectric producer’s optimal pro-
duction schedule, one must consider the impacts of today’s water use on future revenue over
a medium term (one to five years). Over the medium term, hydroelectric producers experi-
ence large variations in reservoir inflows, due mainly to varying amounts of rainfall. Since
reservoir inflows impact the price-making hydroelectric producer’s bidding decisions, in this
problem, one must examine different possible inflow scenarios.
Dynamic Programming (DP) schemes are attractive in hydroelectric modeling because
each period in the time-coupled problem can be separated and solved using a multi-stage
decomposition scheme. For a given period, DP algorithms recursively compute the maximum
possible revenue in all future periods via so-called Future Revenue Functions (FRF) and pre-
defined discrete values for the state variables. Alternatively, one can use a decomposition
algorithm to dynamically approximate FRFs, e.g., Benders decomposition [14] or Stochastic
Dual Dynamic Programming (SDDP) [15].
Benders decomposition, however, is limited in that it requires that the FRFs be concave.
In our problem, FRFs are piecewise linear and non-concave. Consequently, modeling FRFs
requires Integer Programming (IP) formulations. Practitioners typically resort to either
solving LP relaxations of the original IP or applying concave overestimators and then solving.
Approaches that utilize LP relaxation, or concave overestimators make the objective function
concave through making each periods’ revenue function concave. This static overestimation
typically yields larger cumulative errors than a dynamic overestimation.
The present paper proposes a novel dynamic overestimation that overcomes the concavity
limitation and enables the use of Benders decomposition for the bidding problem. We are
able to dynamically overestimate the revenue by using Lagrangian relaxation to dualize the
constraints (water balance constraints) that link periods together in the given time horizon.
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Instead of overestimating the revenue function in each period, we use a representation of
the immediate revenue function and overestimate only the FRF. Furthermore, for any given
period, the objective function that results from dualizing the water balance constraints is
concave and can be approximated using Benders optimality cuts. Paired together, we utilize
Lagrangian relaxation and Benders decomposition to model and solve the bidding problem
for hydroelectric producers over the medium term. Though combining Lagrangian relaxation
and Benders decomposition is not new to hydro-thermal scheduling problems, its application
to the bidding problem is.
Ultimately our method is to be used in conjunction with a decomposition algorithm that
incorporates inflow uncertainty and is capable of modeling large systems over the medium
term (1 to 5 years), i.e., SDDP. However, in this paper we assume inflows are known so that
we can find the true solution to the problem. Only then can we demonstrate the value of
our approach by comparing the solution our approach yields with both the true solution and
the solutions that are found from existing methods.
Our work strengthens the body of literature on the bidding problem through
• introducing a new methodology for solving the bidding problem, over the medium
term, for a single price-maker hydroelectric producer and by proving the method’s
correctness (Section 3.4 and Theorem 3);
• providing an in-depth analysis of the proposed algorithm and documenting the cases
in which our approach is useful, i.e., computes better bounds and solutions, through
theoretical results and case studies (Sections 3.5-3.6, and Theorem 5); and
• proving that the approaches that utilize LP relaxation or tight concave overestimators
for the revenue function yield identical upper bounds (Theorem 2).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.3 discusses relevant
literature and provides some background on the problem of interest. Following this, Section
3.4 introduces our methodology and Section 3.5 discusses the usefulness of our approach.
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Next, in Section 3.6, we present a small illustrative example and three case studies. Last,
Section 3.7 offers conclusions and discusses several extensions and generalizations to our
model and approach. Following the body of the paper, Appendix A lists all of the data
required to replicate our case studies.
To avoid confusion in our notation, our convention is to represent fixed values (or pa-
rameters) with uppercase letters, decision variables with lowercase letters, and vectors of
parameters or decision variables with boldface. For optimization problem (·) we denote its
set of feasible solutions as F (·), its optimal objective function value as z(·), and its LP re-
laxation as (·). Additionally, energy producers that have the ability to impact prices with
their bids are termed price makers and energy producers that have no influence on prices
are termed price takers. For brevity, hydroelectric producers are simply referred to as hydro
producers. Additionally, the terms period and stage are used interchangeably since both
terms imply the same level of time fidelity.
3.3 Literature Review and Fundamentals
Before describing our methodology, we briefly discuss other approaches that have been
used to solve the bidding problem. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of different techniques
used to model and solve different variants of the problem. The bidding problem has been
studied by many researchers, for a wide variety of market players. Researchers utilize many
different modeling approaches and represent system components with varying levels of detail.
In the diagram, we consider cases in which the agent is a price-taker thermal producer, the
agent is a price-maker thermal producer, the agent is a price-taker hydro producer, and, most
relevant, the case in which the agent is a price-maker hydro producer. The arrows show how
different challenges have inspired different modeling techniques and solution approaches.
Arrows with slashes illustrate why the affiliated technique cannot be used on a different
variant of the problem.
In the model for price-taker thermal producers, Gross and Finlay [31] prove that the opti-
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Figure 3.1: Bidding problem evolution [91]
Because a price maker can, by definition, alter the market-clearing price, it is no longer op-
timal for price makers to bid their marginal costs. In a market with both price makers
and price takers, price makers will, most likely, bid above their marginal costs while price
takers will continue to bid their marginal costs. The bidding problem for price-maker ther-
mal producers is formulated as a bi-level optimization problem and is then transformed
into an equivalent, nonlinear Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints using the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Because the resulting problem is non-convex, many meth-
ods that focus on efficient solution methodologies have been devised for this problem. The
difficulty with these solution methodologies is that they typically cannot guarantee a global
optimum. In an effort to decrease optimality gaps, Pereira et al. [33] devise models based
on Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) techniques.
When modeling power systems with hydro producers, the problem becomes coupled
in time which makes modeling and solving the bidding problem more difficult. The bid-
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ding problem for hydro producers is first considered and solved for price-taker producers by
Gjelsvik et al. [17]. Their solution algorithm is widely used throughout the literature with
varying levels of modification.
The most involved variant of the problem is for price-maker hydro producers, where
the problem is multi-stage, non-convex, and stochastic. Stochastic Dynamic Programming
(SDP) is well suited for multi-stage, stochastic problems with nonlinearities. Unfortunately,
SDP suffers from “curses-of-dimensionality” [27]. In other words, as the number of reservoirs
that we are modeling and/or the number of periods over which we solve the problem increase,
the number of required state variables grows exponentially and the problem becomes compu-
tationally intractable. For this reason, SDP is typically limited in its applications to systems
with ten or fewer hydro plants, i.e., water reservoirs. And because many real-world systems
contain more than ten hydro plants, often significantly more, SDP cannot be used to model
these systems.
3.3.1 Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming
In hydro-scheduling problems, the state-space is comprised of the water reservoir levels
at the beginning of each stage, assuming stagewise independent inflows. When modeling
hydro-scheduling problems, one needs to consider various combinations of reservoir levels for
each reservoir, and this leads to an exponential number of combinations of reservoir levels –
a curse-of-dimensionality in the state-space. Benders decomposition counters the curse-of-
dimensionality by automatically and iteratively computing reservoir levels at values which
are candidates for an optimal solution.
The stochastic nature of the inflows also creates curse-of-dimensionality concerns. Mod-
eling the uncertainty via a tree may lead to an exponential number of possible realizations,
if the tree is not “thinned” out. To overcome the curse-of-dimensionality inherent to SDP
approaches, Pereira and Pinto [15] proposed their so-called Stochastic Dual Dynamic Pro-
gramming (SDDP) algorithm. SDDP is a multi-stage Benders decomposition algorithm
which utilizes sampling approaches to counter the aforementioned curse-of-dimensionality
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[53, 92].
SDDP is an established method in hydro-thermal scheduling. SDDP allows for the de-
tailed modeling of the reservoir system, though it is limited to convex problems. This lim-
itation poses challenges in modeling many important real-world aspects, such as non-linear
head-effects. Many papers have been published, specifically, in the last decade, extending the
SDDP methodology to include (linearized) transmission constraints [93], natural gas supply,
demand and transportation networks [94], CO2 emission allowance constraints [86, 95], alter-
nate sampling strategies [96], and risk constraints [97, 98]. SDDP-type algorithms have been
dominating practical applications, specifically in Central America, for more than a decade
[99].
Several important algorithms have been developed which are related to the SDDP method-
ology, including general decomposition methods [26, 100], abridged nested decomposition
[101, 102], cutting-plane and partial-sampling [103], generalized dual dynamic programming
[104], constructive dual dynamic programming [105, 106], and approximate dual dynamic
programming [52].
Given that SDDP is based on Benders decomposition, we focus our developments in this
paper on Benders decomposition for ease of presentation. Following this presentation, our
methodology can be readily applied to SDDP-type algorithms. We return to this point in
Section 3.4.8.
3.3.2 Lagrangian Relaxation
To combat the challenges associated with the non-convexities inherent in our problem,
we turn to Lagrangian relaxation. The following review is based off of Geoffrion [107]. In
addition to the notation we have already defined, let λ denote the optimal multipliers (dual
variables) associated with the constraints that are dualized in the Lagrangian relaxation,
and generated from solving the associated LP relaxation (·).






cTx + λT (b− Ax)
s.t. Ax ≤ b (λ ≥ 0) s.t. Bx ≤ d
Bx ≤ d
xi integer ∀ i ∈ I xi integer ∀ i ∈ I,
in which A and B are matrices, and I is an indexed set that represents the variables that
are required to be integers.
(Pλ) is useful because it may be easier to solve than the original problem (P ). Further, it
yields an upper bound for the original problem, for any λ > 0. The fundamental relationships
between (P ), (P ), (Pλ) and (Pλ) are stated in
Theorem 1 ([107] Theorem 1)
(a.) F (P ) ⊇ F (P )⇒ z(P ) ≥ z(P ) and
F (Pλ) ⊇ F (P )⇒ z(Pλ) ≥ z(P ).
(b.) If (P ) is feasible, then z(P ) ≥ z(Pλ).
(c.) If, for a given λ and x,
(i.) x is optimal for (Pλ),
(ii.) Ax ≤ b, and
(iii.) λT (b− Ax) = 0,
then x is an optimal solution to (P ). If x satisfies (i.) and (ii.), but not (iii.) then x
is an ε-optimal solution of (P ) with ε := λT (b− Ax).
In Theorem 1, (a.) shows the relationship between (P ) and its relaxations, (b.) shows
that using λ in (Pλ) will yield a bound at least as good as the bound provided by (P ),
and (c.) describes the conditions under which a solution to (Pλ) is also optimal or near-
optimal for the original problem (P ). (i.), together with (ii.), imply that x is feasible in (P ).
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We utilize these insights in Section 3.4.1, where we analyze the bounds that are computed
through our approach.
The tightest (smallest) upper bound on z(P ) achievable through Lagrangian relaxation









cTx + λT (b− Ax)
}
s.t. Bx ≤ d
xi integer ∀ ∈ I.
Theorem 1 (a.) yields
z(Pλ) ≥ z(D) ≥ z(P ),
and Theorem 1 (b.) yields
z(P ) ≥ z(Pλ) ≥ z(D). (3.1)
The quality of the upper bound, z(D), that we obtain using Lagrangian relaxation is problem
specific, as is the duality gap, z(D)− z(P ).
3.3.3 Obtaining Optimal Lagrangian Multipliers
This leaves a couple of questions unanswered. Specifically, how does one compute “good”
values for the multipliers, λ, and how does one deduce a “good” feasible solution to the
original problem? In the bidding problem, finding a good feasible solution to the original
problem (or a lower bound) for each stage and given state variable is not a significant issue.
We are more concerned with tight upper bounds as they are used to generate Benders
optimality cuts (see Section 3.4.3). This is why we focus more on finding optimal or near-
optimal multipliers. The subgradient method is commonly used to update the multipliers.
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In the subgradient method, practitioners use
λκ+1 = max {0,λκ − θκ(b− Axκ)}
to compute the multipliers from iteration index κ for the next iteration, for a maximization
problem., in which parameter θκ is the step size. Different approaches, in the body of
literature, for updating the multipliers are given in Table 3.1.
In the subgradient method, there is not a way to prove that the generated solution
is optimal. As a consequence, subgradient methods typically incorporate a fixed iteration
count. Other procedures for updating the multipliers are termed multiplier adjustment
methods, in which heuristics are used on the dual. The heuristics are tailored for specific
applications and typically exploit some special structure of the dual problem.
Table 3.1: Methods used in updating multipliers.
zLB = best known feasible solution
|| · || = Euclidean norm
MC = marginal cost (if known, for a cost minimization problem)
MC = average MC of the active generators (for a cost minimization problem)
Reference Update Step Size
[108], 1969 λκ+1 = max {0,λκ − θκ(b− Axκ)} Sufficient conditions for convergence:
as κ→∞, θκ → 0 & ∑κi=1 θκ →∞
[109], 1974 Same as [108] γ
κ(z(Pλ)−zLB)
||b−Axκ||2 , γ
κ ∈ (0, 2]
[110], 1974 Ascent method -
[111], 1975 BOXSTEP method -
[112], 1979 Ascent & subgradient methods -
[113], 1981 Tailored subgradient method -
[114], 1983 λκ+1 = ψλκ + (1− ψ)MC, ψ = 0.6 θκ = 1
a+bκ
(a, b fixed scalars)
[115], 1983 Iterative primal & dual solves -
[116], 1985 Same as [108] θκ = 1
κ+1
[117], 1988 λκ+1 = ψλκ + (1− ψ)MC, ψ ∈ [0, 1] -
[118], 1993 Cutting plane technique -
[119], 1996 Primal bundle method -
[120], 1998 Dual bundle method -
[60], 1999 Adaptive control -
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3.3.4 Applications
Having discussed most of the relevant details associated with Lagrangian relaxation, we
are ready to present some of the areas in which it has been successfully applied. Table 3.2
lists several Lagrangian relaxation application areas and is by no means completely exhaus-
tive, but instead a sampling of the most common application areas. The table shows how
Lagrangian relaxation is typically used to make difficult problems more manageable. The
seminal work results from studying non-convex problems and the Traveling Salesman Prob-
lem in the 1960’s and 1970’s. In more recent applications, Lagrangian relaxation is used
for solving large-scale problems, where complicating constraints are dualized so that the re-
sulting problem is easier to solve. In many cases, the original problem is too large to solve
efficiently and Lagrangian relaxation is used to solve the problem by decomposing it into a
number of solvable independent subproblems.
Because Van Roy [115] connects Lagrangian relaxation and Benders decomposition, this
particular article is worth discussing in greater detail. We also couple the two approaches,
but in a different fashion. Van Roy introduces what is termed “cross decomposition.” Cross
decomposition is a modified version of Benders decomposition that aims to decrease com-
putational convergence time through simultaneously exploiting both primal and dual in-
formation. The method makes use of integer variables in the first stage and Lagrangian
relaxation in subsequent stages. Lagrangian relaxation is used to relax a subset of compli-
cating constraints. Cross decomposition solves MILP problems exactly in a finite number of
iterations.
Two other recent bodies of work that deserve more attention because of their similarities
with our work are found in Cerisola et al. [121] and Thomé et al. [85]. The difference is
that Cerisola and Thomé incorporate nonlinear hydro reservoir head effects into their hydro-
thermal scheduling models. They optimize a linear objective function, subject to a non-
convex feasible region. In our approach, we optimize a non-convex objective function subject
to linear constraints, where modeling the objective function leads to a non-convex feasible
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region as well. However, in both the present work and the work by Cerisola and Thomé, the
water balance constraints are dualized in order to make the FRFs concave (for a maximization
problem) or convex (for a minimization problem). Cerisola et al. propose three methods for
dealing with the non-convexities. In methods one and two, they solve a linear relaxation
for each subproblem to obtain dual information. By solving the corresponding Lagrangian
subproblem for these dual values, they aim to strengthen the Benders optimality cuts through
parallel shifting, utilizing Theorem 1 (b.). Cerisola et al.’s third method optimizes the dual
values, but the manner in which this is done is not explicitly stated and computational results
are not reported. In addition, our work distinguishes itself from the two papers above in
that it provides a rigorous mathematical and computational analysis of our decomposition
algorithm and its connection to other relaxations as well as the original problem, through
quantifying optimality and duality gaps.
3.3.5 Market Clearing and Immediate Revenue Function
We are now ready to present the formulation for the problem of interest. We assume the
electricity market in which the single price maker hydro producer sells energy, consists of J
price-taker thermal producers. The hydro producer is assumed to be a price maker because
it controls a large portion of the energy produced in the market. This assumption fits several
electricity markets in Central America. To begin, we examine the problem over a one-period
time horizon. We make use of the following notation:
Indices and Sets:
j = 1, . . . , J index for price-taker thermal producers
Parameters:
D demand in market [GWh]
Gj quantity bid (capacity) for producer j, j = 1, . . . , J [GWh]
Cj price bid (variable operating cost) for producer j, j = 1, . . . , J [$/GWh]
Decision Variables:
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Table 3.2: Applications of Lagrangian relaxation, in chronological and topical order. Ind. =
independent, Stoch. = stochastic
Reference Application Relaxed Lagrangian
Type Constraints Solution
Everett [122] Non-convex optimization All Unconstrained
Brooks and Geoffrion [123] ” All Unconstrained
Held and Karp [124] Traveling salesman problem Cycle elimination Spanning Tree
Held and Karp [125] ” ” ”
Helbig Hansen and Krarup [126] ” ” ”
Bazaraa and Goode [112] ” ” ”
Shapiro [127] Pure IP using group theory - -
Fisher and Shapiro [110] ” - -
Fisher [128] Machine Scheduling Resource Network
Fisher [128] ” ” ”
Fisher [129] ” ” ”
Fred Shepardson [130] ” Side ”
Nishi et al. [131] ” Machine capacity Ind. subproblems
Ross and Soland [132] Generalized assignment Set partitioning Knapsack
Fisher et al. [133] ” ” ”
Glover et al. [134] Manpower planning Set partitioning Unconstrained
Geoffrion and McBride [135] Facility location Set partitioning Ind. knapsack
Cornuejols et al. [136] ” ” ”
Fisher and Hochbaum [137] ” Demand & flow Algebraic
Van Roy [138] ” Capacity Plant location
Mazzola and Neebe [139] ” Set partitioning Ind. knapsack
Etcheberry [140] Set covering Set covering Unconstrained
Muckstadt and Koenig [141] Thermal generation Generator coupling Ind. subproblems
Bard [117] ” ” ”
Wang et al. [142] ” Power system ”
Cheng et al. [143] ” Demand & reserves ”
Dotzauer [144] ” ” ”
Ongsakul and Petcharaks [145] ” ” ”
Seki et al. [146] ” ” ”
Nemhauser and Weber [147] Set partitioning Side Matching
Mulvey [148] Clustering Set partitioning IP
Van Roy and Gelders [149] Distribution networks Throughput & side Facility location
Bell et al. [150] ” Demand Quasi knapsack
Graves [151] Production planning Inventory IP
Van Roy [115] Cross decomposition Complicating LP
Bean [152] Investment decisions Return requirement IP
Nowak and Römisch [153] Hydro-thermal generation Generator coupling Ind. subproblems
Takriti and Birge [154] Stoch. production planning Scenario bundles Ind. subproblems
Jain and Vazirani [155] K median Facility openings Facility location
Wang [156] Hydro generation Turbine limitations Plant subproblems
Cerisola et al. [157] Stoch. unit commitment Energy balance Ind. subproblems
Cerisola et al. [121] Hydro-thermal operation Nonlinear head effects Convex region
Thomé et al. [85] ” ” ”
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e hydro production (quantity bid) for price-maker [GWh]
gj quantity of energy produced (sold in market) for producer j [GWh]
πd market-clearing price (dual of demand constraint) [$/GWh]
The price maker seeks to maximize revenue, or mathematically,
max R(e) = πd · e.
The difficulty is that the market-clearing price, πd, depends on how much the price maker
bids, e, and vice versa. To remedy this, we seek to determine how the revenue function
changes with different values of e, which can be determined by studying the market-clearing
formulation. In the day-ahead market, the operator satisfies demand while minimizing cost
and the market-clearing price, πd, is determined based on the value of e. The market-clearing








gj = D − Ek (πdk)
0 ≤ gj ≤ Gj ∀j.
The set of gj, j = 1, . . . , J , such that gj > 0, in a solution to the market-clearing
formulation, is referred to as the market-clearing dispatch. πd is given as the dual (marginal
value) of the demand constraint, i.e., πd is the highest price bid from the set of producers
that are part of the market-clearing dispatch. Regardless of what the producers bid, all
producers that are part of the market-clearing dispatch are paid the market-clearing price
πd.
We assume the price-maker producer submits their bid at zero price, so that all of the
quantity they offer (given adequate demand) is dispatched. Additionally, we assume that
all of the price-taker producers offer quantity bids equal to their capacity at a price equal
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to their variable cost, i.e., they bid according to their optimal bidding strategy [31]. The
reasonableness of these assumptions is studied in [158]. By knowing each price-taker j’s
bid, we are able to populate parameters Cj and Gj in the market-clearing formulation.
Knowledge of the bids the price takers submit allows us to determine the market-clearing
price and, consequently, the shape of the price maker’s revenue function. This is a large
assumption. In practice, competitors’ variable costs and, thus, their bids are not known.
We plot the revenue curve, i.e., the revenue as a function of the price maker’s quantity
bids, R(e), in Figure 4.1. The function has a sawtooth shape, since as the price maker’s bid
increases, the most costly price-taker producer that is part of the market-clearing dispatch
“drops out.” Because the market-clearing price is equivalent to the most costly price bid in
the market-clearing dispatch, when price-taker producers are forced out of the dispatch by
the price maker, the market-clearing price (slope of the revenue curve) decreases. We assume
that the price maker can produce up to a break point in the revenue curve without excising
the associated price taker in the market-clearing dispatch. Without this assumption, the
price maker would produce up to ε away from the break point to avoid kicking the price
taker out of the dispatch and decreasing the market-clearing price.
Because we know the optimal behavior of the price maker, we can provide a representation
of the revenue curve by eliminating “downward” steps. Figure 4.1 depicts the revenue curve
(solid gray line) and its representation (dashed black line). For our intents and purposes, this
is an exact representation because the agent’s optimal generation decisions will not include
inefficient amounts. For example, any quantity of hydro production between break point
E ′1 and break point E
′
2 will not be chosen because the same revenue can be achieved by
producing the lesser amount E ′1 (we represent the break points in the revenue function as




4. Though it is possible for an alternate
optimum to exist where an inefficient amount of hydro power is produced, the hydro producer
can always spill water from the reservoir to avoid selecting this point and produce a lesser











Figure 3.2: Representation of the revenue function
3.3.6 Example: Day-Ahead Electricity Market and Revenue Function
A simple example helps explain how the day-ahead electricity market operates and the
construction of the revenue function for the price-maker producer. For this example, assume
J = 4, i.e., we have four price-taker thermal producers with quantity and price bids shown
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Example: Day-ahead electricity market and revenue function
j Cj Gj gj
1 20 20 20
2 30 10 5
3 10 15 15
4 35 10 0
D 40
With a demand of 40 GWh, the market operator will meet demand while minimizing
costs and the price-taker producers will generate energy quantities gj (step 2 in the day-
ahead electricity market). The market operator achieves this cost minimization by satisfying
demand, starting with the least costly price-taker producer (j = 3). If the least costly price-
taker producer does not have sufficient capacity to satisfy demand, the market operator goes
to the next cheapest producer (j = 1) and attempts to satisfy demand using some or all of this
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producer’s capacity. The process continues until demand is satisfied. The market-clearing
price is determined by the price bid (variable operating cost) of the most costly price-taker
producer that is part of the market-clearing dispatch. In our example, πd = C2 =$30/GWh.
All of the price-taker producers that are part of the market-clearing dispatch are then paid
the market-clearing price (step (3) in the day-ahead electricity market).
We now use the information from the market-clearing formulation to create the price-
maker’s revenue function. Since, the price-maker sells everything it bids, any amount the
price-maker bids will be deducted from the amount of energy the price-taker producers
are generating. The amount the price-maker bids Ek will also determine the market-clearing
price. If the price-maker bids more than the amount the most costly price-taker is producing,
then the price-taker producer drops out of the market-clearing dispatch and the market-
clearing price decreases. For example, if 5 ≤ Ek ≤ 25, then g2 = 0 and πd =$20/GWh.
Therefore, to maximize revenue, the price-maker producer must consider the tradeoff between
the revenue received by selling more energy and the associated decrease in the price they
receive for selling that energy.
3.3.7 The Bidding Problem Formulation
With the above knowledge of the revenue function, we present the bidding problem
formulation for a single price-maker producer. For a time horizon lasting longer than one
period, we distinguish between the immediate revenue function and the FRF. For a given
period, the immediate revenue function yields the revenue gained in that period, is a function
of production in that period, and is found in the exact manner discussed in Section 3.3.5.
The FRF yields the maximum achievable revenue in all future periods, based on the amount
of water available in the future periods, which is a function of current production. The




i = 1, . . . , I index for reservoirs operated by the price-maker
k = 0, . . . , K index for the breakpoints of the revenue function Rt(et)
t = 1, . . . , T index for time periods
Ui set of reservoirs that are immediately upstream of reservoir i
Parameters:
E ′kt k
th breakpoint of the revenue function, in period t [GWh]
R′kt value of the revenue function at the k
th breakpoint, in period t [$/period]
V i minimum storage storage level for reservoir i [hm
3]
V i maximum storage level for reservoir i [hm
3]
Vi1 initial storage level for reservoir i [hm
3]
U i water turbine outflow capacity for reservoir i [hm
3]
Ait inflow for reservoir i, in period t [hm
3]
ρi production coefficient (assumed constant) for reservoir i [GWh/hm
3]
Functions:
Rt(et) immediate revenue function, based on total production, for period t [$/period]
Binary Decision Variables (SOS2):
µkt indicator to determine which segment k of the revenue function et is on [-]
Decision Variables:
et total price-maker hydro production (bid) in period t [GWh]
eit price-maker hydro production (bid) from reservoir i in period t [GWh]
sit spillage from reservoir i in period t [hm
3]
vit volume of reservoir i at the beginning of period t [hm
3]
λit dual variable associated with reservoir i in period t [$/hm
3]
53
The problem we wish to solve, the bidding problem, is given as
















V i ≤ vi,t+1 ≤ V i ∀i, t (3.3)
0 ≤ eit
ρi





sit ≥ 0 ∀i, t, (3.6)
where vi1 ≡ Vi1 and V1 denotes the vector of the initial reservoir levels, vi1. Constraint
(3.2) is the water balance constraint that couples our decisions in period t with all past
and future periods. We assume that water used for production or spilled from reservoir
m ∈ Ui, immediately upstream from reservoir i, is available to reservoir i in the same
period. Constraints (3.3) and (3.4) guarantee that we do not exceed reservoir capacity and
that the water outflow does not exceed the capacity limitations of the water turbine, for
any of the I reservoirs. Constraint (3.5) sums production from each of the price-maker’s
reservoirs yielding total production.
Equivalently, the bidding problem (BR) can be written as

















µkt = 1 ∀t (3.8)
0 ≤ µkt ≤ 1 ∀k, t (3.9)
µkt ∈ SOS2 ∀k, t. (3.10)
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When we refer to solving the monolith formulation, we are referring to solving (B) di-
rectly, i.e., without any tailored (decomposition) algorithm, using off-the-shelf software. In
(B), the revenue for each stage is found via the methodology discussed in Section 3.3.5 and
the E ′kt, and R
′
kt values are parameters that are found a priori, based on our knowledge of the
price takers’ bids. The only difference is that the price maker now operates I reservoirs, so
that total revenue is based on the total production, which is the sum of the production from
all I reservoirs. Constraints (3.7) through (3.10) ensure that we model the piecewise-linear
segments of the revenue function correctly. SOS2 variables are an ordered set of non-negative
variables, of which at most two can be non-zero. And, if two are non-zero they must be con-
secutive in their ordering. By defining the µkt as SOS2 variables, constraint (3.10) implies
that we have binary variables
φkt =
{
1, if et is in segment k,
0, otherwise
∀k, t,
and the following constraints to ensure φkt = 1 if and only if et is on line segment k:
K∑
k=1
φkt = 1 ∀t (3.11)
µ0t ≤ φ1t ∀t (3.12)
µkt ≤ φkt + φk+1,t k = 1, . . . , K − 1, ∀t (3.13)
µKt ≤ φKt ∀t (3.14)
φkt ∈ {0, 1} ∀k, t.
Current state-of-the-art MILP solvers are able to solve (B) with an acceptable com-
putational effort, even for large reservoir systems and many stages. However, when the
reservoir inflows Ait are unknown, stochastic programming techniques are the methods of
choice for solving (B). Treating inflows via stochastic programming techniques leads to
scenario-tree-type approaches. Unfortunately, the resulting MILP problems are several or-
ders of magnitude too large for current state-of-the-art MILP solvers. Consequently, we rely
on a decomposition algorithm, namely Benders decomposition. The drawback with Benders
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decomposition is that it requires the FRF to be concave, for a maximization problem. We
discuss this drawback in detail in Section 3.4.
To overcome issues with non-concavity, in a different context, Newham [159] solves the









s.t. (3.2)− (3.9), (3.11)− (3.14)
0 ≤ φkt ≤ 1 ∀k, t .
The LP relaxation creates an outer approximation of the feasible region of (B), which makes
it a convex set. The dual values from (3.2) are then used to generate Benders optimality
cuts.
Flach et al. [69] suggest another approach to convexify (B). Flach et al. employ a concave,
piecewise-linear overestimator to approximate the immediate revenue function Rt(·), which














αnt = 1 ∀t
0 ≤ αnt ≤ 1 ∀ n, t .
Ẽnt and R̃nt are chosen so that the resulting segments of the piecewise-linear overestimated
revenue curve have decreasing slopes. By selecting Ẽnt and R̃nt in this manner, Flach et al.
ensure the overestimation is concave. It is important to note that the values for the pa-





(B). Though the formulations in (B) and (C) appear to be different, they result in the same
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solution, which we formalize in
Theorem 2 The optimal objective function values of the LP relaxation formulation (B) and
the concave overestimator formulation (C) are the same, i.e., z(B) = z(C).
Proof. We begin this proof by making the following observations about the set of break-
points and revenue function values in each of the two formulations:
{Ẽnt} ⊂ {E ′kt} and Ẽ0t = E ′0t = 0, ẼNt = E ′Kt ∀ t;
{R̃nt} ⊂ {R′kt} and R̃0t = R′0t = 0, R̃Nt = R′Kt ∀ t .
Given any solution to (B), we can construct a solution to (C) such that z(C) = z(B)
and vice versa. To see why this is the case suppose, without loss of generality, T = 1 and we
have an optimal solution to (B), z(B), where e∗1 lies somewhere between breakpoints p and
r (in which the breakpoints are not necessarily subsequent). Since we are maximizing, the
optimal e∗1 could not lie between breakpoints that are not in {Ẽnt}; thus, breakpoints p and
r are guaranteed to be in the set of breakpoints in (C). Therefore, to construct our solution
in (C) where z(C) = z(B) we set αp1 = µp1 and αr1 = µr1.
In other words, the convex combination of breakpoints that make up our value for et is
the same regardless of whether we are solving using (B) or (C) and the immediate revenue
function representation, Rt(et), is also the same. 
In addition to the upper bound derived from (B) and (C) on the bidding problem (B),
Benders decomposition applied to (B) and (C) can be adapted to yield several lower bounds,
cf. Section 3.4.7.
3.4 Methodology: Solving the Bidding Problem using Benders Decomposition
and Lagrangian Relaxation
We desire a method that can solve the bidding problem (B) for hydro producers with
significant storage (ten or more reservoirs), over time horizons of one year or longer with
weekly or monthly fidelity. Both of the approaches devised by Newham and Flach et al. aim to
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do this, but can result in large optimality gaps because the revenue function they utilize is an
approximation. In our approach, we model the revenue exactly and then employ Lagrangian
relaxation through dualizing the water balance constraints that connect the different stages
with each other to quell non-concavity issues. Consequently, we can generate and use Benders
optimality cuts to approximate the FRFs.
3.4.1 Lagrangian Relaxation
For fixed λ1, . . . ,λT , the Lagrangian relaxation found by dualizing (3.2) reads














vit + Ait −
eit
ρi









For fixed λ1, . . . ,λT , (Lλ) is a relaxation of (B) and z(Lλ) provides an upper bound for
z(B), cf. Theorem 1. Solving
(L ) L1(V1) := min
λ1,...,λT
L1(λ1, . . . ,λT ,V1)
yields optimal λit such that L D1 (V1) provides the tightest upper bound on z(B), obtainable
through Lagrangian relaxation. Because of strong duality in linear programming, the LP
relaxation (L ) results in the same objective function value as z(B). Thus, imposing inte-
grality in (L ) yields an upper bound at least as tight as the upper bound obtained from
solving (B), cf. relationship (3.1). Together with Theorem 2, this proves
Proposition 1 Solving the Lagrangian relaxation (L ) yields an upper bound for (B) which
is at least as tight as the upper bound obtained from solving the LP relaxation (B) or the
upper bound found from solving using a concave overestimator, i.e., z(L ) ≤ z(B) = z(C).
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Next, we describe how Lagrangian relaxation and Benders decomposition are combined
to approximate the maximum achievable revenue in future periods via the use of FRFs.
3.4.2 Stage-wise Decomposition
To use a decomposition scheme, we write (B) in the following recursive form, for t =
1, . . . , T :

















µkt = 1 (3.16)












V i ≤ vi,t+1 ≤ V i ∀i (3.18)
0 ≤ eit
ρi
≤ U i ∀i (3.19)
0 ≤ µkt ≤ 1 ∀k (3.20)
sit ≥ 0 ∀i (3.21)
µkt ∈ SOS2 ∀k, (3.22)
where βT+1(vT+1) ≡ 0. Since the water balance equations (3.17) in problem (BDP ) link
the decisions between periods, we represent the time-dependency via the state variables Vt.
Note, problem (BDP ) is feasible for any vector Vt, with V ≤ Vt ≤ V, because Ait ≥ 0 and
E ′0t = 0.
Recall that βt(Vt) is a piecewise-linear, non-concave function in the state variables Vt.
Whether using a concave overestimator or solving the LP relaxation, the practitioner first
remedies the non-concavity issues in the immediate revenue function Rt(et) and then solves
the problem. Rather than taking this approach, we resolve the non-concavity issues with
respect to Vt by employing Lagrangian relaxation dynamically for t = 1, . . . , T ,
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Vit + Ait −
eit
ρi








+ Lt+1(λt+1, . . . ,λT ,vt+1)
]
s.t. (3.15), (3.16), (3.18)− (3.22).
This relaxed formulation overestimates βt(Vt) for any λ1, . . . ,λT , cf. Theorem 1 (a.).
3.4.3 Benders Optimality Cuts
We use Benders optimality cuts to approximate the FRF in (L DPλ ) by examining each
period of the problem. The Benders optimality cuts for stage t are computed by solving the
following t+ 1-stage problem, for a given λt+1 and Vt+1:














Vi,t+1 + Ai,t+1 −
ei,t+1
ρi










s.t. (3.15), (3.16), (3.18)− (3.22).
Function β̂t+2(vt+2) is the approximate FRF within stage t + 1 that approximates the
cumulative revenues of stages t + 2, . . . , T , i.e., the approximation of βt+2(vt+2). For now,
assume that we are given β̂t+2(vt+2).





γslopeit Vi,t+1 + γ
const
t ,
with slope γslopeit and constant term γ
const
t . These parameters are calculated as






The validity of this linear optimality cut is established in
Theorem 3 The linear function or “cut”
I∑
i=1
γslopeit νi + γ
const
t (3.23)
overestimates βt+1(ν), for any t = 1, . . . , T.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we prove this theorem by assuming there is only one
reservoir and by examining the last period in the time horizon (period T ). Suppose we start
with initial water volume V oT . Since L (λT , V
o
T ) is a relaxation of the function βT (V
o
T ) we
know that (for a maximization problem)
βT (V
o
T ) ≤ L (λT , V oT ) .





we change V oT to νT , and note that νT = V
o
T − V oT + νT . Once again, since L (λT , νT ) is a
relaxation, it must be true that
βT (νT ) ≤ L (λT , νT ) ,
and
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L (λT , νT ) = RT (e
∗
T ) + λT
(





− λTV oT + λTνT (3.24)
= L (λT , V
o
T )− λTV oT + λTνT
= γslopeT νT + γ
const
T .
Note that in (3.24), changing the initial water volume from V oT to νT does not change
the optimal decision variable values e∗T and v
∗
T+1 because the λTνT term is a constant in the
objective function. Thus, we conclude that
βT (νT ) ≤ γslopeT νT + γconstT ∀ νT ,
and all cuts we generate for the last period T are valid. We can continue this logic for any
given period t. Consider period T − 1, where
L (λT−1, VT−1) = RT−1(eT−1) + βT (VT ) + λT−1
(





is used to approximate βT−1(VT−1). We have just shown how our approximation for βT (VT )
overestimates the function and we can use an argument identical to the argument above
to show the remaining terms overestimate the remainder of the function. Consequently,
summing the terms together will also overestimate βT−1(VT−1). Since the only difference in
the Lagrangian function between the last period and any period t is the addition of the term
βt+1(Vt+1) and since we know we are overestimating this function it must be true that, for
any period t
βt(νt) ≤ γslopet νt + γconstt ∀ νt .

Note that cut (3.23) is valid for any water reservoir level “ν,” not only within its bounds
V and V. This has important implications for the tightness of the computed cuts found
through Lagrangian relaxation, cf. Section 3.5.
62
3.4.4 Near-Optimal Lagrangian Multipliers
For given (initial) water reservoir levels in stage t, Vt, we compute near-optimal La-
grangian multipliers in an effort to generate tight Benders cuts. To obtain these multipliers,
we use an iterative method based on the subgradient method (see Section 3.3.3). We present
the procedure in Algorithm 5.
We begin by solving the LP relaxation (B
DP
) and use the associated dual variable values
as the first trial values for the Lagrangian multipliers. By doing so, we ensure that our
upper bounds are always as good as the upper bounds obtained by solving the LP relaxation
instead. Solving the Lagrangian MILP problem for these trial values may lead to a parallel
shift of the Benders optimality cut. In Steps (2)-(5), we iteratively compute different trial
values for the Lagrangian multipliers in order to compute a tighter cut, with a different slope
than the one given by the LP relaxation in Step (1). In Step (4), εtκ is the difference between
the left and right-hand side of the water balance equation, consistent with the definition in
Theorem 1 (c.) (iii.), for iteration κ. As the stopping criterion, we propose to terminate
Algorithm 5 after a fixed number of iterations, or when the change in each multiplier is
“sufficiently” small – whichever is satisfied first.
Algorithm 1 Update for Lagrangian multipliers (for period t and water reservoir levels Vt)
Step (0). Initialize: LBest = +∞, κ = 1, θ1 = 12 .
Step (1). Solve t-stage LP (B
DP
) with the computed cuts approximating function βt+1(vt+1) and obtain
duals λt associated with (4.4); assign λtκ = λt.
while Stopping criteria not satisfied do
Step (2). Solve the MILP Lagrangian problem (L̂DPλ ) for stage t (instead of stage t+ 1) using λtκ.
Step (3). Determine if z(L̂DPλ ) yields a bound tighter than the bound obtained thus far:
if z(L̂DPλ ) < LBest, then LBest = z(L̂
DP
λ ) and λ
∗
t = λtκ.
Step (4). Update multipliers and step size:
λt,κ+1 = max{0,λtκ − θκεtκ} and θκ+1 = 1κ+2 .
Step (5). Increment the iteration count κ← κ+ 1.
end while
Step (6). Exit with LBest and λ∗t .
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3.4.5 Shape of Lagrangian FRF
Next, we focus on the shape of the FRF within (L ) for optimal (or near-optimal) La-
grangian multipliers. Decomposing (L ) into stages yields
(L DP ) L DPt (Vt) := min
λt,...,λT
Lt(λt, . . . ,λT ,Vt).
For fixed λt, . . . ,λT , function Lt(λt, . . . ,λT ,Vt) is linear in Vt. Consequently, L DPt (Vt) is
the minimum of a collection of functions that are all linear in Vt, which implies L DPt (Vt) is
concave. The Lagrangian problem (L DP ) optimizes a linear objective function in Vt over a
polyhedron with finitely many extreme points – the extreme point indices in I are integral
valued – while the polyhedron is unaffected by the choice of the Lagrangian multipliers.
Thus, the Lagrangian function is piecewise-linear. This is summarized in
Proposition 2 The function L DPt (Vt) is piecewise-linear and concave in Vt for any t =
1, . . . , T .
Replacing the FRF in (L DP ) by a piecewise-linear and concave overestimator does not affect
the shape of L DPt (Vt). It follows that a finite number of Benders optimality cuts of type
(3.23) are sufficient to represent L DPt (Vt) exactly.
We are now ready to present our decomposition algorithm that incorporates Lagrangian
relaxation.
3.4.6 Benders Decomposition
Each iteration of the Benders decomposition is divided into a forward pass and a backward
pass. In the forward pass, we solve (B̂DP ) for each period t = 1, . . . , T using the optimality
cuts generated in the backward pass. The discrete values Vt+1 link the subproblems in the
forward and backward passes.
In the forward pass, the goal is to compute a feasible solution to the original bidding
problem (B), i.e., the water balance equations must be satisfied, yielding a lower bound on
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γslopeitl vi,t+1 + γ
const
tl l = 1, . . . , L− 1, (3.25)
where the L − 1 cuts in (3.25) are computed in the backward pass, in the previous L − 1
iterations. β̂t+1 is a decision variable that approximates the FRF for stage t. Notice that
(B̂DPt ) includes the water balance equations in its constraint set. The forward pass also
yields trial values for the reservoir levels, Vt+1, required for the backward pass.
In the backward pass, we use the stored reservoir volumes Vt+1 that were found from
solving (BDP ) in the forward pass, and the optimal λt values (see Algorithm 5) to generate
valid (cf. Theorem 3) and tight (cf. Theorem 1) Benders optimality cuts. Specifically, the
cut for stage t− 1 during the Lth iteration, is generated by solving











Vit + Ait −
eit
ρi













γslopeitl vi,t+1 + γ
const
tl l = 1, . . . , L− 1.
Each time we solve (L̂ DPλt ) for different Vt+1 values, we generate exactly one Benders opti-
mality cut for the FRF. We then resolve (B̂DPt ) and (L̂
DP
λt ) and continue iteratively until
we have a “good” approximation of βt+1(vt+1), for each stage t. An upper bound on the
bidding problem (B) is found by solving (B̂DP1 ) for given initial reservoir level V1.
The bidding problem may exhibit a nonzero duality gap. If this is the case, the lower
bound z will not equal the upper bound z, as computed in Algorithm 2, and we can terminate
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the algorithm either after a set number of iterations or when the upper bound has not
decreased in a specified number of iterations. Algorithm 3 describes a slightly different
approach. It solves the Lagrangian problem (L ) to optimality, if the computed Lagrangian
multipliers are optimal. The correctness of Algorithm 3 is evident, because L DPt (Vt) is a
piecewise-linear and concave function, cf. Proposition 2. We summarize our findings and
establish the correctness of the proposed algorithms in
Theorem 4 Algorithm 2 computes correct lower and upper bounds for the bidding problem
(B). Algorithm 3 computes correct lower and upper bounds for the relaxed bidding problem
(L ), and converges in finitely many iterations.
Algorithm 2 Benders Decomposition with Lagrangian Relaxation – version 1
Step (0). Initialize: β̂t = 0, ∀ t ≥ 2 for first forward pass only, z = 0, z = +∞, and ι = 1.
while Stopping criteria not satisfied do
Forward Pass
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Step (1). Solve the t-stage MILP problem (B̂DPt ). Let Etι := e
∗




be the optimal vector of reservoir volumes computed.
end for










for t = T, T − 1, . . . , 2 do
Step (3). With the stored Vtι values from the forward pass, solve the t-stage MILP Lagrangian
problem
(L̂DPλt ) using Algorithm 5 to find the optimal value for the multipliers.
Step (4). Calculate a new Benders optimality cut (3.23) for stage t using the Lagrange multipliers
and
objective function value obtained from Algorithm 5, Step (3).
end for
Step (5). Solve the first-stage MILP problem (B̂DP1 ).
Step (6). Calculate upper bound z on (B):
z = z(B̂DP1 ).
Step (7). Increment the iteration count ι← ι+ 1.
end while
Step (8). Exit with z, z, Et,ι−1 and Vt+1,ι−1.
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Algorithm 3 Benders Decomposition with Lagrangian Relaxation – version 2
Step (0). See Algorithm 2.
while z < z do
Forward Pass
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Step (1). Solve the t-stage MILP Lagrangian problem (L̂DPλt ) using Algorithm 5 Let Etι := e
∗
t be
the optimal generation, Stι := s
∗
t be the optimal spillage, and Vt+1,ι := v
∗
t+1 be the optimal vector
of reservoir



























for t = T, T − 1, . . . , 2 do
Step (3). See Algorithm 2.
Step (4). See Algorithm 2.
end for
Step (5). Solve the first-stage Lagrangian problem (L̂DPλ1 ) using Algorithm 5.
Step (6). Calculate upper bound z on (L ):
z = z(L̂DPλ1 ).
Step (7). See Algorithm 2.
end while
Step (8). See Algorithm 2.
—————————————————————————————————————————————–
Disclaimer: this algorithm only converges when used in conjunction with the optimal multipliers.
3.4.7 Bounds
We now focus on comparing the bounds obtained by solving either the LP relaxation,
using a concave overestimator, or the Lagrangian relaxation. Table 3.4 describes each of
the resulting bounds. To compute z′
B
and z′C we take the solution from (B) or (C) and
plug it into the true revenue function, as opposed to the overestimated revenue function.
Using the bound definitions, we can make several observations. First, z′
B
= z′C , zB = zC ,
and z(B) = z(C), cf. Theorem 2. Due to the possibility of alternate optima, the dual
variable values and the resulting Benders optimality cuts generated from (B) and (C) may
differ. Consequently, solving both problems as MILPs with Benders optimality cuts may
yield different solutions, i.e., lower bounds, and for the pairs zB and zC , z
′
B




and zC we cannot definitively define a relationship. Specifically, when employing Benders
decomposition to solve the LP relaxation (B), we compute a lower bound for (B) by executing
one additional forward pass (after the Benders decomposition has converged) utilizing the
computed cuts and solving each of the t-stage problems as MILPs. If we define zB/C as any
of the lower bounds obtained from solving (B) or (C), then the following relationship holds:
zB/C ≤ z ≤ z(B) ≤ z ≤ zB ≤ z(B) .
Table 3.4: Bounds obtained from different solution techniques
Approach Symbol Bound Description
LP z′
B
Lower True revenue using optimal production from solving (B)
Relaxation zB Lower
∑T
t=1Rt(·) found from z(B̂DPt ), with LP relaxation cuts
zB Upper z(B̂
DP
1 ), after generation of all LP relaxation cuts
z(B) Upper Solution to (B)
Concave z′C Lower True revenue using optimal production from solving (C)
Overestimator zC Lower
∑T
t=1Rt(·) found from z(B̂DPt ), with concave overestimator cuts
zC Upper z(B̂
DP
1 ), after generation of all concave overestimator cuts
z(C) Upper Solution to (C)
Lagrangian z Lower
∑T
t=1Rt(·) found from z(B̂DPt ), with Lagrangian cuts
Relaxation z Upper z(B̂DP1 ), after generation of all Lagrangian cuts
3.4.8 Stochastic vs. Deterministic Inflows
At the beginning of this chapter, we argued that a crucial element of modeling hydro
producers over the medium term is the inherent uncertainty in reservoir inflows. However,
everything we have presented is based on deterministic inflows. In this paper, we only
consider deterministic inflows so that we can compare solutions found using our approach
and those found via the LP relaxation with the true solutions, i.e., solutions found from
solving the monolith. We are also limiting the time horizons over which we solve the problems
so that solutions to the monolith formulation remain tractable and we can find the exact
solutions. Only after demonstrating the value of our method can we consider uncertainty in
reservoir inflows.
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3.5 Discussion: When is this Approach Useful?
At this point you, the reader, may ask: If LP relaxation, in some cases, can provide
an upper bound as good as Lagrangian relaxation, then when does Lagrangian relaxation
provide a tighter upper bound and a better solution, i.e., when is this approach useful? The
answer is never, in the case of one reservoir. However, in cases with more than one reservoir,
the Lagrangian will provide tighter upper bounds, in most cases. We discuss reasons for this
and instances where our approach is useful in the next two subsections.
3.5.1 One Reservoir
If the hydro producer only operates one reservoir, then the optimal objective function
value using the tightest concave overestimator for the immediate revenue function and the
optimal objective function value of the Lagrangian relaxation are the same. It follows, from
Theorem 2, that they also equal the optimal objective function value of the LP relaxation.
To aid in this discussion, we assume that the FRF is given and analyze the problem for
the first stage only. The general case, for T stages, is then derived by induction. In this












s ≥ 0 . (3.29)
Parameter V0, is the initial volume of the reservoir and A is the water inflow during the
period. Both quantities are assumed to be known. Let (Ǵ) denote formulation (G), where
the tightest concave overestimator approximates R(e) : [0, ρU ]→ R.
















s.t. (3.27)− (3.28) .
In this case, since the LP and Lagrangian relaxation solutions are the same, the optimal mul-
tiplier equals the dual from the water balance constraints in the LP relaxation formulation,
i.e., λ∗ = λ.
We are now ready to state the main theorem,
Theorem 5 With one reservoir, the optimal objective function value of (G) using the tightest
concave overestimator for R(e) : [0, ρU ] → R, equals the optimal objective function value of
the Lagrangian relaxation formulation (LG), i.e., z(Ǵ) = z(LG) for all V0.
Proof. The theorem holds, if and only if there exits no V0 such that the objective function of
the Lagrangian is strictly less than the objective of the tight concave overestimated problem,
i.e., @ V0 such that z(LG) < z(Ǵ).
We prove this theorem by analyzing the following three cases:
(i.) The optimal solution of the Lagrangian only involves R(e), i.e., v = v.
From Theorem 2 we know that
{ẼnT} ⊂ {E ′kT} .
We also know that both objective functions in (LG) and (Ǵ) are concave. The objective
function in (LG) is concave because, for fixed v, the Lagrangian, with fixed multipliers,
is linear in λ and thus (LG) is the minimum of a collection of functions that are all
linear in λ [160]. The objective function in (Ǵ) is concave because we are using a
concave overestimator to represent the immediate revenue function.
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Additionally, from Theorem 1, we know that z(LG) ≤ z(Ǵ). But it is not possible for
z(LG) < z(Ǵ) if {ẼnT} ⊂ {E ′kT}; thus,
z(LG) = z(Ǵ) .
In other words, the concave overestimator is, by construction, the tightest concave
approximation of the immediate revenue function. So the Lagrangian relaxation cannot
be better but, from Theorem 1, we know it cannot be worse. Therefore, it must be the
same.
(ii.) The optimal solution of the Lagrangian only involves β(v), i.e., e
ρ
= 0.
Assume there exists V0 such that z(LG) < z(Ǵ). This contradicts the fact that the
tightest concave overestimator is used to approximate R(e) in (Ǵ) because the same
β(·) function is used in both formulations.
(iii.) The optimal solution of the Lagrangian involves both R(e) and β(v).
Again, assume there exists V0 such that z(LG) < z(G). Let the optimal objective
function value of the Lagrangian be z(LG) and its solution be e∗, v∗ and ε∗. Now,
fix the decision variable v = v by increasing the spillage. Increasing the spillage
has no impact on the optimal values for e∗ and ε∗. The Lagrangian then yields an
objective function value of z(LG) − β(v∗) + β(V ). This defines an optimal solution
for Ṽ0 = V0 − v∗ − V . Because both the Lagrangian and the LP relaxation have the
same function β(·) and the Lagrangian yields a valid cut, the cut computed by the
Lagrangian is a strictly better, concave (because it is linear) overestimator for R(e) for
Ṽ0. Again, this contradicts the fact that the tightest concave overestimator is used to
approximate R(e) in (Ǵ). 
In our approach, tightness of the constructed concave overestimator for R(e) is crucial.
If we construct a tight concave overestimator for R(e) on an interval I ! [0, ρU ], then
Lagrangian relaxation might yield a smaller (i.e., better) objective function value. This holds
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true, even if the exact revenue function R(e) is used on interval I instead of the interval
[0, ρU ]. In this case, the Lagrangian is able to automatically detect the precise bounds for
the immediate revenue function, which potentially results in a better solution. Consequently,
this may result in a tighter cut when used in conjunction with Benders decomposition. The
importance of this observation is made clear in the next subsection and this is the very
reason why the Lagrangian approach outperforms static, a priori approximation of R(e),
with multiple reservoirs.
Similarly, in the LP relaxation (B), the representation of R(e) needs to be exact on
[0, ρU ], i.e., there needs to be a breakpoint at V0 = 0 and at V0 = ρU . As was the case
with one reservoir, here, the LP and Lagrangian relaxation objective function values are the
same, and λ∗ = λ.
Theorem 5 can be generalized to include lower bounds U on the hydro plants’ generation.
However, if this is done, care has to be taken regarding the problem’s feasibility. Also, other
non-concave revenue functions can be used, but, in these cases, the LP relaxation and the
concave overestimation approach may not yield the same results.
3.5.2 Multiple Reservoirs
If the hydro producer operates more than one reservoir, then our approach tends to yield
better solutions and bounds for three main reasons.
First, our approach may yield tighter bounds and better solutions, because, rather than
overestimating the immediate revenue function, we represent it exactly. Our approach will
never yield worse upper bounds. By representing the immediate revenue functions exactly
we create more accurate FRF approximations. We utilize dynamic overestimation since we
approximate or overestimate the resulting FRFs as opposed to approximating or overesti-
mating the immediate revenue functions in each period, i.e., static overestimation. As a
result, since dynamic overestimation may yield tighter bounds, it also may generate tighter
optimality cuts.
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Second, the Lagrangian approach takes into account the cumulative output capacity
of the hydro plants. By doing so, it may detect that a certain portion of the immediate
revenue function can never be reached for specific inflow scenarios. This is consistent with
the above discussion on the single reservoir case – the immediate revenue function contains
this information implicitly in the upper bound ρU . In contrast to the cumulative output
capacity of the hydro plants, the Lagrangian cannot detect cases in which a certain portion of
the immediate revenue function can never be reached, resulting from bounds on the reservoir
volumes. This is because the computed cuts are valid for any reservoir levels, cf. Theorem
3. These facts, together, allow for the computation of tighter cuts compared to the LP
relaxation.
Third, for cases in which the producer can increase revenue in the current period and
simultaneously increase revenue in future periods, by focusing on the concavity of the cu-
mulative revenue and not the concavity of the revenue in each period, our approach creates
a “smoothing” effect that tends to yield better bounds and solutions. This can occur, for
example, if we remove the assumption that upstream water, used for production or spilled,
is available in the same period. Typically, practitioners (including us, in this paper) assume
that when a hydro producer uses water to produce energy in the current period, that water is
immediately available to the downstream reservoirs. This makes it so that, in any particular
period, the hydro producer must choose to increase revenue by either producing now or by
saving the water to be used in future periods. If, instead, the practitioner assumes that it
requires some amount of time (say one period) for the water being used for production in
the current period to flow to the downstream reservoirs, then the hydro producer’s decision
changes slightly. In this construct, if the hydro producer produces now it will increase rev-
enue in the current period and increase revenue in the future period as well, since production
in the current period makes more water available in the next period. Through adding delays
in the resulting inflows from upstream activity, there is a good chance that our approach will
yields tighter upper bounds and better solutions than LP relaxation due to the smoothing
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effect.
Figure 3.3 helps to explain the smoothing effect. In this simple example, by making
the cumulative function concave instead of making the function concave in each period and
summing the results, we are able to approximate the function without error.
Figure 3.3: Non-concave function smoothing. Solid lines depict the exact function while
dashed lines depict the function’s concave overestimator.
3.6 Computational Results
Our computational tests are performed on a standard desktop computer with an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i3 CPU @ 2.10 GHz processor, with 4GB of RAM, running on Windows 7. We
implemented the monolith formulation and the Benders decomposition algorithms (LP re-
laxation, concave overestimation, and Lagrangian relaxation) in GAMS 24.1.3 and solved
the resulting LPs and MILPs using CPLEX version 12.5.1.0.
3.6.1 Illustrative Example
A small example illustrates some of the finer points of our methodology. In the example,
we compare the optimal solution with the solution we obtain from our approach and the
solution found from solving the LP relaxation or through using a concave overestimator.
Assume there is one price-maker hydro producer that controls two independent reservoirs,
and that the time horizon of interest is only two periods long. Additionally, assume there is
one price-taker thermal producer in the first period, and two price-taker thermal producers
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in the second period (see Table 3.5). These parameters result in the immediate revenue
functions depicted in Figure 3.4. In the figure, period one is on the top and period two is on
the bottom. Since the immediate revenue function is linear for period one, the function, its
representation, and the concave overestimator are all the same.
Table 3.5: Example parameters
Thermal Parameters D j Gj Cj gj
Period 1 400 1 400 95 400
Period 2 400 1 300 150 300
2 110 300 100
Hydro Parameters V0i V i V i ρi U i Ait
Reservoir 1 Period 1 0 0 500 1 175 225
Period 2 25
Reservoir 2 Period 1 0 0 500 1 225 0
Period 2 0
Solving the problem via the monolith (true solution), via the LP relaxation, via the use of
a concave overestimator, or via Benders decomposition with Lagrangian relaxation results in
the variable and function values given in Table 3.6. Observe that solving the LP relaxation
or using a concave overestimator, in this case, results in the same solution and bounds on
the true solution. This will always be true for the upper bounds, but not necessarily for the
solution and lower bounds. Solving the problem using Benders decomposition coupled with
Lagrangian relaxation results in a tighter upper bound (smaller objective function value) on
the true solution. In this case, the Lagrangian is exact, i.e., the lower bound (best feasible
solution) equals the upper bound. This is not the case for the LP relaxation or the concave
overestimator.
Implementing the LP relaxation or concave overestimator solution, as opposed to the La-
grangian solution, results in a loss of revenue of $7,125 and inefficient production. Therefore,
in this example, the Lagrangian provides a much better solution. The optimality cuts gener-
ated by the LP relaxation and the Lagrangian relaxation are given in Figure 3.5. “Common















Figure 3.4: Example immediate revenue function (solid line), representation (dashed line) of
the immediate revenue function, and concave overestimator (dotted line)
cut generated from the LP relaxation solve while the “Lagrangian cut” is the unique cut gen-
erated from Lagrangian relaxation solve. We construct this example so that reservoir two
has an initial water volume of zero and no inflow so that we can plot the Benders optimality
cuts in two dimensions. Consequently, Figure 3.5 is a projection onto reservoir one’s space.
From this plot, we see that the cuts generated by the Lagrangian are always at least as tight
as the cuts generated by the LP relaxation (or through using a concave overestimator). The
cuts generated by the LP relaxation and the concave overestimator are identical. The hori-
zontal cut generated by the Lagrangian is exact, and this is why we have a zero optimality
gap. The cut is exact because, by representing the immediate revenue function exactly, we
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Table 3.6: Variable and function values found when solving the problem via the four different
approaches. Since e∗2t = 0, v
∗
2t = 0 ∀ t, we do not report these values.
Monolith LP Overestimator Lagrangian
Variable Level Variable Level Variable Level Variable Level
e∗11 150 e11 75 e11 75 e11 150
e∗12 100 e12 175 e12 175 e12 100
R∗1 $14,250 R1 $7,125 R1 $7,125 R1 $14,250
R∗2 $30,000 R2 $37,500 R2 $37,500 R2 $30,000
v∗12 75 v12 150 v12 150 v12 75




$37,125 z′C $37,125 - -
- - zB $37,125 zC $37,125 z $44,250
- - zB $44,625 zC $44,625 z $44,250
- - z(B) $44,625 z(C) $44,625 - -
- - Gap 20.20 % Gap 20.20 % Gap 0 %
create an exact approximation of the FRF and consequently generate exact Benders opti-
mality cuts. Through solving the LP relaxation (or the concave overestimator formulation),
we overestimate the immediate and the future revenue. In Figure 3.4, we can see how the
overestimation results in selecting inefficient production quantities (e11 = 75 and e12 = 175
vs. e∗11 = 150 and e
∗
12 = 100). The overestimation also leads to Benders optimality cuts that
are not as tight as those found via Lagrangian relaxation.
3.6.2 Case Studies
To demonstrate the value of our approach we model the electricity markets for three
Central American countries: El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In each solve, we
compare the solution found from our approach and the solution found from solving the LP
relaxation with the optimal solution. Since we have already demonstrated the relationship
between the LP relaxation and the concave overestimator, we now center our focus on the
differences between the LP relaxation and the Lagrangian.
We assume a time horizon of two years and solve the problem in monthly steps for “low,”














Figure 3.5: LP relaxation and Lagrangian relaxation optimality cuts. The FRF is denoted
by the solid gray line
each market, we assume that there is only one price-maker hydro producer that owns and
operates a series of reservoirs and run-of-the-river plants. Run-of-the-river plants are hy-
dro plants with little or no storage. They are modeled as reservoirs with no storage, i.e.,
V = V = 0. The thermal and hydro parameters used to model each of these countries’ elec-
tricity markets are given in Table 3.7, Table 3.8, and Table 3.10, and Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7,
Table 3.9, and Figure 3.8. Since the capacities Gj and U i change based on the number of
days in the month, we only show these parameters for a month with 30 days. In the figures,
reservoirs are depicted as triangles, while run-of-the-river plants are depicted as squares only.
Demand parameters and hydro inflows are given in Appendix A. Initial reservoir levels are
determined based on historical data. Last, if the price-taker thermal producers alone cannot
satisfy demand, we assume the price-maker hydro producer must at least produce enough
energy, in each period, to meet the residual demand. In this case and in our model, the
price-maker hydro producer is penalized for not meeting the residual demand and only earns
revenue for production levels above the residual demand. Of the three countries, that we
model, this only occurs for Honduras.
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Table 3.7: El Salvador’s thermal parameters
j Name Gj Cj
1 ACAJ-M 104.90 151,179.51
2 ACAJ-U 114.68 322,220.99
3 SOYA 10.76 175,482.49
4 TALN 72.96 142,497.25
5 NEPO 106.87 168,020.36
6 TEXT 30.88 154,235.77
7 BERL 80.35 2,728.25
8 AHUA 72.17 3,256.33
9 CESSA 24.11 171,616.60
10 GCSA 8.33 190,096.44
11 BORE 9.46 200,884.75
12 HILC 4.76 180,208.72
13 CASSA 33.48 419.00
14 LANG 30.13 414.00
15 LCAB 7.44 832.00




Table 3.8: Honduras’ thermal parameters
j Name Gj Cj
1 Lufussa1 29.39 162,954.50
2 Lufussa2 57.29 82,375.00
3 Emce2 40.92 80,125.00
4 Enersa 159.96 81,225.00
5 Ceiba 17.86 91,725.00
6 Lufu3-210 156.24 75,225.00
7 Elcosa 59.52 85,275.00
8 Puert ENE 11.90 253,536.80














































Figure 3.7: Honduras’ hydro profile and parameters. Run-of-the-river plants not included in
the profile are not connected to reservoirs.
Table 3.9: Honduras’ run-of-the-river hydro parameters
i Name ρi U i
4 Nispero 0.37 45.26
5 Nacaome 0.06 189.10
6 Esperanza 1.27 7.50
7 Cuyamapa 0.83 9.37
8 Cuyamel 0.31 18.75
9 Peq-hidro 0.52 29.30
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Table 3.10: Nicaragua’s thermal parameters
j Name Gj Cj
1 PNI-U1 37.20 100,500.00
2 PNI-U2 37.20 103,650.00
3 PMANAG-U3 31.99 117,825.00
4 PMANAG-U4 3.72 87,375.00
5 PMANAG-U5 3.72 86,850.00
6 PBRISA-U1 17.86 229,767.00
7 PBRISA-U2 28.27 179,695.20
8 PMOMOTOM 23.06 56,860.00
9 PAMFELS 42.41 83,850.00
10 PCENT1 37.20 79,287.50
11 PCENT2 13.76 84,225.00
12 PTIPITAPA 37.87 76,700.00
13 MTR 26.04 27,000.00
14 HChavez 44.64 162,109.20
15 CG Canal 4.46 85,625.00













Figure 3.8: Nicaragua’s hydro profile and parameters
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The resulting bounds found from solving the LP relaxation, the Lagrangian relaxation,
and the monolith (optimal solution) for each of the three countries and the five different inflow
scenarios are given in Table 3.11. Table 3.12 compares the optimality gaps and differences
between bounds for each of these solves individually and for each country. The optimality


















Similarly, we compute the optimality gaps and the differences between the bounds for












From the tables we observe that the Lagrangian function produces significantly smaller
optimality gaps. Also, in all but one case, the lower bound found from solving the Lagrangian
is much closer to the actual solution than the lower bound found from solving the LP
relaxation. This is an important distinction because the lower bounds represent the strategies
that would be implemented. The smaller gaps and better solutions, however, come at the
cost of longer computation times. Note, computation times from solving the monolith (B),
directly, are not reported because they are approximately the same as the times reported
for solving the LP relaxation. We expect the differences between the gaps to grow as we
lengthen the time horizon over which we study the problem and as we model larger systems.
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Table 3.11: Bounds found from solving the LP relaxation, the Lagrangian relaxation, and
the monolith [$M]
LP relaxation Lagrangian Monolith
Inflow z′
B
zB zB z(B) z z z(B)
El Salvador Low $921.50 $990.87 $1,024.82 $1,024.82 $998.06 $1,020.07 $1,001.33
Medium-low $922.65 $995.45 $1,035.21 $1,035.21 $1,000.72 $1,034.15 $1,005.12
Medium $914.15 $996.42 $1,034.88 $1,034.88 $1,001.23 $1,030.79 $1,007.29
Medium-high $955.44 $1,035.57 $1,063.09 $1,063.09 $1,038.32 $1,038.32 $1,040.62
High $976.58 $1,069.72 $1,098.74 $1,098.74 $1,068.36 $1,098.74 $1,074.21
Honduras Low $265.25 $299.59 $340.66 $341.36 $304.57 $330.43 $312.03
Medium-low $317.06 $339.31 $371.89 $372.90 $346.26 $367.45 $347.09
Medium $326.78 $343.86 $378.23 $379.15 $355.25 $372.65 $355.39
Medium-high $379.03 $393.72 $413.75 $414.64 $394.08 $411.75 $394.90
High $384.90 $395.99 $416.11 $417.21 $396.50 $415.41 $396.77
Nicaragua Low $188.10 $188.90 $191.46 $191.46 $189.21 $190.47 $189.25
Medium-low $193.08 $193.56 $197.05 $197.05 $194.91 $196.44 $194.93
Medium $194.64 $196.26 $198.73 $198.73 $196.62 $198.08 $197.10
Medium-high $199.10 $200.45 $203.43 $203.43 $201.01 $202.77 $201.81
High $225.22 $226.64 $229.19 $229.19 $227.55 $229.19 $228.08
Table 3.12: Optimality gaps and computation times
LP relaxation Lagrangian
Inflow Gap Gap’ ∆ LB ∆ UB Time Gap ∆ LB ∆ UB Time
El Salvador Low 3.99% 11.21% 0.97% 2.99% 00:08 3.34% 0.44% 2.89% 12:51
Medium-low 3.43% 12.20% 1.06% 2.35% 00:08 2.21% 0.33% 1.87% 13:13
Medium 3.86% 13.21% 1.09% 2.74% 00:08 2.95% 0.61% 2.33% 12:52
Medium-high 2.66% 11.27% 0.49% 2.16% 00:07 2.39% 0.22% 2.16% 12:40
High 2.71% 12.51% 0.42% 2.28% 00:07 2.84% 0.55% 2.28% 11:37
Average 3.33% 12.08% 0.81% 2.50% 00:07 2.75% 0.43% 2.31% 12:39
Honduras Low 13.71% 28.70% 4.15% 9.18% 00:06 8.49% 2.45% 5.90% 22:00
Medium-low 9.60% 17.61% 2.29% 7.14% 00:05 6.12% 0.24% 5.87% 22:50
Medium 10.00% 16.02% 3.35% 6.43% 00:10 4.90% 0.04% 4.86% 22:54
Medium-high 5.09% 9.40% 0.30% 4.78% 00:08 4.49% 0.21% 4.27% 22:12
High 5.08% 8.39% 0.20% 4.87% 00:09 4.77% 0.07% 4.70% 21:48
Average 8.70% 16.02% 2.06% 6.48% 00:08 5.75% 0.60% 5.12% 22:21
Nicaragua Low 1.35% 1.78% 0.18% 0.17% 00:04 0.66% 0.02% 0.64% 08:02
Medium-low 1.80% 2.06% 0.71% 1.09% 00:07 0.78% 0.01% 0.77% 08:32
Medium 1.26% 2.10% 0.43% 0.83% 00:07 0.59% 0.09% 0.50% 07:56
Medium-high 1.49% 2.17% 0.68% 0.80% 00:07 0.88% 0.40% 0.48% 05:58
High 1.12% 1.76% 0.64% 0.49% 00:02 0.72% 0.24% 0.49% 04:27
Average 1.40% 1.97% 0.53% 0.68% 00:05 0.73% 0.15% 0.58% 06:59
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we provide a solution to a problem that has received very little attention
in the literature. We present a new methodology to be used for a single price-maker hydro
producer seeking to maximize revenue in the day-ahead electricity market. Existing tech-
niques either solve the LP relaxation of the problem or approximate the revenue functions
via concave overestimators. These approaches first create concave approximations of the
relevant functions and then combine the results to generate FRF approximations. We have
proven that these two techniques are identical, in that they both provide the same upper
bounds.
Our method combines Benders decomposition with Lagrangian relaxation to produce ef-
ficient solutions for the bidding problem for a single price-maker hydro producer, over the
medium term. We utilize a representation of the immediate revenue function to provide bet-
ter upper bounds and solutions. Additionally, rather than making the price-maker producer’s
revenue function concave in every stage, we first combine the immediate revenue function
and FRF and then make the resulting aggregate function concave. The resulting aggregate
function, in many cases, yields a better approximation of the true revenue. For this reason,
in many cases, our methodology yields tighter optimality cuts and consequently better upper
bounds and better solutions than existing methods. And, in all cases, upper bounds found
via our approach are never worse than upper bounds found via existing methods.
To emphasize the fundamentals of our approach and to have a benchmark with which
to compare our results, we assume inflows are known with certainty. Future work will
incorporate uncertainty in reservoir inflows. Ultimately, this approach is to be paired with
SDDP so that large hydro systems can be modeled and solved for price-maker producers. In
addition to incorporating uncertainty, future efforts in this area could
• study the problem and modify our approach for cases with multiple price makers;
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• study how to modify this methodology so that it can be used to model other non-convex
model characteristics, e.g., power flow constraints [87, 161]; and/or




STRATEGIC BIDDING FOR A PRICE-MAKER HYDROELECTRIC PRODUCER:
STOCHASTIC DUAL DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING AND LAGRANGIAN
RELAXATION
Modified from a paper submitted to
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Gregory Steeger 10 11, Timo Lohmann 12, and Steffen Rebennack 13 14
4.1 Abstract
In bid-based markets, energy producers seek bidding strategies that maximize their rev-
enue. Because of their unique ability to store energy (water), hydroelectric producers must
consider the opportunity cost associated with producing energy today versus saving it for
use in a future period. The opportunity cost makes decisions in each stage impact those
made in other stages. In this paper, we seek the maximum-revenue production schedule for
a single price-maker hydroelectric producer. We assume the producer sells energy in the
day-ahead electricity market and has the ability to impact the market-clearing price with its
bids. Our approach models the price-maker hydroelectric producer’s bidding decision via a
combination of Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming and Lagrangian relaxation. In this
framework, we dualize the water balance equations, allowing an exact representation of the
non-concave immediate revenue function, while preserving the concave shape of the future
revenue function. We model inflow uncertainty and its stagewise dependence by a periodic
autoregressive model. To demonstrate our approaches’ utility, we model Honduras’ electric-
ity market assuming that the thermal producers act as price takers and that one price-maker
10Primary researcher and author
11Graduate student, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
12Graduate student, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
13Author for correspondence
14Assistant professor, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
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hydro producer operates all of the hydroelectric plants.
4.2 Nomenclature
Our convention is to denote parameters with uppercase letters, decision variables with
lowercase letters, and vectors of parameters or decision variables with boldface characters.
Indices and Sets:
I price maker’s hydro plants, i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}
J price-taker thermal plants, j ∈ J = {1, . . . , J}
K set of breakpoints of Rt(et), k ∈ K = {1, . . . , K}
L backward openings, l ∈ L = {1, . . . , L}
M forward inflow scenarios, m ∈M = {1, . . . ,M}
T time stages t ∈ T = {1, . . . , T}
Ui hydro plants immediately upstream of hydro plant i
Parameters:
Dt demand in market, in stage t [GWh]
Gj quantity bid (capacity) for producer j [GWh]
Cj price bid (operating cost) for producer j [$/GWh]
E ′kt k
th breakpoint of Rt(et), in stage t [GWh]
R′kt revenue at the k
th breakpoint, in stage t [$]
V i minimum storage storage level for reservoir i [hm
3]
V i maximum storage level for reservoir i [hm
3]
Vi1 initial storage level for reservoir i [hm
3]
U i water turbine outflow capacity for reservoir i [hm
3]
Ait inflow for reservoir i, in stage t [hm
3]
ρi production coefficient for reservoir i [GWh/hm
3]
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γvimt cut slope for reservoir i, scenario m, stage t [$/hm
3]
γaimt cut factor for reservoir i, scenario m, stage t [$/hm
3]
γcmt cut constant for scenario m, stage t [$]
Periodic AutoRegressive (PAR) Parameters:
εit white noise process for reservoir i, in stage t [-]
µit mean inflow for reservoir i, in stage t [hm
3]
σit inflow std deviation for reservoir i, in stage t [hm
3]
φit coefficient for reservoir i, in stage t [-]
ϕit slope used to express inflow Ait [$/hm
3]
const constant used to express inflow Ait [hm
3]
Functions:
Rt(et) immediate revenue function, in stage t [$]
βt(·) maximum revenue from stage t to T [$]
Lt(·) maximum revenue from t to T , for relaxation [$]
Binary Decision Variables (SOS2):
µkt indicator variable for Rt(et) and breakpoint k [-]
Decision Variables:
gj quantity of energy produced for producer j [GWh]
πdt market-clearing price, in stage t [$/GWh]
et total hydro production (bid), in stage t [GWh]
eit hydro production from reservoir i, in stage t [GWh]
sit spillage from reservoir i, in stage t [hm
3]
vit volume of reservoir i, at beginning of stage t [hm
3]
λit dual for reservoir i, in stage t [$/hm
3]
ηt+1 approximate revenue, in stage t+ 1 [$]
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4.3 Introduction
Though the power of water was harnessed and used, by the Greeks, as early as 2000
years ago, it was the advent of the hydraulic reaction turbine (or the Kaplan turbine), in
the twentieth century, that led to the development of modern-day hydroelectric power [2].
Perlman [3] states that hydropower is the most important and widely used renewable source
of energy and that hydropower provides for 19% of total electricity production worldwide. In
the last several years, energy production from renewable sources has become more affordable
and experts believe this trend will continue. Since 2004, worldwide renewable energy capacity
has grown at annual rates of 10% to 60% [5].
Our growing reliance on hydropower, demands we develop more efficient ways to utilize
it. With this in mind, we ask: What is the revenue-maximizing production schedule for a
single price-maker hydro producer, facing a bid-based market?
This problem is not new and has been studied by many before us. However, those that
study the problem either limit their research by focusing on some of the problem’s special
characteristics, by limiting the size of the systems they study, or by limiting the time horizon
[91]. Those that study realistic manifestations of the problem, over time horizons longer
than one year, either use Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming (SDDP) combined with
a Linear Programming (LP) relaxation [159], or SDDP paired with concave overestimation
of the revenue function [69]. Steeger and Rebennack [162] prove the equivalence of these
approaches and show how Lagrangian relaxation paired with Benders decomposition can
yield tighter bounds and better solutions than these approaches, when reservoir inflows are
deterministic. In the present paper we extend the methodology presented in Steeger and
Rebennack [162] by considering stagewise dependent stochastic inflows.
This work contributes to the body of knowledge through
• expanding the methodology presented in Steeger and Rebennack [162] for stochastic
reservoir inflows with stagewise dependency;
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• presenting a novel approach that determines a coherent hydro operations policy for
a single price maker, over time horizons longer than one year, in a strategic bidding
framework; and
• performing a case study for the power system of Honduras.
There are three papers that combine SDDP-type algorithms with Lagrangian relaxation
through dualizing the water balance equations: Thomé et al. [85], Cerisola et al. [121] and
Steeger and Rebennack [162]. Thomé et al. [85] and Steeger and Rebennack [162] are un-
published. None of these three approaches utilize a Periodic AutoRegressive (PAR) model
to represent the stagewise dependence of the water inflows. We distinguish our paper further
from the literature by doing so (cf. Section 4.4.4).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.4 provides the necessary
background and framework. Next, Section 4.5 presents the methodology. Section 4.6 demon-
strates the approaches’ utility through a case study on the Honduran power system. Last,
Section 4.7 summarizes our findings and conclusions.
4.4 Background
Before presenting the methodology, we build the necessary framework. This includes an
explanation of the electricity market the price-maker faces, some of the problem’s intricacies,
a brief description of SDDP, and a short review of Lagrangian relaxation.
4.4.1 Day-ahead Electricity Market
Deregulation spurred the development of power-industry-tailored markets that utilize
procurement auctions. One example is the day-ahead electricity market [10]. A significant
amount of power is allocated through the day-ahead electricity market [12]. We assume that
our price-maker hydro producer faces a day-ahead electricity market in which (i) producers
submit price and/or quantity bids for the following day; (ii) the market operator (utility
company) adjusts the market-clearing price, while minimizing costs, until the total energy
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dispatched is equal to the total demand; and (iii) energy producers are paid for the amount
of energy they dispatch, according to the market-clearing price.
4.4.2 Opportunity Costs, Uncertainty, & Dynamic Programming
Hydro producers possess the ability to store energy (water) at practically no cost, which
creates a time coupling between stages in the problem. The decision of whether to produce a
unit of energy today versus saving it for future production is known as an opportunity cost.
The opportunity cost of today’s production must be considered in each decision. Due to
the inherent time coupling, dynamic programming methods are typically used for modeling
hydro producers and the decisions they face. Another characteristic that impacts a hydro
producer’s production or bidding decision is the uncertain nature of inflows. Hydro producers
experience large variations in reservoir inflows, especially over horizons that last longer than
one year. To account for these variations, practitioners rely on stochastic programming
methods.
Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) is arguably the most prevalent method used
to model hydro producers. SDP makes use of discrete combinations of reservoir levels to
approximate revenue in future periods. This can result in problems that are intractable due
to “curses-of-dimensionality.” The curses-of-dimensionality are three combinatorial “explo-
sions” of the state or scenario space with an increase in (i) reservoir level discretization, (ii)
scenarios, and (iii) time stages. This limitation prohibits SDP from being able to model
“large” systems or systems over “long” time horizons.
4.4.3 Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming (SDDP)
Pereira and Pinto [15] introduce SDDP, a multi-stage Benders decomposition algorithm
that utilizes sampling approaches to break the aforementioned curses-of-dimensionality [53,
92]. In the context of hydroelectric modeling, SDDP decomposes the original T -stage stochas-
tic linear program into one-stage subproblems that are “connected” through so called water
balance equations. Philpott and Guan [163] and Shapiro [164] substantiate the SDDP algo-
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rithm by analyzing its statistical and convergence properties. Since its introduction, SDDP
has become an established method in hydro-thermal scheduling because of its ability to
model large hydro systems, over the medium to long term (i.e., one to ten+ years). How-
ever, because the algorithm makes use of Benders optimality cuts, it can only be applied to
convex problems. This limitation poses challenges in modeling many important real-world
aspects, e.g., resulting from non-linear relationships in head-effects [121], gas and electricity
networks [87, 165].
Instead of solving the subproblem at each node, SDDP relies on scenario tree sampling.
The “forward pass” solves one-stage subproblems for each of the sample paths through the
scenario tree, from the first to the last stage. Associated water levels are stored in the process.
In the forward pass, a feasible solution and an approximate lower bound for the overall
maximization problem are obtained. The “backward pass” solves one-stage subproblems
from the last to the first stage. In the last step of the backward pass, solving the first stage
problem yields an upper bound to the overall problem. The algorithm iterates until the
lower bound and upper bound satisfy some predetermined statistical convergence criterion.
Much work has been done to extend the SDDP methodology so that it incorporates
(linearized) transmission constraints [93], natural gas supply, demand and transportation
networks [94], CO2 emission allowance constraints [86, 95], alternate sampling strategies
[96], risk constraints [97, 98], and expansion planning [166, 167]. Extensions have also
been made to better model hydro inflow scenarios. Specifically, Infanger and Morton [168]
and Queiroz and Morton [169] develop cut-sharing methods to overcome the restriction of
independent inflows and to allow interstage dependency. SDDP, which was designed for
a regulated market environment, has also been tailored to deregulated electricity markets.
In this setting, electricity prices are typically uncertain, giving rise to hybrid SDP-SDDP
methods [55] and bidding strategy analyses [91, 162].
To combat the convexity limitations of SDDP, we transform our non-convex problem into
a convex approximation using Lagrangian relaxation.
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4.4.4 Lagrangian Relaxation
Lagrangian relaxation is typically used to make difficult problems tractable by moving
complicating constraints from the constraint set into the objective function and, thus, cre-
ating a relaxation of the original problem. In many cases, Lagrangian relaxation is used
to solve large problems by decomposing them into a number of solvable independent sub-
problems. However, since Lagrangian relaxation solves a relaxed problem, the solution it
provides may not be the optimal solution of the original problem. Lagrangian relaxation is
only guaranteed to provide bounds on the original problem [107]. The tightest bound one can
find through Lagrangian relaxation is achieved by minimizing (when the original problem
is a maximization problem) the resulting Lagrangian objective function. Unfortunately, the
minimization problem is seldom easy to solve. Instead of explicitly solving the minimization
problem to obtain the optimal set of Lagrangian multipliers, practitioners use subgradient
methods [108, 153, 156].
Two recent bodies of work that employ a method similar to ours are presented in Cerisola
et al. [121] and Thomé et al. [85]. The approaches appear similar, because, in both our ap-
proach and theirs, the water balance constrains are dualized in order to create a concave (for
a maximization problem) or convex (for a minimization problem) functional form. Cerisola
et al. and Thomé’s approaches differ from ours because their hydro-thermal scheduling mod-
els incorporate nonlinear reservoir head effects. They optimize a linear objective function
over a non-convex feasible region, whereas we optimize a non-linear (non-convex) objective
function over a convex feasible region.
4.5 Methodology
In any stage t, the price maker seeks to maximize revenue, or mathematically,




The difficulty is that the market-clearing price, πdt , depends on how much the price maker
bids, et, and vice versa. We overcome this difficultly by analyzing the shape of the price-
maker’s revenue function.
4.5.1 Market Clearing and Revenue Function
To determine the shape of the price-maker’s revenue function, we assume that each of
the price-taker producers’ capacities and variable costs are known. We then assume that
each price taker bids these quantities, which is their optimal decision in a market consisting
solely of price-takers [31]. Additionally, we assume that the price-maker offers a quantity
bid at zero price, so that all of the energy they offer as a bid is sold (given adequate market
demand). With these assumptions in place, we examine the day-ahead electricity market’s
structure. The market operator satisfies demand while minimizing cost. The market-clearing
price, πdt , is determined based on the value of et. The market-clearing formulation, for a fixed








gj = D − Et (πdt )
0 ≤ gj ≤ Gj ∀j.
If all of the parameters are known, determining the market-clearing dispatch (i.e., the
set of producers that supply some nonzero amount of energy to satisfy demand) is trivial,
and one does not need to explicitly solve the market-clearing formulation. After determining
the market-clearing dispatch, we plot the price-maker’s revenue as a function of the quantity
bids, Rt(et) (solid gray line in Figure 4.1). As the price maker’s bid increases, the most costly
price-taker producer, that is part of the market-clearing dispatch “drops out,” and this gives
the revenue function its sawtooth shape. By eliminating downward steps in the revenue











Figure 4.1: Exact representation of the revenue function
This is an exact representation because, with unlimited spillage, the price-maker’s optimal
generation decisions will never include inefficient amounts.
If the price-taker thermal producers alone cannot satisfy demand, we assume the price-
maker hydro producer must at least produce enough energy, in each period, to meet the
residual demand. In this case, the price-maker hydro producer is penalized for not meeting
the residual demand and only earns revenue for production levels above the residual demand.
Figure 4.1 does not depict this case.
4.5.2 Formulation
We write the bidding problem for the price-maker (BP ), assuming deterministic inflows,


















µkt = 1 (4.3)
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V i ≤ vi,t+1 ≤ V i ∀i (4.5)
0 ≤ eit
ρi
≤ U i ∀i (4.6)
0 ≤ µkt ≤ 1 ∀k (4.7)
sit ≥ 0 ∀i (4.8)
µkt ∈ SOS2 ∀k, (4.9)
where βT+1(vT+1,AT ) ≡ 0. In the above formulation, we sum the production from each of
the price-maker’s reservoirs yielding total production in (4.2). The constraints in (4.4) are the
water balance constraints that couple the decisions in stage t with all past and future stages.
We assume that water used for production or spilled from reservoir m ∈ Ui, immediately
upstream from reservoir i, is available to reservoir i in the same stage. Constraints (4.5)
and (4.6) guarantee that we do not exceed reservoir capacity and that the water outflow
does not exceed the capacity limitations of the water turbine, for any of the I reservoirs.
Last, (4.3), (4.7), and (4.9) model the piecewise-linear exact representation of the revenue
function. To model this function we use Special Ordered Sets of type 2 (SOS2) variables
[170]. If we model the inflows Ait stochastically, state-of-the-art MILP solvers are not able
to solve (BP ) for large reservoir systems and/or many stages. Consequently, we rely on
decomposition algorithms, such as Benders decomposition, to solve the problem.
4.5.3 SDDP with Lagrangian Relaxation
Having already described the general idea of SDDP in Section 4.4.3, we are now ready to
go into greater detail. For our case study, we assume that uncertainty in inflows is stagewise
dependent and use a PAR model, with lag one, to model this dependency. The PAR model








where εit is a white noise process with mean 0. Parameters µit, σit and φit for each hydro
plant and stage are estimated using historic inflow data.
We construct a stagewise dependent scenario tree by sampling residuals from the white
noise process εit via a bootstrap method, and correlate the residuals to represent the spatial
dependence between hydro plants. Alternatively, the spatial dependence can be explicitly
modeled [171]. SDDP does not require the full scenario tree but, instead, relies on M paths
through the tree. These so-called forward inflow scenarios are denoted by Aimt, t = 1, . . . , T ,
m = 1, . . . ,M and Figure 4.3 shows 100 such scenarios. We identify L so-called backward
openings for each forward inflow scenario m in each stage t, denoted by Ailmt, l = 1, . . . , L.
Benders optimality cuts approximating the future revenue function βt+1(V t+1,At) for





































where λilm,t+1 and ψflmt are the dual variables associated with (4.4) and the existing Benders















Note, L̂t+1(·) is defined later in this section. We express inflow Ait using the state variable
Ai,t−1 as





const = µit − ϕitµi,t−1 + σitεit.
In the above algorithm, the objective function in the maximization problem must be
concave. To make our objective function concave we turn to Lagrangian relaxation, cf.
Section 4.4.4, and dualize the water balance constraints (4.4). The Lagrangian relaxation
(Lλ), for t = 1, . . . , T , reads













Vit + Ait −
eit
ρi









+ Lt+1(λt+1, . . . ,λT ,vt+1,At)
]
s.t. (4.2), (4.3), (4.5)− (4.9),




Lt(λt, . . . ,λT ,Vt,At−1).
Proposition 2 in Steeger and Rebennack [162] states that function Lt(Vt,At−1) is piecewise-
linear and concave in Vt for any t = 1, . . . , T . Following the same logic, the function
Lt(Vt,At−1) is also concave in At−1.
The SDDP algorithm approximates the FRF in (Lλ) by examining each stage of the
problem. The Benders optimality cuts for stage t are computed by solving the t + 1-stage
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f,t+1,∀f ∈ F (4.12)
s.t. (4.2), (4.3), (4.5)− (4.9). (4.13)
To preserve concavity, the Benders cuts (4.12) must also be dualized. This is because
the inflows At, in addition to Vt+1, enter problem t + 1 as state variables. However, note
that the dual variables ψf,t+1 associated with (4.12) are either 0 or 1 in the above problem,
with relaxed integrality conditions. This is because ηt+2 enters the objective function with
a coefficient of 1. An increase in the right-hand side of (4.12) by +1 directly translates into
an increase in the objective function value by +1 if that particular cut is binding, and 0
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f∈F ψf,t+1 6= 1, the unrestricted variable ηt+2 remains in L̂t+1(λt+1,Vt+1,At) and,
thus, makes the problem unbounded.
Noting that dual variables ψf,t+1 are either 0 or 1 we propose the following approach:
(i) leave constraints (4.12) in the constraint set; (ii) obtain Lagrangian multipliers λit via a
subgradient method, as stated above; and (iii) solve the subproblem with relaxed integrality
conditions, yielding dual variables on (4.12). The dual variables on (4.12) can be used as
Lagrangian multipliers ψf,t+1, because (4.12) overestimates βt+2(Vt+2,At+1) for any t =
1, . . . , T , cf. Theorem 3 in Steeger and Rebennack [162].
In summary, we solve MILP problems (4.1)-(4.9) in which βt+1(vt+1,At) are approxi-
mated by Benders optimality cuts (4.10), denoted by (B̂Pt), and MILP problems (4.11)-
(4.13), denoted by (L̂λt).
The resulting SDDP algorithm with Lagrangian relaxation is presented in Algorithm 4
using the tailored subgradient method as summarized in Algorithm 5.
4.6 Computational Results: Honduras Case Study
To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we model Honduras’ electricity market. Al-
gorithm 4 is carried out on a single core machine using GAMS 24.1.3 with CPLEX 12.5.1.0.
We terminate our algorithm after five iterations and, consequently, the results shown corre-
spond to the fifth iteration. We analyze our results over one full hydrological season, i.e.,
one year, with monthly fidelity. To avoid undesired reservoir-level effects at the end of the
one year horizon, we solve our models over two years (24 stages).
Thermal parameters are given in Table 4.1, while hydro parameters are given in Figure 4.2
and Table 4.2. All capacities shown are for a 30-day month and costs are in millions of
dollars. We use inflow data from 1965-2002 to generate 100 inflow scenarios for each of the
nine hydro plants (Figure 4.3), representing the number of forward inflows scenarios, and
use 25 backward openings. The thermal and hydro parameters allow us to build the price
maker’s revenue function (Figure 4.4). In the figure, dashed lines depict the capacities (width
of the lines) and variables costs (slopes of the lines) of the price-taker thermal producers.
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Algorithm 4 SDDP with Lagrangian Relaxation
Step (0). Initialize: ηt = 0, ∀ t ≥ 2 for first forward pass only, ẑ = 0, z = +∞, and ι = 1.
while Stopping criteria not satisfied do
Forward Pass
for t = 1, . . . , T do
for m = 1, . . . ,M do
Step (1). Solve the t-stage problem (B̂Pt). Let Emtι := e
∗
mt be the optimal genera-
tion and Vm,t+1,ι := v
∗
m,t+1 be the optimal vector of reservoir volumes computed.
end for
end for














for t = T, T − 1, . . . , 2 do
for m = 1, . . . ,M do
for l = 1, . . . , L do
Step (3). With the stored Vmtι values from the forward pass, solve the t-stage
Lagrangian problem (L̂λt) using Algorithm 5 with At := Almt and V t := V mt
to find the optimal value for the multipliers, λlmt and ψflmt, f ∈ F.
end for
Step (4). Calculate a new Benders optimality cut (4.10) for stage t using the




for m = 1, . . . ,M do
Step (5). Solve the first-stage problem (B̂P1) and store its optimal objective function
value as ẑm.
end for







Step (7). Increment the iteration count ι← ι+ 1.
end while
Step (8). Exit with ẑ, z.
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Algorithm 5 Update for Lagrangian multipliers (for stage t, water reservoir levels Vt and
inflows At)
Step (0). Initialize: LBest = +∞, κ = 1, θ1 = 12 .
Step (1). Solve t-stage relaxed problem (L̂λt) with relaxed integrality conditions and
obtain duals λt associated with (4.4); assign λtκ = λt.
while Stopping criteria not satisfied do
Step (2). Solve the Lagrangian problem (L̂λt) for stage t using λtκ.
Step (3). Determine if z(L̂λt) yields a bound tighter than the bound obtained thus far:
if z(L̂λt) < LBest, then LBest = z(L̂λt) and λ
∗
t = λtκ.
Step (4). Update multipliers and step size:
λt,κ+1 = max{0,λtκ − θκεtκ} and θκ+1 = 1κ+2 .
Step (5). Increment the iteration count κ← κ+ 1.
end while
Step (6). Solve the relaxed Lagrangian problem (L̂λt) for stage t using λ
∗




Step (7). Exit with LBest, λ∗t and ψ
∗
ft, f ∈ F.
R denotes the residual demand and MaxU marks the total hydro capacity from all hydro
plants. Though the plot shows the revenue for the month of January, it is representative for
all months in the time horizon.
Table 4.1: Honduras’ thermal parameters
j Name Gj Cj
1 Lufu3-210 156.24 0.075225
2 Emce2 40.92 0.080125
3 Enersa 159.96 0.081225
4 Lufussa2 57.29 0.082375
5 Elcosa 59.52 0.085275
6 Ceiba 17.86 0.091725
7 Lufussa1 29.39 0.162955
8 Puert ENE 11.90 0.253537




Using our methodology to find the price-maker hydro producer’s maximum revenue yields

















Figure 4.2: Honduras’ hydro profile and parameters. Run-of-the-river plants not included in
the profile are not connected to reservoirs.
Table 4.2: Honduras’ run-of-the-river hydro parameters
i Name ρi U i
4 Nispero 0.37 45.26
5 Nacaome 0.06 189.10
6 Esperanza 1.27 7.50
7 Cuyamapa 0.83 9.37
8 Cuyamel 0.31 18.75
9 Peq-hidro 0.52 29.30
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Figure 4.4: Sample revenue function (January shown)
bold line while the envelopes around the means show the range of values in all 100 scenarios.
The two legends above each plot describe the curves shown and their associated axis, i.e.,
the top-right legend indicates the curves that belong to the vertical axis on the right.
Figure 4.5 shows that aggregate hydro production parallels residual demand for the first
six months, because it is optimal to produce just above the residual demand, at breakpoint
A, in Figure 4.4 until there is enough inflow to produce above breakpoint B, in Figure 4.4.
It is not until month seven (“July”) where there is enough storage and inflow to make it
profitable to produce past breakpoint B. Optimal production quantities are typically at
breakpoints left of a plateau because higher production does not yield additional revenue,
and revenue obtained from producing just below this point can be increased by producing a
marginal amount more. In fact, our results show only two different market prices because
production is either at breakpoint A (where thermal generators 8-9 are offline) or at the
rightmost section of the revenue curve (where thermal generators 5-9 are offline). Also, in
the first five months, the water level decreases as hydro production increases because the
inflow remains fairly constant. This occurs until month six (“June”), in which there is a large
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Figure 4.5: Hydro production, aggregate reservoir levels, and demand
Figure 4.6 demonstrates how the most costly price-taker thermal producers “drop out”
of the market-clearing dispatch as the price-maker increases its production. This explains
why the market-clearing price decreases as hydro production increases. Figure 4.7 shows
the relationship between the aggregate water level and the market-clearing price. Generally,
as the level increases, the market-clearing price decreases. The aggregate water level is the
level at the end of the month, so there is a one month lag between it and the market-clearing
price. Last, Figure 4.8 shows how the aggregate water level and the aggregate inflows move
in tandem, except from month four to five and from month nine to ten. To explain what is
causing this we must also examine hydro production in these months. From month four to
five, inflows increase and water levels decrease; thus, hydro production must also increase.
In contrast, from month nine to ten, inflows decrease while water levels increase. This means
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Figure 4.8: Aggregate reservoir levels and aggregate hydro inflows
4.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a state-of-the-art approach that finds the revenue-maximizing pro-
duction schedule for a price-maker hydro producer operating in a bid-based market. Most
practitioners that study this problem do not model realistic manifestations or limit the time
horizons over which they model the problem. Our work fills a void in the literature through
presenting a method that determines a coherent operations policy, over the medium term, in a
strategic bidding framework, while incorporating stochastic inflows. The approach combines
SDDP and Lagrangian relaxation to form a methodology that solves the problem over time
horizons that last longer than one year. A case study of the Honduras’ market establishes
the usefulness of our approach.
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CHAPTER 5
STRATEGIC BIDDING FOR MULTIPLE PRICE-MAKER HYDROELECTRIC
PRODUCERS
Modified from a paper to be submitted
Gregory Steeger 15 16 and Steffen Rebennack 17 18
5.1 Abstract
Hydroelectric producers possess the unique ability to store energy (water). Storage cre-
ates an opportunity cost associated with producing today versus producing in future periods.
Opportunity costs for hydroelectric producers link the decisions made in each stage and make
the hydroelectric producer’s bidding problem difficult to solve. In this paper, we ask: What is
the revenue-maximizing production schedule for multiple price-maker hydroelectric produc-
ers competing in a deregulated, bid-based market? We assume a market that is comprised of
both price-taker thermal producers and price-maker hydroelectric producers. The market in-
teraction between the price-maker producers and the price-taker producers creates a revenue
function that contains jump discontinuities and is lower semi-continuous. For this reason,
mixed-integer linear programming techniques are required to model a price-maker’s revenue.
In every time stage, each price maker’s bidding decision is a move in a non-cooperative Nash-
Cournot game in which we seek a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. To find an equilibrium,
we create interpolations for each price maker’s best response function using mixed-integer
linear programming formulations within a dynamic programming framework. If multiple
Nash equilibria exist, we use a tailored bargaining algorithm to determine a unique solu-
tion. Unlike existing methods, our method guarantees the Pareto optimal equilibrium will
15Primary researcher and author
16Graduate student, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
17Author for correspondence
18Assistant professor, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business
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be found, when one exists. We utilize a backwards dynamic programming algorithm to solve
for a Markov perfect equilibrium over the entire time horizon.
5.2 Introduction
Hydropower is the most important and widely used renewable source of energy, account-
ing for 19% of total electricity production worldwide [3]. To take full advantage of this
resource, we need to develop better ways to model its use in real-world markets. A signif-
icant amount of power is allocated through the day-ahead electricity market [25]. Typical
day-ahead electricity markets can be described by the following three phases: (i) bidding,
in which producers submit price and/or quantity bids for the following day (in hourly in-
crements); (ii) clearing, in which the market operator (utility company) adjusts the market-
clearing price, while minimizing costs, until the energy dispatched equals demand; and (iii)
pricing, in which producers are paid for the amount of energy they dispatch, according to
the market-clearing price [10].
Hydroelectric producers possess the unique ability to store energy (water) for use in
future periods, in which it may generate more profit. The ability to store water creates an
opportunity cost for producers, associated with producing energy today versus saving it for
use in a future stage and makes it so decisions made in the current stage impact other periods
in the time horizon. Consequently, modeling and solving the maximum-revenue problem for
hydro producers non-trivial. Steeger et al. [91] find that the literature on the problem is
limited.
More often than not, practitioners assume that producers’ bids will have no impact on the
market-clearing price. Because the demand for electricity is relatively inelastic, Kelman et al.
[74] argue that changes in aggregate supply will alter the marker-clearing price. Similarly,
Bower et al. [172] argue that many electricity market structures are vulnerable to firms that
possess some amount of market power. Market power is the ability to influence prices in
one’s favor so that they differ from competitive levels [173]. In this paper, we assume the
market consists of both price makers, producers that can alter the market-clearing price with
111
their bids, and price takers, producers whose bids have no impact on the market-clearing
price.
When a competitive market consists of multiple price-maker producers, the revenue for
each producer depends on the bids from all other price-maker producers. In this case,
all of the price-maker producers act simultaneously to maximize their individual revenue.
The scenario is usually modeled via non-cooperative economic game theory in which the
practitioner seeks to find a set of bids such that, given all other price-maker producers’ bids,
no price-maker producer can improve (increase) their revenue by changing their bid. Such a
condition constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Our growing reliance on hydropower, and the lack of realistic models and efficient mod-
eling techniques for price-maker hydroelectric producers motivate this work. We ask, “What
is the revenue-maximizing production schedule for multiple price-maker hydroelectric pro-
ducers competing in a deregulated, bid-based market?”
In each time stage, we determine a price maker’s revenue-maximizing bids, subject to
all other price makers’ best responses to those bids, through a Mixed-Integer Linear Pro-
gramming (MILP) formulation. When this is done for all price makers, the answer defines
a Nash equilibrium. Each price-maker’s MILP incorporates interpolations of the other price
makers’ best response functions. The interpolation used to approximate a price maker’s best
response function is created through solving an MILP formulation that is based on discrete
bids and reservoir levels from the other price makers. In cases with multiple equilibria, we use
a tailored bargaining algorithm to determine the equilibrium that should be implemented.
We contribute to the body of literature on hydro producer modeling through
• extending the methodology presented in Steeger and Rebennack [162] to model multiple
price-maker producers;
• presenting a state-of-the-art methodology that finds a revenue-maximizing hydro op-
erations policy for multiple price-maker producers, in a strategic bidding framework;
and
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• introducing a tailored bargaining solution for cases with multiple equilibria.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 5.3, we review the fun-
damentals of game theory relevant to our problem and review some literature studying the
bidding problem for multiple price-maker producers. Section 5.4 presents our methodology.
Following this, Section 5.5 demonstrates the utility of our approach through illustrative ex-
amples and a case study. Section 5.6 lists areas for future work. Finally, Section 5.7 presents
our findings and conclusions.
5.3 Fundamentals and Literature Review
In the next two subsections, we discuss both the fundamentals necessary to analyze this
problem and relevant literature.
5.3.1 Fundamentals
In non-cooperative economic games, the payoff each player receives depends not only on
one’s own actions, but also on the actions of others. This is termed strategic interdependence
[174] and is the defining characteristic of a non-cooperative economic game. We can describe
a game by five aspects:
(i.) the players
(ii.) the rules – Who moves when? What can the players do?
(iii.) the information available to each player – What do the players know when they
move?
(iv.) the actions available to each player (the action space) – What possible moves can
each player make?
(v.) the payoffs – What are the players’ preferences (i.e., utility functions) over the
available actions?
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For our application, the players are the price-maker hydro producers; all price makers
possess perfect information, i.e., for each move, each player has full knowledge of all of their
competitors’ previous moves; each price maker can choose to produce anywhere in the range
between zero and their capacity, in other words, the action space is continuous; and each
player’s payoff is the revenue they receive, in that stage. The rules of the games depend on
the type of game being played.
Non-cooperative economic games can be sequential move games or simultaneous move
games. In sequential move games, the players move sequentially. In contrast, in simultaneous
move games, all of the players (agents) make decisions simultaneously. Within simultaneous
move games there are two model variations, Bertrand models and Cournot models [175].
In Bertrand models, or price competition models, agents make price choices simultaneously
and the dispatch is determined by an Independent System Operator (ISO). In the Cournot
model, or quantity competition model, agents make quantity bids, simultaneously, and the
price is chosen to clear the market by the ISO or via an inverse demand function.
Since, in this market, the price-maker producers simultaneously decide how much to bid
(produce), we are specifically interested in the Cournot model. In simultaneous games, the
most common solution concept is that of a Nash equilibrium [176]. A Nash equilibrium exists,
if and only if each player’s move is a best response to the moves played by his rivals. Kelman
et al. [74] define a Nash equilibrium as a “standoff” situation in which no firm can unilaterally
increase its revenue by changing its production. In this paper we are only concerned with
pure-strategy equilibria and not mixed-strategy equilibria; thus, any reference to a Nash
equilibrium refers to a pure-strategy equilibrium.
The price-maker producers must determine their quantity bids in every time step, over
an indefinite time horizon. In every time step, whether monthly or hourly, the price-maker
producers seek a Nash equilibrium. This is an important distinction. In a multi-stage
problem, we could either satisfy the conditions for a Nash equilibrium over the entire time
horizon or in each stage. In other words, we must ask: “Does the production of the price
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makers have to satisfy the conditions for a Nash equilibrium in only the current stage or
the current stage and each and every future stage?” The latter is much more restrictive.
Since the decisions made today will impact future production, is it adequate to only seek
a Nash equilibrium in the current stage? The answer is no, because decisions in the future
will also have an impact on today’s decisions and thus the constraints for a Nash equilibrium
should be considered in future decisions. In summary, today’s (or the current stage’s) bid
is impacted by the opportunity cost of using water today versus using it in the future, and
the opportunity cost of using water should take the other price maker’s future decisions into
account.
Our problem is repeated over an indefinite time horizon, but we approximate the problem
by assuming a time horizon of length T . The game is not a T -stage repeated game, because
it is dynamic and in a repeated game, past plays cannot influence the feasible actions of
payoffs in the current stage [177]. In our game, the decisions made today are dependent
on the water reservoir levels (state variables), which are determined in the previous stage.
The water reservoir state variables capture the effect of the previous stage’s decisions on the
current stage. A player’s strategy specifies an action for that player for all possible sequences
of actions for all other players [178]. Applying this definition to our problem, a strategy for
each price-maker hydro producer specifies a set of sequential bids over the time horizon for
all possible sets of sequential bids from the other price-maker hydro producers. Since the
strategies depend on the state variables, they are Markov strategies [177].
Each stage can either yield a unique Nash equilibrium, a finite set of Nash equilibria,
or a continuum of Nash equilibria. When there are multiple equilibria, one must determine
which is “best.” Generally speaking, there is no single method that can be used to select the
best Nash equilibrium [177]. If there are multiple Nash equilibria, practitioners may utilize
economic bargaining theory. In bargaining, one seeks a unique Nash equilibrium through
solving what is termed the bargaining problem. In the bargaining problem, players determine
how to split some portion of a good. In the split, player one receives ζ percent and player
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two receives 1 − ζ percent of the good, with ζ ∈ [0, 1]. Nash, in [179] and [176], provides
the first cooperative solution to this problem, through an axiomatic derivation. The “Nash




s.t. U1(x) ≥ Dx
U2(y) ≥ Dy,
in which U1(x) and U2(y) are the utility functions for each price maker, Dx and Dy are the
disagreement payoffs (or status quo utilities), and F is the feasible set of players’ actions. Dx
and Dy are the utilities each price maker would expect if they cannot reach an agreement
with the other price maker. We refer to the solution of the above formulation as the “Nash
solution.” The solution favors the player(s) with the most bargaining strength. A player’s
bargaining strength is his relative ability to exert influence over other players.
Alternatively, to determine how each player will act in each stage, we could use contingent
strategies. Contingent strategies depend on other players’ behavior in preceding plays of the
game [180]. Examples of contingent strategies include the grim trigger strategy [181] and
tit-for-tat [182]. These types of strategies are termed trigger strategies because as soon as
a player deviates from the cooperative play, a period of punishment is triggered in which
the other players do not act cooperatively. Players act cooperatively so long as the other
players are doing so. In this application, contingent strategies will not guarantee that a
Nash equilibrium will be selected in every stage. Because we seek a Nash equilibrium in each
stage, we use Nash’s approach to determine which solution to implement in each stage.
5.3.2 Literature Review
Table 5.1 lists several references that study the strategic bidding problem for multiple
price-maker producers. Scott and Read [75] model two energy producers operating both
hydro and thermal generators, in a decentralized duopoly market. In each stage, the sub-
models are Cournot duopolies. Ramos et al. [43] seek to minimize the sum of the producers’
116
Table 5.1: References on the strategic bidding problem for multiple price-maker producers
Reference NE Hydro Comments
Scott and Read [75] X X Dual DP with Cournot duopolies
Ramos et al. [43] X X Profit maximization via a MPEC
Borenstein et al. [183] X - Nash-Cournot measure to evaluate market power
Barquin et al. [76] X X Value of water
Hobbs et al. [34] X – MPEC solved via an interior point algorithm
Kelman et al. [74] X X SDP for future cost functions & iterative Nash
Hobbs [184] X – Mixed linear complementarity problems
Garcia et al. [185] X X Bertrand oligopoly – Markovian states
de la Torre et al. [44] – – MPEC converted to MILP
de Lujan Latorre and Granville [39] X – Stackelberg equilibrium
Bushnell [42] X X Characterization of Cournot equilibrium
Villar and Rudnick [41] X X Strategic thermal and hydro firms
Xian et al. [186] X – Nonlinear complementarity approach
Barroso et al. [46] X – Binary expansion & Nash equilibria
Bakirtzis et al. [47] X – MPEC converted to MILP via binary expansion
Hobbs and Pang [187] X – Incorporate non-smooth demand curves
Kannan et al. [48] X – Two-settlement framework
Wehinger et al. [81] – X Uncertainty via model-based price forecasts
and consumers’ costs, thus maximizing social welfare. Borenstein et al. [183] discuss how
the concentration measures are inadequate in determining whether or not a firm possesses
some amount of market power. They propose a new measure based on a Nash-Cournot
equilibrium and assume any price above the competitive level indicates that one or more
firms possess some amount of market power. The equilibrium is found iteratively.
Barquin et al. [76] seek a Nash equilibrium to provide a new framework for the calculation
of what is termed the water value in a competitive market, i.e., the opportunity cost of using
a marginal amount of water. The main goal in Hobbs et al. [34] is to present a model that
maximizes multiple price-maker producers’ profits, i.e., finds a Nash equilibrium. In the
game, each firm solves an MPEC and the results are coordinated to find a Nash equilibrium
for all the price-maker producers’ bids.
Kelman et al. [74] present the first Nash-Cournot model that determines an optimal
hydro operations policy for two price-maker hydro producers in a multi-stage, stochastic
setting. Kelman et al. [74] utilize a backwards Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP)
scheme to find the hydro producers’ future cost functions. Villar and Rudnick [41] extend
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this methodology so that both hydro and thermal firms act strategically. Their iterative
approach to find a Nash-Cournot equilibrium is as follows:
(1.) first strategic firm chooses its profit maximizing output assuming fixed and known
output levels for the other strategic firms;
(2.) step (1.) is repeated for each strategic firm, resetting the output levels based on
the most recent decisions of the other strategic firms;
(3.) a Nash equilibrium is reached when no firm can profit from changing its output
level, given the output levels of all the other strategic firms.
Similar iterative techniques can be found in Otero-Novas et al. [36], Otero-Novas et al.
[37], and Weber and Overbye [38].
Hobbs [184] calculates a Nash-Cournot market equilibrium for thermal energy generation
and transmission. Hobbs applies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions to
form a MPEC, but then assumes that each agents’ outputs will not affect prices. This allows
Hobbs to transform and solve the MPEC as a Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP).
Similarly, Bushnell [42] solves a multi-stage hydrothermal scheduling problem as a LCP, but
first provides an analytical characterization of the Cournot equilibrium condition.
de la Torre et al. [44] present a MILP that finds the optimal schedule for a price maker
in a market consisting of both price takers and price makers. de la Torre et al. convert the
MPEC into a MILP by assuming that the residual demand (or price quota) curve for the
price maker is known. The authors, de Lujan Latorre and Granville [39], present models
and solution techniques for both a duopolistic Nash-Cournot equilibrium and a monopolistic
Stackelberg equilibrium. In Xian et al. [186], the MPEC formulation is transformed into a
set of nonlinear equations and solved via a heuristic.
Pereira et al. [33] introduce binary expansion, which transforms products of variables in
the nonlinear MPEC into mixed-integer linear expressions. The representation is used to
solve the strategic bidding problem, in the short-term, for one price-maker thermal producer.
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Barroso et al. [46] apply the technique to markets with multiple price-maker thermal pro-
ducers to calculate a Nash equilibrium. They begin with the MPEC formulation in which
equilibrium constraints are used to represent the optimal solution of the economic dispatch
model via its KKT optimality conditions. The objective in this function is to maximize
an individual price maker’s revenue which is a product of the energy production and the
market-clearing price. Binary expansion is used to transform the products of variables in
the objective and constraints into mixed-integer linear constraints. A Nash equilibrium is
sought through an iterative approach. To guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium,
which may only exist under mixed strategies, Barroso et al. assume producers bids’ are
discrete. Based on this approach, multiple Nash equilibria may exist and, if this is the
case, Barroso et al. assume the best equilibrium is the one with the highest market-clearing
price. Bakirtzis et al. [47] extend the methodology in Barroso et al. [46] to find a single
price-maker thermal producer’s optimal bid while considering stepwise energy offers, con-
sisting of multiple price-quantity pairs and increasing prices. Hobbs and Pang [187] argue
that piecewise-linear demand curves are more realistic and incorporate said curves in their
efforts.
Kannan et al. [48] seek optimal bidding strategies for price-maker energy producers in
a two-settlement framework. In this framework, firms bid quantities in the forward (or
day-ahead) market and then can alter their bids in the real-time (or spot) market after
uncertainty is realized. The overarching game is an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium
Constraints (EPEC) and each firm solves an MPEC. Similar approaches for a two-settlement
framework can be found in Hu and Ralph [188] and Yao et al. [189].
Most recently, Wehinger et al. [81], utilize “predictive bidding” to find the profit-maximizing
set of bids, for a market with multiple agents. In predictive bidding, each agent uses a market
model to generate an hourly price forecast curve. This is in contrast to other agent-based
models in which learning heuristics or trial-and-error approaches are used. Examples of these
include adaption algorithms [190, 191], Q-learning algorithms [192, 193], genetic algorithms
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[49, 194], and learning classifier systems [195].
In applications with multiple equilibria, many authors consider any equilibrium found,
optimal. There are, however, a few papers that present ideas on how to find all equilibria or
how to determine the best equilibrium.
Correia et al. [196] show how multiple pure Nash equilibria can be found in centralized
(regulated) markets. Similarly, Pozo and Contreras [197] find all pure Nash equilibria in a
Stackelberg game via a stochastic EPEC. Pozo and Contreras define a finite set of prices
and quantities, i.e., strategies, for the price makers and use this set to model the nonlinear
Nash equilibrium constraints as a MILP subject to uncertain demand. de la Torre et al.
[198] model an electricity market consisting solely of thermal producers in which each price
maker seeks to maximize their profit. Based on the results of a simulation, six bidding
strategies are selected as possible options for each of three price makers. A market-clearing
formulation is solved for each of the 216 possible scenarios and the solutions are examined for
Nash equilibria. Dominated strategies are removed and a total of seven pure strategy Nash
equilibria are found and characterized. Yang et al. [199] present a method, based off the
payoff matrix approach and polynomial equations, to find all Nash equilibria in an electricity
market with multiple price makers.
Hasan et al. [200] and Hasan and Galiana [201] present a paper in two parts. The first
finds all pure strategy Nash equilibria and the second selects the best one. Hasan et al. [200]
clear the market by merit order (i.e., plants with the lowest marginal cost are used first
to meet demand, and plants with the highest marginal costs are used last) and present the
necessary conditions for a pure Nash equilibrium. The authors find all pure Nash equilibria
via a MILP. In Hasan and Galiana [201], the authors select the best equilibrium based off
risk-dominance measures. They assume that only one GENeration COmpany (GENCO) will
act as a price maker (bid above their marginal cost) and the rest will act as price takers
(bid at their marginal costs). To determine if a GENCO should game (act as a price maker)
or not, they examine the GENCO’s potential profit gain or loss achieved by gaming or not.
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The GENCO with the highest gain to loss ratio achieved by gaming is the one that should
game and the resulting Nash equilibrium is the best for all other GENCOs. This approach
is beneficial to all GENCOs because the GENCO that games will increase the price for all
GENCOs. Hasan and Galiana [202] is a follow-on paper to Hasan et al. [200], it develops a
more efficient iterative algorithm to find all pure strategy equilibria.
5.3.3 Approaches Most Similar to Ours
Of the papers listed in Table 5.1, only six seek a Nash equilibrium (in every stage) for
hydroelectric producers. Of those, four utilize a Dynamic Programming (DP) scheme similar
to ours, they are: Scott and Read [75], Barquin et al. [76], Kelman et al. [74], and Villar
and Rudnick [41]. Table 5.2 portrays the differences and similarities between our approach
and the approaches in these four papers. To our knowledge, our approach is the only one
that seeks a Nash-Cournot equilibrium for multiple price-maker hydro producers, through
DP, utilizing a stepwise-linear revenue function, in a day-ahead electricity market structure.
Scott and Read [75] and Barquin et al. [76] study a different problem than we do because
they analyze a market in which only two producers exist, i.e., a duopoly. Scott and Read
[75] use Dual DP (DDP) in which the focus is on the marginal value of water as opposed to
DP in which the focus is on power generation. Scott and Read [75] also account for contract
obligations and not just energy sold via the wholesale electricity market. Barquin et al. [76]
utilize a backwards DP recursion similar to the method we propose; however, they assume
differentiable profit curves and use differential calculus to determine the optimal bidding
conditions.
Both Kelman et al. [74] and Villar and Rudnick [41] use a backwards DP approach similar
to our approach and study a market structure similar to the one we study here. However,
the authors represent the price takers in the market in aggregate to determine the residual
demand that the price makers satisfy. They assume that the aggregate operating cost for
all price takers is quadratic. This assumption yields a linear supply curve for the price
takers and results in quadratic revenue curves for the price-maker producers, which enables
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Kelman et al. and Villar and Rudnick [41] to use differentiable calculus to determine the
optimal production quantities for the price makers. In reality, when firms sell their energy
in the day-ahead market, revenue curves are piecewise-linear and thus non-differentiable, so
calculus-based approaches will not work.
Our approach to find a Nash equilibrium is different than any of the approaches in the
listed papers. The most common approach uses iteration. In the iterative approach, the
practitioner assumes that all other price makers’ current and future bids are known. This is
far from realistic. The practitioner, however, does not need to make any assumptions about
the other price makers’ water reservoir levels. Iterative approaches are also not guaranteed
to converge. In our approach, we assume that the other price makers’ current bids and
current reservoir levels are known. We do not need to know the future price makers’ bids or
reservoir levels. Though the assumptions we require in our approach are not always satisfied,
they are more realistic than those made in the iterative approach.
5.3.4 Notation
Our convention is to denote parameters with uppercase letters, decision variables with
lowercase letters, and vectors of parameters or decision variables with boldface characters.
We define the following:
Indices and Sets:
n = 1, . . . , N index for price-maker producers
i = 1, . . . , I index for reservoirs operated by price-makers
j = 1, . . . , J index for price-taker thermal producers




t = 1, . . . , T index for time periods
−n set of all price makers that are not price maker n
In set of reservoirs operated by price-maker n
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Table 5.2: Comparisons of How Different Aspects of the Problem are Modeled
Dimension Approach Reference(s)
Revenue or profit Concave overestimation Scott and Read [75]
function Generic differentiable Barquin et al. [76]
Quadratic Kelman et al. [74]
Nonlinear differentiable Villar and Rudnick [41]
Stepwise linear Our approach
Inflow uncertainty Discrete distributions Barquin et al. [76], Kelman et al. [74]
Probability curves Scott and Read [75]
Not considered Villar and Rudnick [41], our approach
Price-Taker Known (variable cost) Kelman et al. [74], Villar and Rudnick [41],
competitors’ bids Our approach
N/A Scott and Read [75], Barquin et al. [76]
Time-dependency DDP Scott and Read [75]
DP Barquin et al. [76], Villar and Rudnick [41],
Our approach
SDP Kelman et al. [74]
Demand Demand curves Scott and Read [75], Barquin et al. [76]
Villar and Rudnick [41]
Deterministic Kelman et al. [74], our approach
Bid structure Cournot Scott and Read [75], Barquin et al. [76],
Kelman et al. [74], Villar and Rudnick [41]
Our approach
Nash equilibrium Algebraic manipulation Scott and Read [75]
found via Unspecified method Barquin et al. [76]
Iterative approach Kelman et al. [74], Villar and Rudnick [41]
Discretization & optimization Our approach
123
Uin reservoirs immediately upstream of reservoir i, for price-maker n
Parameters:
Dt demand in market, in stage t [GWh]
Gj quantity bid (capacity) for producer j [GWh]
Cj price bid (variable operating cost) for producer j [$/GWh]
E ′kt k




, in stage t [GWh]
πdkt market-clearing price, of revenue segment k, in stage t [$/Gwh]
V in minimum storage storage level for reservoir i, for price-maker n [hm
3]
V in maximum storage level for reservoir i, for price-maker n [hm
3]
Vin1 initial storage level for reservoir i, for price-maker n [hm
3]
U in water turbine outflow capacity for reservoir i, for price-maker n [hm
3]
Aint inflow for reservoir i, for price-maker n, in stage t [hm
3]







aggregate revenue function for all price makers, in stage t [$]
Rnt(e1t, . . . , eNt) immediate revenue function, for price-maker n, in stage t [$]
βnt(Vnt,V−nt) price-maker n’s revenue from stage t to T [$]
γnt(e−nt,Vnt,v−n,t+1) price-maker n’s best response function, in stage t [$]
Binary Decision Variables:
φkt indicator variable used to determine the market-clearing price [-]
Decision Variables:
gj quantity of energy produced (sold) for price-taker producer j [GWh]
πdt market-clearing price, in stage t [$/GWh]
ent total hydro production (bid), for price-maker n, in stage t [GWh]
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eint hydro production from reservoir i, for price-maker n, in stage t [GWh]
sint spillage from reservoir i, for price-maker n, in stage t [hm
3]
vint volume of reservoir i, for price-maker n, at the beginning of stage t [hm
3]
vnt vector of reservoir volumes, for price-maker n, at the beginning of stage t [hm
3]
5.4 Methodology
Having built the necessary foundation, we now present our methodology.
5.4.1 Revenue Function
To determine the shape of each price maker’s revenue function, we examine their maximum-
revenue problem, the day-ahead electricity market, and the way in which the market-clearing
price is determined, for any stage t. Price maker n seeks to maximize revenue, or mathe-
matically
max Rnt(e1t, . . . , eNt) = π
d
t · ent.
We have two options that we can pursue to analyze a price-maker’s revenue function. In
the first option, we model all price-makers’ bids simultaneously. In the second, we simulate
the price-makers’ simultaneous bids by iteratively solving for a Nash equilibrium using one
formulation for each price maker, assuming the bids from the other price makers are known.
To analyze each of these options a bit further and, for ease of discussion, we assume there
are only two price-maker producers.
In modeling the two price makers’ bids simultaneously




• We solve the maximum-revenue problem from price-maker one’s point of view while
ensuring price-maker two’s revenue is also considered and vice versa
• An individual price maker’s revenue can be found by decomposing the aggregate rev-
enue function. We can model an individual price-maker’s revenue using
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(i.) a nonlinear objective function in which, for price-maker n,








(ii.) MILP constraints to determine the market-clearing price; or
(iii.) an MPEC and binary expansion.
If we use multiple formulations to simulate the two price makers’ simultaneous bids, the
revenue for each price maker is built based on knowledge of the other price maker’s bids.
This makes it so the break points of the revenue curve E ′kt and revenue at those break points
R′kt are functions of the bids from the other price maker. In other words, the break points
of the function will change, based on the bids from the other price maker. Consequently,
finding the revenue function parameters becomes quite tedious. In this framework, we solve
the revenue-maximizing formulation for price maker one, given a bid for price maker two,
and then use the optimal solution to solve price-maker two’s problem. The process continues
iteratively until the bids are constant.
We choose to model all price-maker’s bids simultaneously and utilize logical MILP con-
straints to determine the market-clearing price and resulting revenue for each price maker. In
the revenue maximization, πdt depends on the sum of the bids from all price makers,
∑N
n=1 ent,
and each price maker’s bid will depend on the market-clearing price. To determine how the
revenue function for price maker n changes with different values of ent, we assume that all
the price-taker producers’ bids are known and study the market-clearing formulation. We
assume that each price taker bids its variable operating cost and capacity, which is their op-
timal decision in a market consisting solely of price takers [31]. In the day-ahead electricity
market, the operator satisfies demand while minimizing cost and the market-clearing price,
πdt , is determined based on the value of
∑N
n=1 ent. Note, this cost minimization is the same
as clearing the market by merit order (see Section 5.3.2). The market-clearing formulation,
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0 ≤ gj ≤ Gj ∀j.
The solution to the market-clearing formulation yields both the market-clearing price πdt ,
and the market-clearing dispatch. The market-clearing price is found via the dual (marginal
value) of the demand constraint, whereas the set of gj, j = 1, . . . , J , such that gj > 0 yields
the market-clearing dispatch. We assume that the price-maker producers submit quantity
bids at zero price, so that all of the energy they offer, given adequate demand, is dispatched.
Because of this assumption, the market-clearing price is the highest price bid from the set
of price-taker producers that are part of the market-clearing dispatch. Regardless of their
bids, all producers that are part of the market-clearing dispatch are paid the market-clearing
price πdt .
Knowledge of each price-taker j’s bid allows for the population of parameters Cj and
Gj in the market-clearing formulation. This information allows us to determine the market-
clearing price and the shape of the aggregate price maker’s revenue function. We plot





, in Figure 5.1. The revenue curve assumes a sawtooth shape, because as the
price makers’ bids collectively increase, the most costly price-taker producer that is part of
the market-clearing dispatch “drops out.” As price-taker producers are forced out of the
market-clearing dispatch, the market-clearing price (slope of the revenue curve) decreases.
We assume that the price makers can collectively produce up to a break point in the revenue
curve without kicking the associated price taker out of the market-clearing dispatch. Without
this assumption, price makers would collectively produce up to ε away from the break point
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Figure 5.1: Joint revenue function
Because the market-clearing price is constant over fixed intervals of
∑N
n=1 ent, we can
model how it changes using binary variables and “big M constraints.” Assuming πdkt (a
parameter) is the market-clearing price (or slope) for line segment k, we maximize the
revenue, in stage t, for price maker ω using the following objective function and constraints:
Rωt(e1t, . . . , eNt) := max ψ (5.1)
N∑
n=1
ent ≤ E ′kt +Mφkt ∀ k (5.2)
ψ ≤ πdkteωt +Mφkt ∀ k (5.3)
K∑
k=1
(1− φkt) = 1 (5.4)
φkt ∈ {0, 1} ∀ k. (5.5)
We use the big M constraints shown in (5.2) to determine the segment in which the cumu-
lative production lies. Constraints (5.4) and (5.5) ensure that exactly one of the φ variables
equals zero and consequently force exactly one of the K constraints in both (5.2) and (5.3) to
bind. Since we are maximizing ψ, since the πdkt parameters decrease as the index k increases,
and since exactly one of the φ variables equals zero, it will be desirable to select the πdkt
with the smallest k index. (5.2) restricts us from choosing too small of an index based on
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the cumulative production. These constraints together guarantee the correct market-clearing
price, based off cumulative production, and thus the correct revenue for price maker ω. Since,
eint ≤ U inρin and πd1t is the largest possible market-clearing price, for each of price-maker







Our formulation for finding price maker ω’s revenue is similar to the one found in de la
Torre et al. [44]. The main differences are in the variable definitions and the objective func-
tions. de la Torre et al.’s variables are segment-based. This means that the total production,
for a given price maker, is a fractional amount of the segment in which optimal production
lies plus the size of all previous segments. In contrast, our variables are based on break points
in the revenue function. Additionally, de la Torre et al.’s objective function sums, over all
segments, the product of each segment’s associated price and the total production. Only one
term in de la Torre et al.’s sum is non-zero. We chose to use our formulation because it has
a simpler objective function and has fewer constraints.
5.4.2 Example: Day-Ahead Electricity Market and Revenue Function
The following example aids in explaining how the day-ahead electricity market operates
and how each price-maker’s revenue function is constructed. Assume there are four price-
taker producers (J = 4), with quantity and price bids shown in Table 5.3, and two price-
maker producers (N = 2). For this example, it is not necessary to specify parameters for
the price makers.
We begin by examining the market as if it consisted solely of price-taker producers.
Without the two price-maker producers, the ISO will clear the market at a minimum cost,
according to the market-clearing dispatch, given in Table 5.3. The ISO achieves the cost
minimization by dispatching as much of the least costly price-taker producer’s (j = 3)
capacity as possible, based on demand. If the least costly price-taker producer does not have
sufficient capacity to satisfy demand, then the market operator goes to the next cheapest
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Table 5.3: Day-ahead electricity market and revenue function example: Price taker param-
eters
j Cj Gj gj
1 20 20 20
2 30 10 5
3 10 15 15
4 35 10 0
D 40
producer (j = 1) and attempts to satisfy demand using some or all of this producer’s capacity.
The process continues until demand is satisfied. The market-clearing price is determined by
the price bid (variable operating cost) of the most costly price-taker producer that is part
of the market-clearing dispatch. In our example, without the price-makers intervention,
πdt = C2 =$30/MWh. All of the price-taker producers that are part of the market-clearing
dispatch are then paid the market-clearing price.
From the information gained from the market-clearing formulation, we create each price-
maker’s revenue function by unraveling the function’s parameters from either of the price-
maker’s perspectives. We choose to view the problem from the first price-maker’s perspective.
Since each price maker sells everything they bid, any amount the price makers bid will be
deducted from the amount of energy the price takers are generating. The aggregate amount
the price-makers bid e1 + e2 will determine the market-clearing price. If the price makers
bid more than the amount the most costly price-taker is producing, then the price-taker
producer drops out of the market-clearing dispatch and the market-clearing price decreases.
Sample bids, not necessarily optimal, for each of the price makers and the resulting market-
clearing price and revenues are given in Table 5.4. To maximize revenue, each price-maker
producer must consider the tradeoff between the revenue received by selling more energy and
the associated decrease in the price they receive for selling that energy.
In this example,
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Table 5.4: Day-ahead electricity market and revenue function example: Price makers’ bids
Trial e1t e2t π
d
t R1t(·) R2t(·)
1 2 2 30 60 60
2 4 2 20 80 40
3 8 10 20 160 200





30 if 0 ≤ e1t + e2t ≤ 5
20 if 5 ≤ e1t + e2t ≤ 25
10 if 25 ≤ e1t + e2t ≤ 40
.
Breaking e1t + e2t into segments, we use (5.1)-(5.5) (along with other constraints that we
discuss later) to maximize price-maker one’s revenue in stage t. The breakpoints in (5.2) are
the intervals defined above for πdt ; 5, 25, and 40.
5.4.3 Game Characterization and Existence of Nash Equilibria
To be certain that the game we are playing is understood, we define it in standard terms
used in Economic game theory [174]. For N players, let
znt ∈ Snt(Vnt) denote a strategy for player n in stage t, based on reservoir levels Vnt and
unt(z1t, . . . , znt) denote the payoff function for player n.
With this notation in place Γt := [N, {Snt(Vnt)}, {unt(·)}], is the normal form representation
of the game. Since this game is repeated, Γt is defined for every stage t. Though each
strategy znt depends on Vnt, we omit this to avoid overcomplicating the notation, i.e., we
use znt as opposed to znt(Vnt). In our application, Snt(Vnt) is a polyhedron defined by a
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∀ i ∈ In,
V in ≤ vi,n,t+1 ≤ V in ∀ i ∈ In,
sint ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ In
}
Note that the strategy space Snt(Vnt) is connected to the previous stage in the problem
through the state parameters Vint. All past decisions are represented by these state param-
eters, which are decision variables in stage t− 1. This means that the strategy space and a
Nash equilibrium, in stage t, depend on the decisions made in the previous stage. For this
reason, each strategy is termed a Markov strategy. Thus, over the entire time horizon, we
seek a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). An MPE is a profile of Markov strategies that
yields a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame [177]. In this context, a proper subgame
is a game in which all previous actions are known to all players at the start of the stage. In
our application, the game played in every stage t is a proper subgame.
If we let −n denote all price-makers except price-maker n, the payoff function is given as
unt(znt, z−nt) := Rnt(ent, e−nt), ∀ n, t, znt ∈ Snt(Vnt), z−nt ∈ S−nt(V−nt).





−nt) ≥ unt(znt, z∗−nt) ∀ n, znt ∈ Snt(Vnt). (5.6)
Mas-Colell et al. [174] state that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in game Γt :=
[N, {Snt(Vnt)}, {unt(·)}] exists, if for all n = 1, . . . , N ,
(i.) Snt(Vnt) is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of some Euclidean space Rm
and
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(ii.) unt(znt, z−nt) is continuous in (znt, z−nt) and quasiconcave in znt.
In our application, (i.) is satisfied, but (ii.) is not. Snt(Vnt) is nonempty because there
will always exist a set of feasible points that satisfy the constraint set. This is because
V in ≤ Vint ≤ V in and Aint is a non-negative quantity. Snt(Vnt) is convex because it is
a polyhedron. Last, Snt(Vnt) is compact because eint and vi,n,t+1 are bounded above and
below.
Because we can pick two points ẑnt and z̃nt in the domain of unt(·) such that
unt
(
θz̃nt + (1− θ)ẑnt, z−nt
)
< unt(ẑnt, z−nt) for θ ∈ [0, 1], for unt(z̃nt, z−nt) ≥ unt(ẑnt, z−nt),
the payoff function (revenue curve) is not quasiconcave in znt.
A pure strategy equilibrium can still exist with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoff
functions. Dasgupta and Maskin [203] show that a pure strategy equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist if the strategy space is compact and the payoff functions are upper semi-continuous.
These characterizations are important, because typically, finding a Nash equilibrium is a fixed
point problem [204]. An upper semi-continuous function is a function with no downward
jumps. Stated formally [177], unt(znt, z−n,t) on Snt(Vnt) is upper semi-continuous at znt, if,





nt, z−n,t) ≤ unt(znt, z−n,t).
Unfortunately, each player’s revenue function has downward jumps and is lower semi-continuous
as opposed to upper semi-continuous. unt(znt, z−n,t) on Snt(Vnt) is lower semi-continuous at
znt, if, for any sequence z
k





nt, z−n,t) ≥ unt(znt, z−n,t).
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Mallozzi [204] suggests that a class of economic games known as potential games are the
“link between optimization and game theory.” Potential games are attractive because, under
predetermined conditions pure strategy equilibria are guaranteed to exist [205]. Economic
games in which a potential function exists are termed potential games.
According to Branzei et al. [205], Γt := [N, {Snt(Vnt)}, {unt(·)}] is a potential game if
there exists a function P :
∏N
n=1 Snt(Vnt)→ R such that
unt(znt, z−nt)− unt(z′nt, z−nt) = P (znt, z−nt)− P (z′nt, z−nt)
∀ n, znt ∈ Snt(Vnt), z′nt ∈ Snt(Vnt), z−nt ∈ S−nt(V−nt).
In our case, the potential function is simply the joint revenue function, or
P (znt, z−nt) = R(ent, e−nt).
Potential games are of interest, because, under certain conditions, optimizing a potential
function results in a solution that is a Nash equilibrium [204]. According to Mallozzi, when
firms jointly maximize their potential function, the resulting solution is a Nash equilibrium.
Mallozzi also states that the set of all strategy profiles that maximize P is a subset of the
set of Nash equilibria for the game. For our problem, this would mean that any point
that maximizes the joint revenue is a Nash equilibrium, which is not true in our case (see
Figure 5.4). In the example presented in Figure 5.4, the continuum of points from (e1 =
100, e2 = 100) to (e1 = 200, e2 = 0) maximize joint revenue, while only the continuum
of points from (e1 = 125.42, e2 = 64.41) to (e1 = 135.48, e2 = 74.58) are Nash equilibria.
Though Mallozzi does not clearly state it, based on Reny [206], Philippe [207] and Kukushkin
[208], we believe he is assuming the potential functions are upper semi-continuous. To our
knowledge, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is only guaranteed if the payoff functions or
potential functions are upper semi-continuous. Thus, since this is not the case for our payoff
function or potential function, we cannot rely on existing literature to prove the existence of
a Nash equilibrium.
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With continuous strategy spaces there are well known examples in which a pure strat-
egy equilibrium exists [209–211], a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist while a mixed-
strategy equilibrium does [212], and in which neither a pure strategy nor a mixed-strategy
equilibrium exists [213].
If each price maker can only select from a discrete set of bids, then a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium may or may not exist. For example, Figure 5.2 shows the total aggregate
revenue and best responses for a scenario with two price makers. A pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists at any and all intersections of the players’ best response curves. The best
response functions are computed and plotted for eight discrete bids, and though a Nash
equilibrium exists with continuous bids, by selecting this discrete set of bids we do not find
it. Barroso et al. [46] assumes each price maker can only select from a discrete set of bids,
and consequently admit that it is possible for no pure strategy Nash equilibrium to exist for
their problem.
In our problem, by allowing the price makers to bid any amount within their range
and, thus, creating a continuous strategy space, we guarantee the existence of at least one
Nash equilibrium. Even if a producer does not have the resources (water) to produce at an
adequate level, a Nash equilibrium will still exist. Inadequate water resources only reduce
the effective water turbining capacity and do not impact the existence of an equilibrium.
Formally stated,
Conjecture 1 Solving our problem will always yield at least one Nash equilibrium. Further,
the point that maximizes joint revenue always yields at least one Nash equilibrium.
The existence of multiple Nash equilibria and their location depends on the shape of the
revenue function. Consider the following three cases:
(i.) Joint revenue is maximized when all price-maker producers bid their capacity. In
this case, there is exactly one Nash equilibrium in which all price makers produce at















Figure 5.2: No Nash equilibria. On top is the joint revenue function (Nash equilibrium
depicted by dashed line) and on bottom is a plot of discrete best responses for each price
maker. Price-maker one’s best response is black, whereas price-maker two’s best response is
gray.
(ii.) Joint revenue is maximized at some point less than the cumulative price makers’
capacity. In this case, the point that maximizes the joint revenue is at a break point,
call it E∗. There may be an infinite number of Nash equilibria at which
∑
n en = E
∗
and possibly another Nash equilibrium at the point at which all price-maker producers
are producing at capacity (see Figure 5.4).
(iii.) Joint revenue is maximized when all price-maker producers bid their capacity and
at some point less than the cumulative price makers’ capacity (i.e., we have alternate














Figure 5.3: Case (i.): Exactly one Nash equilibrium. On top is the joint revenue function
(Nash equilibrium depicted by dashed line) and on bottom is a plot of best responses for
each price maker. Price maker one’s best response is black, whereas price maker two’s best
response is gray.
5.4.4 Feasibility Problem and Best Response Formulations
To find a Nash equilibrium using optimization, if it exists, we solve the feasibility problem
(FP ). For n = 1, . . . , N players,
(FP ) max z = 1
s.t. Rnt(ent, e−nt) + βn,t+1(vn,t+1,v−n,t+1) ≥ γnt(e−nt,Vnt,v−n,t+1) ∀ n (5.7)























Figure 5.4: Case (ii.): Infinite number of Nash equilibria. On top is the joint revenue
function (Nash equilibria are depicted by dashed lines) and on bottom is a plot of best
responses for each price maker. Price maker one’s best response is black, whereas price
maker two’s best response is gray.
V in ≤ vi,n,t+1 ≤ V in ∀ i, n (5.9)
0 ≤ eint
ρin




eint ∀ n, t (5.11)
sint ≥ 0 ∀ i, n, t. (5.12)
Solving (FP ) results in optimal hydro production e∗nt ∀ n and optimal reservoir volumes





















Figure 5.5: Case (iii.): Exactly two Nash equilibria. On top is the joint revenue function
(Nash equilibria are depicted by dashed lines) and on bottom is a plot of best responses for
each price maker. Price maker one’s best response is black, whereas price maker two’s best
response is gray.
In (FP ), the Rnt(·) functions are found via (5.2)-(5.5). (5.7) ensures that every price
maker’s production level is a best response to all other price makers’ production levels. This
is equivalent to (5.6). The right-hand side γnt(·) functions, or best response functions, are
computed a priori for each of the price makers assuming the bids and water levels from all
other price makers are known. We discuss this in greater detail in the following paragraph.
Interpolations of the γnt(·) functions are created so that we have right-hand side values
for any of the function’s parameters (cf. Section 5.4.11). (5.8) establishes the conditions
necessary to connect each of the stages in the time horizon, via the state variables vi,n,t+1.
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Last, (5.9) -(5.12) define the bounds on each of the decision variables.
γnt(E−nt,Vnt,Vω,t+1) is price maker n’s maximum achievable revenue, given bids from all
other price makers (E−nt). Thus, if (5.7) holds, then none of the price makers can increase
their revenue, given all other price makers’ bids, and this defines a Nash equilibrium. To
obtain γnt(E−nt,Vnt,V−n,t+1), for any n, and create their interpolations, we solve (BRn). In
(BRn) we assume we know both the bids and the reservoir levels for all other price makers
E−nt and V−n,t+1.




E−nt ≤ E ′kt +Mφkt ∀ k
Rnt(ent, E−nt) ≤ πdktent +Mφkt ∀ k









V in ≤ vi,n,t+1 ≤ V in ∀ i
0 ≤ eint
ρin







(1− φkt) = 1
φkt ∈ {0, 1} ∀ k
sint ≥ 0 ∀ i.
Though (5.7) have “≥” relational operators, because of how the γnt(·) functions are defined,
it will never be the case that the left-hand side values are greater than the right-hand side
values; thus, we could equivalently use “=” relational operators.
5.4.5 Solution Approach One: A Feasibility Problem and Dynamic Program-
ming
For ease of presentation, we assume there are only two price makers. In this approach,
the function γ1t(·) is solved for multiple, incremental, and discrete values of E2t, V1t, and
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V2,t+1, i.e., (E2t,V1tV2,t+1) ∈ D1 (see Algorithm 6). This can be done with multiple nested
“for” loops. The same is done for γ2t(·). We solve for this discrete set of values of the
producers’ bids and the reservoir levels to create an interpolation of the γ(·) functions.
These interpolations are denoted by γ̃(·), because they approximate the true γ(·) function.
The interpolations are used as parameters in the monolith formulation (FP ).
Algorithm 6 DP algorithm for two price makers, for t = 1, . . . , T .
Step (0). Initialize: β1,T+1(V1,T+1,V2,T+1) = 0
for t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1 do
for (E2t,V1t,V2,t+1) ∈ D1 do
Step (1). Solve (BR1) for γ1t(E2t,V1t,V2,t+1) using the interpolation β̃1,t+1(v1,t+1,V2,t+1).
end for
for (E1t,V1,t+1,V2t) ∈ D2 do
Step (2). Solve (BR2) for γ2t(E1t,V1,t+1,V2t) using the interpolation β̃2,t+1(V1,t+1,v2,t+1).
end for
Step (3). Construct the interpolations γ̃1t(·) and γ̃2t(·).
for (V1t,V2t) ∈ D3 do
Step (4). Solve (FP ) for stage t using γ̃1t(·) and γ̃2t(·).
Step (5). Construct the interpolations β̃1t(V1,t+1,V2,t+1) and β̃2t(V1,t+1,V2,t+1).
end for
end for
return γ1t(E2t,V1t,V2,t+1) and γ2t(E1t,V1,t+1,V2t) for discrete values of E2t, V1t, V2,t+1, E1t, V1,t+1,
and V2t ∀ t; and β1t(V1t,V2t) and β2t(V1t,V2t), e∗1t, e∗2t, v∗1,t+1, and v∗2,t+1 ∀ t.
Once the γ̃(·) functions are populated for stage t we solve (FP ) for stage t. We continue
this procedure recursively from t = T to t = 1. The backwards recursion yields the desired
results because with β1,T+1(·) = 0 and β2,T+1(·) = 0, β1T (·) = R∗1T (·) and β2T (·) = R∗2T (·),
and thus
β1,T−1(·) = R∗1,T−1(·) + β1T (·) = R∗1,T−1(·) +R∗1T (·) and
β2,T−1(·) = R∗2,T−1(·) + β2T (·) = R∗2,T−1(·) +R∗2T (·),
and so forth. This continues until we have β11(·) and β21(·).
5.4.6 Multiple Nash Equilibria
When seeking an equilibrium, most practitioners utilize an iterative approach that, for
all intents and purposes, solves (FP ). If multiple Nash equilibria exist, the approach will
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not provide any indication. Additionally, this approach does not guarantee a Pareto optimal
equilibrium will be selected, if one exists. All that the approach guarantees is that the
solution will be a Nash equilibrium. For these reasons, we propose a different approach.
5.4.7 Solution Approach Two: One Formulation for each Price Maker and Dy-
namic Programming
Once again, assume N = 2. Adding a recursive objective function and constraints (5.2)-
(5.5) with ω = 1 to (FP ) yields the strategic bidding problem for price maker one
(SB1) β1t(V1t,V2t) := max ψ + β1,t+1(v1,t+1,v2,t+1)
s.t. (5.2)− (5.5) with ω = 1, (5.7)− (5.12)
R2t(e1t, e2t) ≤ πdkte2t +Mφkt ∀ k
R2t(e1t, e2t) ≥ πdkte2t −Mφkt ∀ k.
We can be certain that (SB1) yields a Nash equilibrium, when it exists, because the constraint
set includes all of the constraints in (FP ). Similarly, for price maker two with ω = 2, we
have
(SB2) β2t(V1t,V2t) := max ψ + β2,t+1(v1,t+1,v2,t+1)
s.t. (5.2)− (5.5) with ω = 2, (5.7)− (5.12)
R1t(e1t, e2t) ≤ πdkte1t +Mφkt ∀ k
R1t(e1t, e2t) ≥ πdkte1t −Mφkt ∀ k.
Exactly how these formulations are used in conjunction with our dynamic programming
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 7. Though this approach yields a Nash equilibrium, if
multiple equilibria exist, (SB1) and (SB2) may not yield the same Nash equilibrium as each
other or the one found in (FP ). In (SB1), we seek a Nash equilibrium that maximizes
price maker one’s revenue and vice versa for (SB2). Consequently, price make one has an
advantage in (SB1) and price maker two has an advantage in (SB2). We discuss how we
resolve this issue in Section 5.4.10.
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Algorithm 7 DP algorithm for two price makers, method 2, for t = 1, . . . , T .
Step (0). Initialize: β1,T+1(V1,T+1,V2,T+1) = 0
for t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1 do
for (E2t,V1t,V2,t+1) ∈ D1 do
Step (1). Solve (BR1) for γ1t(E2t,V1t,V2,t+1) using the interpolation β̃1,t+1(v1,t+1,V2,t+1).
end for
for (E1t,V1,t+1,V2t) ∈ D2 do
Step (2). Solve (BR2) for γ2t(E1t,V1,t+1,V2t) using the interpolation β̃2,t+1(V1,t+1,v2,t+1).
end for
Step (3). Construct the interpolations γ̃1t(·) and γ̃2t(·).
for (V1t,V2t) ∈ D3 do
Step (4). Solve (SB1) for stage t using γ̃2t(·).
Step (5). Solve (SB2) for stage t using γ̃1t(·).
Step (6). Construct the interpolations β̃1t(V1,t+1,V2,t+1) and β̃2t(V1,t+1,V2,t+1).
end for
end for
return γ1t(E2t,V1t,V2,t+1) and γ2t(E1t,V1,t+1,V2t) for discrete values of E2t, V1t, V2,t+1, E1t, V1,t+1,
and V2t ∀ t; and β1t(V1t,V2t) and β2t(V1t,V2t), e∗1t, e∗2t, v∗1,t+1, and v∗2,t+1 ∀ t.
We use two of the most popular examples of strategic games, Prison’s Dilemma and
Matching Pennies [178], to demonstrate our second approach. Though these are both ex-
amples over discrete (not continuous) strategy sets, they aid in explaining how the above
formulations can determine a Nash equilibrium. Exactly one pure strategy equilibrium exists
in Prisoner’s Dilemma, while no pure strategy equilibrium exists in Matching Pennies.
5.4.8 Example: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Two suspects are arrested and imprisoned. There is enough evidence to to convict each
of them of a minor offense, however not enough to convict either of them of a major offense
unless one of them betrays the other (or defects) and testifies against them. If both suspects
remain silent, each will be sentenced to a year in prison. If exactly one of them betrays the
other then the he/she will go free and the other will spend three years in prison. If each of
them defects, then they will each spend two years in prison. In this strategic game the players,
the two suspects, are referred to as prisoner A and prisoner B. We denote each prisoner’s
action, or decision variable as a and b (with discrete values A and B). Each prisoner’s actions
are either to remain silent, which we denote by S, or to defect, which we denote by D (i.e.,
a, b ∈ {S,D}). Each outcome of the game is denoted by the corresponding pair of prisoners’
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utilities (UA, UB), in which each prisoner’s utility is the negative of the amount of time in
prison. The outcomes of the game are expressed compactly in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Prisoner’s dilemma
Prisoner B
Remain silent Defect
Prisoner A Remain silent (−1,−1) (−3, 0)
Defect (0,−3) (−2,−2)
Defining the γ(·) functions in a similar way to that described above, we have
γA(B) := max UA(a,B)
s.t. a ∈ {S,D} .
Since there are only two discrete choices for B we can examine γA(B) for each choice. Doing
so we have γA(B = S) = 0 with a
∗ = D and γA(B = D) = −2 with a∗ = D. Similarly,
γB(A) := max UB(A, b)
s.t. b ∈ {S,D} ,
in which γB(A = S) = 0 with b
∗ = D, and γB(A = D) = −2 with b∗ = D. We can write the
strategic problem for prisoner A as
βA := max UA(a, b)
s.t. UA(a, b) ≥ γA(b)
UB(a, b) ≥ γB(a) (∗)
a, b ∈ {S,D} .
In βA, regardless of the realization of a, b
∗ = D because of (∗) and the function γB(A). Since
this is the case, to maximize prisoner A’s utility a∗ = b∗ = D and βA = −2, which is the
Nash equilibrium in this game. Thus, our approach correctly finds the Nash equilibrium.
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5.4.9 Example: Matching Pennies
Matching Pennies is played between two players, denoted player A and player B. Each
player has a penny and must secretly turn the penny to heads or tails. Both players then
reveal their choices simultaneously. If the pennies match (both heads or both tails), player
A keeps both pennies. If the pennies do not match (one heads and one tails or vice versa)
player B keeps both pennies. Once again, each outcome of the game is denoted by the
corresponding pair of players’ utilities (UA, UB), in which each player’s utility is the net gain
or loss of coins. The outcomes of the game are expressed compactly in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Matching Pennies
Player B
Heads Tails
Player A Heads (1,−1) (−1, 1)
Tails (−1, 1) (1,−1)
In this game, we have
γA(B) := max UA(a,B)
s.t. a ∈ {H,T} .
γB(A) is defined in a similar fashion. Solutions to these functions are γA(B = H) = 1 with
a∗ = H, γA(B = T ) = 1 with a
∗ = T , γB(A = H) = 1 with b
∗ = T , and γB(A = T ) = 1
with b∗ = H. The strategic problem for player A is
βA := max UA(a, b)
s.t. UA(a, b) ≥ γA(b) = 1 (∗)
UB(a, b) ≥ γB(a) = 1 (∗∗)
a, b ∈ {H,T} .
In βA there are four choices for (a, b), but because of (∗) and (∗∗), none are feasible. Analyzing
Table 5.6 we see that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in this game.
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5.4.10 Multiple Nash Equilibria
When it exists, the solutions to (SB1) and (SB2) yield a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto
optimal. What this means is that if there are multiple equilibria, then one equilibrium will
be preferred by both price makers to all of the other equilibria and the solution to both
(SB1) and (SB2) will be this point [214]. In the absence of an equilibrium that is Pareto
optimal, (SB1) and (SB2) will yield different equilibria, and these equilibria are Pareto
efficient. In other words, if there are multiple equilibria and none of them are strictly and
jointly preferred to the others, by both price makers, then (SB1) and (SB2) will yield two
different solutions. In both of these solutions, any change in the production quantities cannot
increase one price-maker’s revenue without decreasing the other’s.
If the solutions to (SB1) and (SB2) do not agree, then there are two or more equilibria.
If, in the solutions, the market-clearing price and aggregate production is the same, then
there is an infinite number of Pareto efficient Nash equilibria that can be represented as any
convex combination of the solutions to (SB1) and (SB2). Formally stated,
Theorem 6 If (SB1) and (SB2) yield different solutions in which the market-clearing price
is the same and the aggregate production is the same, then every convex combination of the
solutions to (SB1) and (SB2) is a Nash equilibrium.




2) with market-clearing price π
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yields solution (e21, e
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prove the theorem in the following progressive steps:
(1.) E ′ must be equal to a breakpoint in the joint revenue function. If E ′ is not at a
breakpoint then either price maker one could increase their revenue by increasing e11
in (SB1) or price maker two could increase their revenue by increasing e
2
2 in (SB2).
This contradicts the assumption that (e11, e
1







1 is at capacity and cannot increase then the only way that E
′ is not at a
breakpoint is if e12 can increase, but this cannot happen because e
1
2 is a best response
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to e11. Similarly, if e
2
2 is at capacity and cannot increase then the only way that E
′ is
not at a breakpoint is if e21 can increase, but this cannot happen because e
2
1 is a best
response to e22.
(2.) The solutions to (SB1) and (SB2) are Pareto efficient equilibria. One of the
equilibria cannot be Pareto optimal because, if this was the case, the solutions would
agree. By definition, (e11, e
1




2) is preferred by
price-maker two. Since the market-clearing price is the same in both it must be true







(3.) Decreasing e11 or e
2
2 by a small amount ε will be countered by a best response
increase of ε to e12 or e
2
1. If we decrease e
1
1 by ε and increase e
1
2 by an amount greater
than ε then we will no longer be at breakpoint E ′ and the market-clearing price will
decrease, which decreases revenue for both price makers and cannot be a best response.
If we decrease e11 by ε and increase e
1
2 by an amount less than ε then we are just
below breakpoint E ′ and price maker two’s revenue could increase marginally, thus
this response could not be a best response. The same argument can be made for
decreasing e22.
(4.) Since the best response to decreasing e11 or e
2
2 by a small amount ε is increasing
e12 or e
2
1 by ε, these new points are Nash equilibria.
(5.) We can continue to decrease e11 or e
2











2) is a Nash
equilibrium.

Figure 5.6 shows how a unique solution is determined in all cases. If (SB1) and (SB2)
yield identical results then we have a Pareto optimal equilibrium and are done. However,
if the results do not agree, we use Nash’s solution (see Section 5.3.1) to determine the
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Solve (SB1) and (SB2)
Do the solutions 
agree?
yesStop, equilibrium is 
Pareto optimal
Do the solutions share 
the same market-clearing 





Nash’s bargaining solution  determines the equilibrium to implement. The 
set of feasible points are the two solutions to  (SB1) and (SB2).
yes
Nash’s bargaining solution
Nash’s bargaining solution  
determines the equilibrium to 
implement.  The set of feasible points 
is the continuum between the 
solutions to (SB1) and (SB2).





Use a Bernoulli trial  with probabilities equal to the 
price maker’s hydro capacity shares to pick either the 
equilibrium from (SB1)  or (SB2)
Stop, implement 
this equilibrium
Figure 5.6: Multiple Nash equilibria flow chart
equilibrium to implement. The difficulty with this problem, in this application, is selecting
the disagreement payments, Rd1t and R
d
2t. We assume that the disagreement payoff for each
price-maker is the minimum revenue they receive if they are responding optimally. For
price-maker one this equates to solving
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Rd1t := min ψ + β1,t+1(v1,t+1,v2,t+1)
s.t. (5.2)− (5.5) for ω = 1, (5.8)− (5.12)
ψ ≥ πdkte1t −Mφkt
ψ + β1,t+1(v1,t+1,v2,t+1) ≥ γ1t(e2t,V1t,v2,t+1).
Rd1t does not have to be a Nash equilibrium because price-maker two is not responding opti-
mally to price-maker one. In other words, Rd1t is not necessarily the revenue-minimizing Nash
equilibrium for price maker-one. Rd2t is found in a parallel manner and similar arguments
can be made for it.
If Nash’s solution yields alternate optima, then we select the solution to (SB1) with






























We term this value the price maker’s hydro capacity share. In other words, we base each
price maker’s bargaining power off of the ratio of their hydro capacity to total hydro capacity.
5.4.11 Bilinear Interpolation
Both Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7 require the interpolation of both the γ(·) and β(·)
functions. To see exactly how the interpolations are created we, without loss of generality,
examine the two functions from price maker one’s point of view in any time stage t. The
interpolation for γ1t(·) is a function of E2t and V1t and is also dependent on the interpolation
of β1,t+1(·). Similarly, β1,t+1(·) is a function of vt+1 (a decision variable in γ1t(·)) and V2,t+1
(a parameter in γ1t(·)). Regardless of the formulation in which we utilize the interpolation
of γ1t(·), whether in (FP ) or (SB2), e2t is a decision variable and V1t is a parameter. This
fact preserves the linearity of our formulations, though the interpolated function (despite its
name) is not necessarily linear.
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To avoid confusion, we discuss the interpolations in even more general terms. Both γ1t(·)
and β1,t+1(·) are functions of two variables: E2t and V1t, and vt+1 and V2,t+1. In general,
we refer to a function of two variables that we want to interpolate as f(x, y). To build a
bilinear interpolation of the function f(x, y), we assume we know the values of four points
(x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1), and (x2, y2). Together, these points form a rectangular grid in the
xy space. To determine the value of the function for any point (x, y), in this grid, we first
















Interpolating in the y direction yields the function’s value at the desired point,






This results in the quadratic function
f(x, y) ≈ c1 + c2x+ c3y + c4xy,
which is nonlinear unless one of the x or y variables is not a variable, but a parameter. This
is precisely the case in our application since when we use the interpolated functions, one of
the variables is actually a parameter.
To create better approximations of our functions, we partition each 2-dimensional xy
space into smaller rectangles and create an interpolation for each. To demonstrate how we
partition each xy space and model the interpolated functions, assume we desire to partition
our xy space into four rectangles, or quadrants (see Figure 5.7). In the plot, minimum
values are underlined, while maximum values are denoted with an overhead line. We use
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binary variables and constraints to determine which of the quadrants our xy variables are in
and, in turn, which interpolating function to use. We denote the interpolating function in
quadrant (i, j) as fij(x, y), for i, j = 1, 2, and to determine which function to use, we utilize
the constraint set










α2j −M(1− α2j) ≤ x ≤ xα2j +M(1− α2j) ∀ j = 1, 2














f ≤ fij(x, y) +M(1− αij) ∀ i, j = 1, 2
f ≥ fij(x, y)−M(1− αij) ∀ i, j = 1, 2
αij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j = 1, 2.
To improve the accuracy of the interpolation, we increase the number of polygons over which
we partition the xy space and make use of a constraint set analogous to one shown above.
5.5 Computational Results
Our computational tests are performed on a standard desktop computer with an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i3 CPU @ 2.10 GHz processor, with 4GB of RAM, running on Windows 7. We
implemented the algorithms in GAMS 24.1.3 and solved the resulting MILPs using CPLEX
version 12.5.1.0.
To better illustrate the finer points of our methodology, we present three small exam-
ples and a case study modeling Honduras’ electricity market. For ease of presentation and
comprehension, in each of the examples and in the case study, we solve a static model (i.e.,
assume T=1). Each of the three illustrative examples depicts a different path in Figure 5.6.













(1, 2) (2, 2)
(2, 1)
Figure 5.7: Sample partitioning of xy space into four quadrants for interpolations
response function is only a function of the other price maker’s bids and not their own water
level. This allows us to plot the best response functions in 2-dimensions.
5.5.1 Illustrative Example 1
Assume there are two price-taker thermal producers with parameters given in Table 5.7,
and two price-maker hydro producers (each operating one reservoir) with parameters given
in Table 5.8.
Table 5.7: Example 1: Thermal parameters
j Gj Cj gj
1 300 140 300
2 120 225 120
3 150 300 100
D 520
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Table 5.8: Example 1: Hydro parameters
i V0i V i V i ρi U i Ai1
n = 1
1 0 0 400 1 151 350
n = 2
1 0 0 200 1 200 200
The joint revenue and best response functions are plotted in Figure 5.8. From the plot,
we see that there are two Nash equilibria. One is at the point (e1 = 95, e2 = 125) and
the other occurs when both hydro producers produce at capacity, or (e1 = 151, e2 = 200).
Both (SB1) and (SB2) yield the solution (e1 = 95, e2 = 125), because this Nash equilibrium
is Pareto optimal. The equilibrium is Pareto optimal because at (e1 = 95, e2 = 125),
R1(e1) = $21, 375 and R2(e2) = $28, 125, whereas at (e1 = 151, e2 = 200), R1(e1) = $21, 140
and R2(e2) = $28, 000. In this case, both hydro producers prefer (e1 = 95, e2 = 125) and our
methodology finds this solution.
5.5.2 Illustrative Example 2
Again, assume there are two price-taker thermal producers and two price-maker hydro
producers, that each operate one reservoir (parameters are given in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10).
Table 5.9: Example 2: Thermal parameters
j Gj Cj gj
1 300 140 300
2 100 225 100
3 150 300 100
D 500
The joint revenue and best response functions are plotted in Figure 5.9. From the plot
we see that there are an infinite number of Nash equilibria in the range e1 ∈ (150, 168.88),
e2 ∈ (31.12, 50) in which the cumulative production equals 200 GWh’s. Solving for a Nash












Figure 5.8: Illustrative example 1: Revenue and best response functions. On top is the joint
revenue function (Nash equilibria are depicted by dashed lines) and on bottom is a plot of
best responses for each price maker. Price maker one’s best response is black, whereas price
maker two’s best response is gray. The Pareto optimal equilibrium is marked.
166.67, e2 = 33.33) and (e1 = 150, e2 = 50). This is expected, because (SB1) maximizes
price maker one’s revenue while ensuring the solution is a Nash equilibrium, whereas (SB2)
maximizes price maker two’s revenue while ensuring the solution is a Nash equilibrium. To
obtain this solution, we approximate the gamma functions by partitioning each xy space
into thirty-six polygons. Since we are approximating the gamma functions, our solution is
not exact. The actual solution is (e1 = 168.88, e2 = 31.12) and (e1 = 150, e2 = 50).
In Nash’s bargaining solution, we maximize the excess revenue gained from reaching an
agreement. Mathematically, we solve
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Table 5.10: Example 2: Hydro parameters
i V0i V i V i ρi U i Ai1
n = 1
1 0 0 400 1 200 350
n = 2










(225e1 − 33, 750) (225e2 − 7, 000)
s.t. e1 + e2 ≤ 200
150.00 ≤ e1 ≤ 168.88
31.12 ≤ e2 ≤ 50.00.
In this formulation, Rd1 = $33, 750 and R
d
2 = $7, 000 are found as discussed in Section 5.4.10.
Since we know the optimal production occurs when e1 + e2 = 200, we know the slope of each
price-maker’s revenue function and can represent their revenue accordingly. Typically, we
would add the constraints R1(e1) ≥ Rd1 and R2(e2) ≥ Rd2, but these are redundant because
any revenue for price-maker one and two along the line at which e1 + e2 = 200, will satisfy
these constraints. Solving for Nash’s bargaining solution yields e1 = 159.44 and e2 = 40.56.
5.5.3 Illustrative Example 3
For the third example, we again assume there are two price-taker thermal producers and
two price-maker hydro producers (each operating one reservoir); however, the parameters
change slightly (see Table 5.11 and Table 5.12).
The joint revenue and best response functions are plotted in Figure 5.5. Solving (SB1)
yields production quantities e1 = 86 and e2 = 114 with revenues R1(e1) = $21, 070 and
R2(e2) = $27, 930, whereas solving (SB2) yields production quantities e1 = 150 and e2 = 200
with revenues R1(e1) = $21, 000 and R2(e2) = $28, 000. In this case, (SB1) and (SB2) yield













Figure 5.9: Illustrative example 2: Revenue and best response functions. On top is the joint
revenue function (Nash equilibria are depicted by the dashed line) and on bottom is a plot
of best responses for each price maker. Price maker one’s best response is black, whereas
price maker two’s best response is gray. The bargaining solution is marked.
Table 5.11: Example 3: Thermal parameters
j Gj Cj gj
1 300 140 300
2 100 245 100
3 150 300 100
D 500
implement we again use the solution to Nash’s bargaining problem, with Rd1 = $21, 000 and
Rd2 = $27, 930. In Nash’s solution, both feasible points (equilibria) yield the same objective
function value so we have alternate optima. To determine which solution to implement we
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Table 5.12: Example 3: Hydro parameters
i V0i V i V i ρi U i Ai1
n = 1
1 0 0 400 1 150 350
n = 2
1 0 0 200 1 200 200








57.14% = 1− ξ1.
5.5.4 Case Study
To demonstrate how the methodology can be used in a real-world example, we model
Honduras’ electricity market. We assume all of the thermal producers, with parameters given
in Table 5.13, act as price takers and that there are two price-maker hydro producers, with
parameters given in Figure 5.10 and Table 5.14. Additionally, we assume a one-stage time
horizon and utilize deterministic inflows. Run-of-the-river plants are modeled as reservoirs
with no storage, i.e., V = V = 0. Initial reservoir levels and inflows are determined based on
historical data. Last, if the price-taker thermal producers alone cannot satisfy demand, we
assume the price-maker hydro producers must at least produce enough energy to meet the
residual demand. In this case, the price-makers are penalized for not meeting the residual
demand and only earn revenue for production levels above the residual demand.
Figure 5.11 shows the joint revenue and the best response functions for each price maker.
Since our model is limited to one time stage we know the initial water levels, i.e., V1
and V2 are parameters. Consequently, the gamma (or best response) functions are only
functions of the other price maker’s total production quantities and can be plotted in two
dimensions (Figure 5.12). Solving (SB1) and (SB2) for this market yields matching solutions
of
∑
i∈I1 ei = 236.58 and
∑
i∈I2 ei = 108.78. From Figure 5.12, we observe that there is
exactly one Nash equilibrium in which both producers produce as much as possible based
157
Table 5.13: Honduras’ thermal parameters
j Name Gj Cj
1 Lufu3-210 156.24 0.075225
2 Emce2 40.92 0.080125
3 Enersa 159.96 0.081225
4 Lufussa2 57.29 0.082375
5 Elcosa 59.52 0.085275
6 Ceiba 17.86 0.091725
7 Lufussa1 29.39 0.162955
8 Puert ENE 11.90 0.253537



















Figure 5.10: Honduras’ hydro profile and parameters. El Cajon is owned and operated by
price-maker one, whereas Canaveral and Rio Lindo are owned and operated by price-maker
two. Run-of-the-river plants not included in the profile are not connected to reservoirs
[162, 215].
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Table 5.14: Honduras’ run-of-the-river hydro parameters
n i Name ρi U i Ai
1 1 El Cajon 0.39 574.25 381.78
4 Nispero 0.37 45.26 9.78
5 Nacaome 0.06 189.10 29.55
6 Esperanza 1.27 7.50 6.40
2 2 Canaveral 0.36 60.00 42.50
3 Rio Lindo 0.84 70.71 29.10
7 Cuyamapa 0.83 9.37 7.99
8 Cuyamel 0.31 18.75 34.25
9 Peq-hidro 0.52 29.30 46.98
on the water that is available to them and their turbining capacities. This is precisely the
solution that we find through solving (SB1) and (SB2).
5.6 Future Work and Extensions
We initially set out to solve this problem over the medium term, with multiple (N > 2)
price makers, and stochastic inflows. However, we quickly learned how truly difficult the
problem is and, in order to provide a thorough analysis, limited our study to one time stage
with two price makers and deterministic inflows. Consequently, natural extensions to our
methodology could be made by
• studying the problem over longer time horizons;
• including more price maker agents;
• incorporating stochastic inflows; and/or
• improving the interpolations used for the best response functions.
The first two extensions in the above list are not overly complex. Algorithm 7 is already
written for multiple time periods, it just needs to be implemented. Including more price
makers translates to adding more formulations that share the same structure with (SB1)















Figure 5.11: Honduras’ revenue and best response functions. On top is the joint revenue
function (Nash equilibrium is depicted by the dashed line) and on bottom is a plot of best
responses for each price maker. Price maker one’s best response is black, whereas price
maker two’s best response is gray.
built for, and increasing the size of the discrete space over which the (BR) formulation is
solved, to create the interpolations for the best response functions. Incorporating stochastic
inflows is a bit more involved. Since the Nash equilibrium in each stage is dependent on each
price maker’s production capacity and since each price maker’s production capacity is directly
linked to inflows, uncertainty in inflows will have a significant impact on the solution. The
focus of this paper is not on creating the most efficient and/or most accurate approximations
for the best response functions. As such, the approximations could be improved through












Figure 5.12: Best response functions
[216].
In this particular application, there are two additional areas which future research can
focus on:
• mixed strategy equilibria, and
• multi-stage disagreement payoffs in Nash’s solution to the bargaining problem.
Throughout this paper we seek a pure strategy equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium in which
each player’s strategy is selected with certainty. If we relax this assumption and allow the
players to select their strategy based on a probability distribution, then the game changes
and we seek a mixed-strategy equilibrium in each stage. Exactly what this means and how
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it changes our results could be studied in detail. Last, to determine a price-maker’s disagree-
ment payoff in a given stage, we assumed examined the problem in a static environment. In
other words, we assumed that if the players could not reach an agreement, in a given stage,
it would only impact the decision made in that stage. If this assumption is relaxed, then
each player’s bargaining power could change substantially.
5.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a method for determining the revenue-maximizing production sched-
ule for multiple price-maker hydro producers. In every stage of the problem, and for every
price maker, we seek a production quantity that maximizes their revenue while ensuring
all other price-maker producers respond optimally to their revenue-maximizing production
quantity. Since the price-maker producers submit quantity bids, the solution, in every stage,
is a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. We build interpolations for the best response functions by
solving MILPs that are based on discrete functional parameters. To ensure all other price
makers respond optimally to a given price maker’s revenue-maximizing production quantity,
we include the interpolated best response functions in the constraint set of a price maker’s
MILP.
Typically, this problem is solved via an iterative approach or via a feasibility problem.
The problem with these approaches is that they cannot detect or distinguish between multiple
equilibria. This means that a Pareto optimal equilibrium may be overlooked. Practitioners
typically are satisfied when a single Nash equilibrium is found, even in cases in which multiple
Nash equilibria exist. Our approach ensures the overall solution to the problem is either a
Pareto optimal equilibrium or a Pareto efficient equilibrium. Pareto-efficient solutions are
selected from the set of equilibria using a tailored bargaining approach. If one exists, our
method will select the equilibrium that is Pareto optimal. Iteration can be time consuming
and tedious. Our method finds a Nash equilibrium in a single-shot optimization procedure.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by presenting several illustrative examples




All models are wrong, but some are useful [217]
This dissertation answers the question “What is the revenue-maximizing production
schedule for both single and multiple price-maker hydroelectric producers in a deregulated,
bid-based market?” We propose two models, based on the number of price-maker producers
in the market. Since SDDP is a widely accepted method for modeling hydro producers, we
chose to modify it so that it can be readily applied to problems of this type. SDDP’s greatest
limitation is that it can only be applied to convex problems. Our problem is non-convex
because the FRFs are discontinuous. We address this limitation with Lagrangian relaxation
by dualizing the water balance constraints.
Contributions to the field:
• A methodology that solves the bidding problem and, thus, determines a coherent hydro
operations policy for a single price-maker hydro producer, over the medium term.
• An in-depth analysis of the single price-maker methodology, including theoretical re-
sults and cases studies.
• An extension of the stochastic dual dynamic programming algorithm.
• A dynamic programming algorithm that finds a revenue-maximizing hydro operations
policy for multiple price-maker producers, operating in a strategic bidding framework.
To ensure a comprehensive treatment, this research progressively studies increasingly
complex variations of the problem. We first study the problem for a single price-maker hydro
producer, using deterministic inflows. Next, we relax the deterministic inflow assumption,
allowing for stochastic inflows. Finally, we study the problem for multiple price-maker hydro
producers, again assuming deterministic inflows.
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6.1 Summary of Research Outcomes
The dissertation begins in Chapter 2 by presenting a detailed review of the bidding
problem and hydro producer modeling. The chapter exposes several areas of weakness in
the literature. The limited attention given to realistic portrayals of the strategic bidding
problem, over horizons lasting longer than one year, motivates the remaining chapters.
Chapter 3 presents our methodology for one price maker and deterministic inflows, specif-
ically providing a meticulous analysis of the methodology. Instead of using a convex over-
estimator to estimate the revenue in each period, we use an exact representation of the
immediate revenue function, that we model using MILP, and only overestimate the FRFs.
We term our approach dynamic convexification. The chapter examines methods that either
utilize LP relaxation or tight concave overestimators and proves their equivalence. Addi-
tionally, we document the cases in which the method is useful and demonstrate how it, in
many cases, provides better bounds than existing methods. Just as important, we show that
our methodology performs at least as well as existing methods in every case. Case studies
modeling the markets of three Central American countries illustrate the value of our ap-
proach. Chapter 4 extends the methodology to account for stochastic inflows and stagewise
dependency. It demonstrates how the approach can be used in conjunction with SDDP to
model the problem for a single price-maker hydro producer.
In Chapter 5, we propose an algorithm for finding a revenue-maximizing hydro operations
policy for multiple price-maker producers in a strategic bidding framework. The problem,
in every stage, is modeled as a non-cooperative Nash-Cournot game in which we seek a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. We find the Nash equilibrium by first creating best response
functions for each price maker using MILP formulations. We build interpolations for the
best response functions based on our solutions to the MILP formulations. Next, we use
the interpolated functions as constraints in a given price-maker’s maximum-revenue prob-
lem making certain the other price-makers’ production quantities are best responses to the
given price-maker’s maximum-revenue production quantity. Unlike existing approaches, our
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approach guarantees a Pareto-optimal equilibrium, when one exists.
6.2 Future Work
The work we present in this dissertation provides a solid foundation for price-maker
hydroelectric producer modeling in a strategic bidding framework. However, there are several
opportunities for future research. For the single price maker case, these include
• extending the methodology to allow for additional non-convex model characteristics;
and
• developing a tailored method for updating the Lagrangian multipliers.
In Chapters 3 and 5, the subgradient method we use to update the Lagrangian multipliers
yields poor computation times. These times could be drastically reduced through a tailored
multiplier updating method. Devising such a method will require a thorough understanding
of the problem and subgradient-related methods.
For the case with multiple price makers, future research could
• broaden the multiple price maker methodology so that stochastic inflows can be incor-
porated and it can be paired with SDDP;
• improve the best response function interpolations;
• study mixed-strategy equilibria in this application; and/or
• incorporate multi-stage disagreement payoffs.
The last two future research areas are significantly more complex. It is not clear what the
implications of mixed-strategy equilibria are in this application. To study mixed-strategy
equilibria, one must possess an extensive knowledge of theoretic game theory. In the case
of multiple equilibria, a more realistic bargaining solution would incorporate multi-stage
disagreement payoffs. In other words, the bargaining solution from each stage would have
ramifications over multiple stages. In our research, we aim to develop models that are
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adequately realistic and above all, useful. Our hope is that future researchers will continue
to make advances in this area.
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APPENDIX A - DATA: DEMAND AND HYDRO INFLOWS
The demand and reservoir inflow parameters used to model and solve each of our case
studies are given in Table A.1, Table A.2, Table A.3, Table A.4, Table A.5, Table A.6,
Table A.7, and Table A.8. Annual inflow scenarios are plotted in Figure A.1, Figure A.2,
and Figure A.3 for the first year of data.
Table A.1: Demand Parameters - periods 1 through 12 [GWh’s]
Country Month t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
El Salvador (2011) 521.80 476.00 543.50 518.10 562.60 532.00 549.90 534.10 519.80 540.80 524.40 529.60
Honduras (2011) 628.70 594.60 659.60 650.40 701.00 664.70 686.80 692.20 651.20 668.20 608.10 627.90
Nicaragua (2011) 305.30 282.30 326.70 312.10 325.20 300.80 309.00 312.60 296.90 305.10 300.60 302.80
Table A.2: Demand Parameters - periods 13 through 24 [GWh’s]
Country Month t
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
El Salvador (2011) 521.80 476.00 543.50 518.10 562.60 532.00 549.90 534.10 519.80 540.80 524.40 529.60
Honduras (2011) 628.70 594.60 659.60 650.40 701.00 664.70 686.80 692.20 651.20 668.20 608.10 627.90
Nicaragua (2011) 305.30 282.30 326.70 312.10 325.20 300.80 309.00 312.60 296.90 305.10 300.60 302.80
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Table A.3: El Salvador’s Inflow Parameters - periods 1 through 12 [hm3]
Scenario & Month t
Hydro Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Low
Guajoya 16.87 7.50 5.09 1.56 11.25 77.24 62.14 188.56 93.83 165.53 14.77 6.43
Cerron Grande 51.43 48.63 43.93 19.70 82.49 466.56 492.56 864.59 841.10 872.89 92.53 46.87
5 de Noviembre 60.80 65.56 49.28 25.92 103.39 548.99 570.50 1045.11 1065.31 1037.08 137.38 51.69
15 de Septiembre 173.29 187.97 90.53 92.28 280.96 956.71 1037.08 1720.07 1909.79 3675.57 221.88 120.80
Medium-Low
Guajoya 2.14 5.81 10.98 3.11 9.11 88.13 74.73 70.44 174.96 64.55 58.32 7.50
Cerron Grande 38.30 35.56 40.98 23.85 109.01 480.82 557.91 575.05 1277.86 776.74 209.17 78.74
5 de Noviembre 43.39 39.19 47.68 37.32 147.58 581.39 758.26 975.47 1782.52 1163.23 259.46 98.30
15 de Septiembre 104.73 94.11 85.17 71.28 340.96 997.92 1333.31 1702.39 3703.45 2810.98 456.97 233.82
Medium
Guajoya 9.91 6.05 1.07 2.59 16.87 80.61 122.94 87.32 254.79 103.12 22.29 19.02
Cerron Grande 47.41 46.21 33.75 38.62 94.82 420.68 608.80 546.93 1419.90 700.67 106.79 66.96
5 de Noviembre 61.60 60.48 45.53 54.43 117.85 502.85 736.56 664.24 1570.75 787.45 137.38 80.35
15 de Septiembre 156.42 164.02 87.58 153.45 398.01 973.56 1199.39 1794.53 2432.07 1218.14 227.58 212.40
Medium-High
Guajoya 9.37 3.14 8.57 17.88 21.70 81.65 90.53 161.78 319.33 249.36 46.92 17.14
Cerron Grande 57.32 27.34 30.00 77.76 122.94 491.96 678.71 1038.68 1775.26 1324.47 206.32 84.37
5 de Noviembre 61.60 29.76 32.68 111.46 216.95 585.79 763.34 1290.99 2024.35 1347.24 228.10 91.07
15 de Septiembre 115.17 70.16 61.60 142.56 353.55 1168.99 1178.50 2324.85 4256.06 2488.23 396.58 176.77
High
Guajoya 4.29 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 89.46 186.95 395.28 87.05 43.55 8.04
Cerron Grande 31.07 22.01 34.55 29.55 55.98 202.95 627.01 897.00 1758.93 537.55 147.74 78.48
5 de Noviembre 43.93 31.69 44.19 46.66 74.19 328.67 754.24 1235.01 2125.18 651.65 179.37 94.01
15 de Septiembre 93.21 64.83 110.89 154.22 238.91 709.69 2043.89 2019.78 3271.62 1605.97 317.26 158.56
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Table A.4: El Salvador’s Inflow Parameters - periods 13 through 24 [hm3]
Scenario & Month t
Hydro Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Low
Guajoya 2.41 9.19 2.14 0.78 9.11 22.81 41.25 75.53 202.69 47.94 18.66 15.27
Cerron Grande 45.53 46.69 23.84 33.18 95.89 335.92 373.10 1082.61 882.32 615.23 98.50 30.53
5 de Noviembre 55.71 55.64 31.07 46.92 132.31 369.10 438.19 1228.85 1068.16 711.92 106.53 33.21
15 de Septiembre 101.78 97.25 65.35 96.16 218.56 602.90 964.76 2881.42 1843.17 1261.53 238.20 61.60
Medium-Low
Guajoya 6.16 3.63 1.07 0.26 15.27 72.32 43.39 27.05 116.12 43.66 16.59 10.18
Cerron Grande 55.18 38.95 20.36 13.74 154.28 362.10 380.87 721.83 1179.36 478.63 73.35 78.48
5 de Noviembre 70.71 43.06 25.98 17.11 226.32 508.03 456.40 962.35 1417.05 702.54 82.94 92.67
15 de Septiembre 132.85 80.32 102.05 40.18 441.13 877.91 877.44 1275.19 2413.15 1549.45 186.88 175.70
Medium
Guajoya 16.34 7.02 5.36 2.85 31.07 109.64 115.17 111.69 81.65 93.21 22.03 5.09
Cerron Grande 56.25 40.88 32.41 44.06 146.51 427.68 290.87 928.60 463.71 483.45 94.87 40.18
5 de Noviembre 72.32 53.22 42.85 49.25 182.13 515.81 324.09 1151.71 565.06 640.14 121.82 50.89
15 de Septiembre 185.08 140.31 74.73 111.97 290.61 1145.15 643.35 1576.77 1158.11 1331.43 292.64 110.35
Medium-High
Guajoya 27.86 20.81 13.66 10.37 60.26 95.13 155.88 55.44 268.79 85.44 37.07 16.34
Cerron Grande 66.96 57.09 36.43 37.32 348.73 740.53 1040.29 554.43 1543.54 598.35 162.52 109.55
5 de Noviembre 72.32 62.90 64.28 64.80 487.47 987.55 1242.78 650.85 1775.52 691.03 209.95 152.67
15 de Septiembre 131.24 89.51 91.07 98.50 891.91 1936.22 2006.12 1074.04 3403.30 1740.96 655.78 216.95
High
Guajoya 13.66 4.11 3.75 32.66 36.43 119.23 190.43 176.24 376.36 170.08 45.88 28.12
Cerron Grande 48.21 38.95 22.77 80.35 193.92 503.63 910.66 967.17 821.15 549.88 191.55 143.56
5 de Noviembre 60.80 49.35 33.21 102.12 272.13 685.58 1227.78 1176.62 981.07 645.23 236.65 181.60
15 de Septiembre 111.42 100.64 99.64 225.24 592.73 1472.00 1736.14 1740.42 1867.80 1231.53 537.84 300.25
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Figure A.1: Annual inflows for El Salvador (first year)
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Table A.5: Honduras’ Inflow Parameters - periods 1 through 12 [hm3]
Scenario & Month t
Hydro Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Low
El Cajon 76.90 71.47 65.64 115.28 68.67 318.61 23.28 128.94 1047.80 927.72 329.41 200.94
Canaveral 19.04 4.77 6.85 4.78 28.94 65.77 54.70 66.24 115.86 91.60 43.16 15.47
Rio Lindo 24.09 16.83 14.46 7.16 46.87 51.29 23.08 97.63 73.63 81.77 39.34 22.09
Nispero 9.33 6.54 3.97 3.84 3.80 12.15 17.39 30.84 40.52 51.03 22.05 18.96
Nacaome 1.74 1.32 0.48 6.44 76.83 142.19 57.00 47.79 461.02 17.95 5.36 5.04
Esperanza 2.07 1.70 1.37 1.14 7.02 14.41 13.04 10.63 13.57 15.58 5.84 4.66
Cuyamapa 2.55 2.25 2.00 1.36 1.55 0.93 9.50 9.64 6.23 7.89 5.30 7.21
Cuyamel 21.96 10.57 11.10 7.59 5.24 5.75 15.45 19.29 29.82 35.53 40.23 8.39
Peq-hidro 31.02 28.94 20.07 11.70 16.49 20.02 15.11 41.87 58.57 40.18 24.21 17.95
Medium-Low
El Cajon 44.89 34.70 28.17 57.11 182.91 655.36 638.11 625.41 814.92 1010.52 327.59 160.41
Canaveral 12.44 10.64 11.08 3.03 44.75 76.82 66.89 63.98 81.69 68.82 38.32 26.00
Rio Lindo 16.77 12.70 10.14 11.19 50.17 89.80 124.52 115.74 128.25 98.44 51.01 28.90
Nispero 6.79 2.45 3.71 3.23 2.96 10.77 9.18 25.22 33.91 42.41 7.09 12.84
Nacaome 0.88 0.84 0.21 2.25 42.15 228.53 37.41 50.28 234.89 375.48 94.16 4.20
Esperanza 0.96 1.08 0.87 1.93 9.32 16.44 12.06 13.12 15.57 15.34 4.12 2.95
Cuyamapa 2.41 1.92 1.05 0.84 1.11 7.31 7.17 3.51 5.68 9.02 7.89 5.38
Cuyamel 16.78 11.51 8.42 4.27 4.56 1.73 11.72 3.60 12.99 14.96 39.75 12.55
Peq-hidro 5.13 21.20 17.77 11.86 10.65 16.96 32.62 53.62 36.88 46.68 30.97 41.37
Medium
El Cajon 57.31 45.58 14.86 19.80 68.13 556.42 608.32 764.05 1317.27 943.49 646.95 216.98
Canaveral 11.72 7.63 6.10 6.82 24.70 83.14 100.30 97.09 71.37 82.09 24.79 23.55
Rio Lindo 16.19 8.89 13.83 11.43 46.43 89.94 41.11 96.04 114.65 96.46 37.18 36.05
Nispero 6.39 6.42 4.62 4.36 2.86 30.34 27.15 36.93 39.94 55.74 25.53 18.77
Nacaome 1.43 1.14 1.93 2.86 117.19 174.28 83.71 153.67 496.05 29.30 51.54 12.16
Esperanza 1.60 1.25 1.75 1.71 6.25 16.07 10.73 14.01 14.98 11.04 5.65 3.92
Cuyamapa 1.87 1.53 1.45 1.11 1.49 9.27 11.80 14.36 19.04 22.27 7.26 5.02
Cuyamel 20.40 14.07 14.03 7.17 5.18 1.76 11.72 17.75 7.69 11.81 28.39 12.54
Peq-hidro 12.94 13.33 18.30 21.61 26.53 18.33 18.86 3.11 3.58 15.04 39.75 38.56
Medium-High
El Cajon 77.77 31.99 21.74 4.89 139.19 894.67 700.97 867.95 1191.17 1147.28 612.49 227.88
Canaveral 17.34 12.77 2.52 17.13 27.53 71.48 44.51 80.68 124.45 113.83 28.00 24.63
Rio Lindo 22.21 14.97 3.53 24.66 22.23 70.02 76.49 118.17 118.79 79.47 60.65 27.73
Nispero 5.87 5.98 6.45 4.96 3.27 32.80 25.38 26.51 46.98 54.21 9.90 14.47
Nacaome 2.17 3.04 2.63 2.71 139.28 214.41 10.20 49.58 541.34 457.71 53.93 4.42
Esperanza 2.12 1.90 2.54 2.45 7.13 14.23 10.35 13.04 15.32 7.79 3.81 3.94
Cuyamapa 2.18 1.24 1.30 0.78 1.00 11.41 7.86 8.10 7.63 14.48 8.62 4.11
Cuyamel 25.14 11.79 11.99 4.57 5.20 5.14 9.75 9.65 17.96 12.53 77.60 16.22
Peq-hidro 14.09 15.05 21.33 11.04 9.92 15.58 22.34 30.51 17.41 37.68 35.60 24.79
High
El Cajon 18.91 3.75 13.22 12.47 161.18 904.76 631.41 1095.78 1621.80 1483.81 381.79 206.84
Canaveral 0.67 7.49 6.75 4.65 30.35 72.31 66.14 94.97 70.59 68.17 42.50 28.41
Rio Lindo 4.28 7.14 9.67 6.24 36.52 98.41 127.31 107.21 122.64 83.90 29.11 22.86
Nispero 2.87 5.06 2.90 2.70 3.06 35.29 32.53 47.07 53.96 53.74 9.78 13.19
Nacaome 0.45 1.87 0.83 2.17 6.55 255.92 73.59 159.59 469.28 365.41 29.55 3.95
Esperanza 1.10 1.51 0.70 1.94 11.37 13.98 10.02 10.62 13.99 13.35 6.40 3.89
Cuyamapa 1.42 1.89 0.90 0.78 0.94 7.91 7.62 5.40 26.74 13.33 7.99 5.95
Cuyamel 11.03 7.13 11.00 10.41 5.88 4.66 8.14 18.21 19.41 11.18 34.25 27.13
Peq-hidro 3.94 14.81 24.87 15.37 13.80 19.09 21.88 43.13 65.08 61.19 46.98 44.51
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Table A.6: Honduras’ Inflow Parameters - periods 13 through 24 [hm3]
Scenario & Month t
Hydro Plant 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Low
El Cajon 98.59 70.58 50.62 46.88 18.45 491.55 239.00 281.41 1156.94 1524.11 849.89 266.84
Canaveral 11.20 8.15 0.36 0.53 32.75 71.59 62.34 85.75 123.06 83.88 46.97 42.92
Rio Lindo 26.31 18.10 14.89 13.73 25.00 64.97 59.79 83.38 82.82 96.11 51.06 49.42
Nispero 14.82 6.90 5.83 6.26 3.43 4.79 15.85 27.02 36.73 44.37 14.06 18.57
Nacaome 3.77 3.43 1.91 5.28 138.77 306.13 47.73 129.35 411.47 340.59 114.23 15.79
Esperanza 2.84 2.14 1.98 2.53 10.62 16.80 10.95 4.10 14.31 12.76 5.86 4.00
Cuyamapa 2.60 1.99 1.11 0.79 0.96 3.60 13.72 16.20 19.10 8.26 6.41 5.18
Cuyamel 26.64 14.32 7.34 4.31 4.50 6.09 11.99 15.97 0.57 21.43 32.74 19.28
Peq-hidro 21.48 23.62 22.55 21.15 21.74 26.55 43.68 18.97 37.98 30.85 33.31 36.47
Medium-Low
El Cajon 130.22 70.08 26.07 39.28 120.54 378.31 496.95 891.38 917.66 839.29 507.63 214.76
Canaveral 12.74 6.56 10.43 9.05 22.20 70.44 97.34 36.08 80.71 68.76 40.43 33.86
Rio Lindo 25.95 8.23 11.72 6.06 38.85 87.09 91.00 63.75 83.35 89.68 50.77 34.43
Nispero 11.96 5.16 3.27 2.24 2.77 5.98 10.28 26.25 31.53 42.70 15.74 11.00
Nacaome 3.58 3.09 3.16 3.38 144.97 455.53 121.08 269.64 503.83 518.01 69.31 17.52
Esperanza 2.21 1.31 1.79 1.93 7.22 12.03 11.63 15.63 16.38 12.44 5.42 3.61
Cuyamapa 1.59 0.93 1.04 0.46 0.21 4.10 7.44 7.02 18.46 13.50 8.23 5.33
Cuyamel 13.02 6.88 11.03 5.96 9.24 6.84 15.03 14.91 10.68 32.31 50.30 17.03
Peq-hidro 42.84 21.91 29.34 18.21 16.99 2.13 7.54 37.56 71.94 37.92 40.64 40.79
Medium
El Cajon 106.19 78.89 70.67 67.95 22.28 291.65 388.60 387.15 337.69 1020.01 639.84 144.81
Canaveral 7.64 0.19 8.07 8.18 38.39 87.17 145.18 99.03 115.01 76.75 39.55 11.27
Rio Lindo 18.31 13.38 13.18 12.78 24.22 75.65 85.28 79.94 116.13 83.57 57.77 35.92
Nispero 15.43 7.27 7.45 1.47 3.14 35.79 43.49 44.25 40.80 51.92 24.44 13.89
Nacaome 4.97 3.37 3.27 7.62 158.64 295.69 78.45 147.57 206.18 390.34 30.37 0.54
Esperanza 2.70 1.46 1.84 2.12 7.74 10.70 12.32 16.64 15.87 13.23 5.12 2.96
Cuyamapa 2.89 2.09 1.78 0.96 0.77 6.78 9.83 10.27 5.94 18.93 10.59 5.65
Cuyamel 27.16 14.79 9.54 7.47 5.96 5.32 7.89 7.96 12.29 10.72 39.25 9.12
Peq-hidro 40.88 29.31 30.99 16.45 16.70 22.42 36.64 20.37 26.18 35.74 38.43 49.42
Medium-High
El Cajon 155.42 110.96 77.92 85.81 262.04 672.01 413.67 831.38 1364.45 1012.47 387.00 236.76
Canaveral 19.14 11.35 2.22 6.25 31.77 89.10 135.06 117.92 118.47 76.96 24.63 26.22
Rio Lindo 25.98 14.61 9.88 16.90 40.35 95.05 111.34 95.45 94.80 88.32 44.46 33.83
Nispero 15.43 4.07 4.96 5.90 2.41 29.38 35.94 39.54 53.69 54.89 36.19 15.03
Nacaome 5.07 4.58 3.22 2.89 99.68 59.74 30.42 55.73 388.81 394.13 95.10 4.86
Esperanza 3.20 0.96 1.85 1.86 7.43 10.60 9.31 7.40 12.82 15.85 5.34 3.60
Cuyamapa 1.99 1.36 1.39 1.17 0.99 9.88 9.61 9.73 14.83 16.77 8.99 6.67
Cuyamel 18.34 9.94 9.58 8.06 5.95 5.53 12.46 13.69 19.71 10.57 11.55 13.07
Peq-hidro 30.42 19.59 29.11 22.98 24.92 30.23 43.69 64.74 45.57 34.91 21.90 28.68
High
El Cajon 143.89 67.66 37.78 54.69 219.93 960.97 786.29 1205.25 1096.45 1023.74 467.11 125.35
Canaveral 13.87 8.49 10.20 16.38 25.01 79.56 67.37 24.50 44.56 172.50 41.70 11.83
Rio Lindo 9.75 6.08 13.49 9.62 33.31 52.78 75.42 90.99 64.95 94.72 58.07 36.00
Nispero 1.78 3.78 4.93 2.94 2.83 34.36 26.33 33.01 34.20 40.48 15.30 15.94
Nacaome 2.89 2.45 2.84 2.62 10.31 51.18 63.40 197.93 327.52 374.27 57.64 15.15
Esperanza 1.75 1.98 2.02 2.46 2.55 10.48 7.36 6.27 11.37 16.09 4.88 4.09
Cuyamapa 5.00 2.19 1.60 0.87 0.81 10.45 7.21 5.46 7.76 14.08 5.78 5.34
Cuyamel 15.48 10.77 13.94 6.25 8.87 5.99 5.15 16.80 24.17 13.12 48.15 11.51
Peq-hidro 16.63 27.78 27.68 20.37 20.71 30.51 36.61 14.94 11.61 49.48 28.90 22.27
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Figure A.2: Annual inflows for Honduras (first year)
Table A.7: Nicaragua’s Inflow Parameters - periods 1 through 12 [hm3]
Scenario & Month t
Hydro Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Low
C. America 8.40 5.52 2.54 1.48 9.92 32.50 35.11 63.61 60.82 68.45 23.64 12.72
S. Barbara 12.21 9.19 4.33 4.19 11.45 47.28 49.36 52.67 107.61 122.14 20.68 22.39
Medium-Low
C. America 8.84 5.81 2.68 1.56 10.45 34.21 36.96 66.96 64.02 72.05 24.88 13.39
S. Barbara 12.86 9.68 4.55 4.41 12.05 49.77 51.96 55.44 113.27 128.56 21.77 23.57
Medium
C. America 15.27 8.95 3.21 2.85 4.55 30.84 32.68 47.14 91.50 112.22 22.55 17.41
S. Barbara 17.68 10.64 5.09 4.41 5.62 32.14 33.75 48.48 100.57 137.67 25.66 19.55
Medium-High
C. America 16.03 9.40 3.37 2.99 4.78 32.39 34.31 49.50 96.07 117.84 23.68 18.28
S. Barbara 18.56 11.18 5.34 4.63 5.91 33.75 35.44 50.90 105.60 144.55 26.94 20.53
High
C. America 8.57 4.35 1.61 7.78 11.78 47.95 68.57 88.66 67.39 55.98 71.80 30.00
S. Barbara 10.18 5.56 2.41 8.81 13.39 53.40 71.25 91.60 79.57 74.19 75.43 32.94
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Table A.8: Nicaragua’s Inflow Parameters - periods 13 through 24 [hm3]
Scenario & Month t
Hydro Plant 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Low
C. America 15.27 6.89 3.56 2.22 9.41 41.86 53.69 34.10 44.82 46.06 27.83 15.52
S. Barbara 17.30 7.58 4.58 3.69 3.56 24.38 48.09 45.80 52.20 117.55 30.29 18.57
Medium-Low
C. America 16.07 7.26 3.75 2.33 9.91 44.06 56.51 35.89 47.17 48.48 29.29 16.34
S. Barbara 18.21 7.98 4.82 3.89 3.75 25.66 50.62 48.21 54.95 123.74 31.88 19.55
Medium
C. America 22.50 5.81 3.75 2.59 10.98 13.74 40.44 56.51 50.80 38.84 36.03 23.57
S. Barbara 16.61 8.71 5.62 6.48 9.37 46.40 44.46 64.28 31.36 21.70 25.40 18.48
Medium-High
C. America 23.62 6.10 3.94 2.72 11.53 14.42 42.47 59.34 53.34 40.78 37.83 24.75
S. Barbara 17.44 9.14 5.91 6.80 9.84 48.72 46.68 67.50 32.93 22.78 26.67 19.41
High
C. America 11.78 3.63 3.21 2.85 26.25 64.02 61.34 72.32 103.68 161.51 59.88 24.37
S. Barbara 14.20 5.32 5.09 4.15 35.09 78.28 64.28 75.80 110.94 197.13 65.58 27.59














































Figure A.3: Annual inflows for Nicaragua (first year)
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